In a quantitative content analysis of textbooks, including junior high and high school civics books from the 1970s and 1980s, empirical support for the preferred status of the formal element in the school curriculum was indicated by a significant disparity in favour of the procedural component over any other. Figure 3.1 is based on Ichilov’s analysis, and demonstrates that political structures and procedures represented 31 per cent of the subject matter of these books, while the Arab–Israeliconflict took up 21.2 per cent, social problems 20 per cent and
as the EEC refused to cede to American demands that a higher degree of linkage
between economic and political matters should be implemented. When the
EEC sought a separate policy initiative towards the Arab–Israeliconflict which
directly contradicted US policy at the end of 1973, it was with some justification that US policy-makers lamented the expansion of the EEC.
It was Kissinger’s ‘Year of Europe’, however, that sparked considerable US–
UK disagreement. The ‘Year of Europe’ initially illustrated procedural problems
for US–UK interaction now that
East had often clashed since the beginning of the Cold War. With Heath coming to office this only continued, and his
ambition of resolving the Arab–Israeliconflict caused further US–UK disagreement. Heath had signalled his intention to find a resolution to the Arab–Israeliconflict soon after assuming office and this solution, as Douglas-Home publicly
declared in October 1970 during a speech at Harrogate, would be based on the
general contours of UN Resolution 242. Briefly summarised, this meant that
Israel would have to surrender the land it had occupied following
: A Political History Since World War I
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), p. 74.
Letters and declarations
43 Quoted in Edward Said, The Question of Palestine (New York: Random House,
2003), p. 13.
44 David Ben Gurion, Memoirs (New York: World, 1970), p. 26.
45 W. T. Mallison, Jr., ‘The Balfour Declaration: An Appraisal in International Law’, in
Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (ed.), The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and
Development of the Arab-IsraeliConflict (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1971), p. 98.
46 See www
that Rogers would have had a major role to play in US foreign policy-making
but in reality he had limited influence upon significant aspects of US foreign
policy. The institutional changes to the Washington bureaucracy ensured
that the State Department’s influence was curtailed, and Nixon’s disdain for
the department meant he had little time for it anyhow. As such, Rogers’ main
area of concern was with trying to resolve the Arab–Israeliconflict. Even this
had only been given to Rogers largely because of Nixon’s belief that Kissinger’s
brings Greece and Turkey into
military confrontation unhinging NATO’s southern flank; because Cyprus’s
crises are invariably raised in the Security Council; and because such crises
have the potential to complicate our evolving relations with the Soviets and
affect the atmosphere in which the United States and the Soviet Union deal
with the Arab/Israeliconflict.61
A second WSAG was convened on 16 July 1974 and again – despite the uncertainty regarding the details of the coup – the clear consensus was that the US
had to prevent Soviet intervention.62 The British idea
terrorists, who in June 1996 bombed the American base in Daharan, killing nineteen soldiers and wounding hundreds of others. Egypt, one of the United States’ closest allies was not only increasingly critical of Washington’s policies on the Arab-Israeliconflict, but also drawing closer to Libya, one of the United Sates regional bâte noirs . Even Israel, perhaps the United States’ staunchest Middle East ally, appeared, following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and election of the right-wing Benyamin Netanyahu to the post of Prime Minister, set on giving Washington a