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Jonathan Colman

The period August 1966–September 1967 saw a decline in Wilson’s commitment to President Johnson and to the United States, both personally and in the wider context of British foreign policy. In February 1967, the Prime Minister tried to use the visit to London of the Russian leader Alexei Kosygin to bring Hanoi and Washington to the negotiating table over Vietnam. Wilson was sincere – if over

in A ‘special relationship’?
Open Access (free)
Harold Wilson and Lyndon B. Johnson: a ‘special relationship’?
Jonathan Colman

. Gordon Walker, Stewart and Brown all supported the idea of close ties between Britain and the United States, but Wilson’s input was such that, as Richard Crossman commented, British foreign policy was characterised above all by the ‘peculiarly Wilsonian touch’ of a ‘personal reliance on LBJ’. 27 The Foreign Office backed up Wilson’s support for the continued close relationship with Washington and for the British ‘great power

in A ‘special relationship’?
Open Access (free)
Jonathan Colman

analysis noted that Britain’s standing in the United States depended ultimately on ‘our practical contribution to the Western Alliance rather than on any particular feeling of United Kingdom/United States interdependence’. 48 It was commented in 1964 that the ‘alliance with the United States’ was ‘the most important single factor’ in British foreign policy: ‘As much the weaker partner, dependent on overseas trade and with world

in A ‘special relationship’?
Peter D.G. Thomas

service. This strategy sufficed to maintain British naval supremacy, since all Choiseul’s efforts to rebuild the French navy foundered on lack of materials, manpower, and money, and so did the Spanish attempt. At the time of the Falkland Islands Crisis of 1770 some eighty British ships were soon fit for action, and there was every confidence Britain could defeat the combined enemy fleets.33 If the conduct of British foreign policy posed more problems than could be anticipated in 1760, the attention of both government and Parliament was increasingly taken up by imperial

in George III
The Stamp Act Crisis
Peter D.G. Thomas

, Macartney in Russia, pp. 13–33. Scott, British Foreign Policy, pp. 95–7. 15 Escott, Thesis, pp. 66–100. Scott, British Foreign Policy, pp. 91–5. 16 Powell, Thesis, p. 110. 17 Walpole, Memoirs, II, 144–5. 18 Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, pp. 132–6. 19 Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, pp. 137–8. This view is confirmed by Lord Hardwicke’s later comment. BL Add. MSS. 35428, fo. 22. For a more literal interpretation, see Langford, First Rockingham Administration, pp. 80–2. 20 Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis, pp. 138

in George III
Jonathan Colman

relations between the Labour government and the United States, characterised above all by Wilson’s determination to secure his ties with the White House, in keeping with his personal inclinations and his view that close cooperation with Washington was fundamental to British foreign policy. The Labour victory President Johnson had never feared a Labour victory in Britain, but he felt it necessary to ease any

in A ‘special relationship’?
Wilkes and America
Peter D.G. Thomas

Austria would adhere to her French alliance was not seen as a final rebuff, merely as a postponement of hopes cherished by many in Britain. Unrealistic as the main thrust of British foreign policy may have been, under Grenville it was nevertheless a success. Quite apart from the 1765 coup in Sweden, which was to prove short-lived in the face of French countermeasures, the Premier himself, continuing his hardline attitude already evident during the Bute ministry, resorted to what in the next century came to be known as ‘gunboat diplomacy’. Still resentful about the

in George III
India and America
Peter D.G. Thomas

settlement there without further orders. A Falkland Islands crisis was postponed only by Spanish failure to find the British base before this dispute was in 1768 temporarily overshadowed on the international scene by the Corsica question and the outbreak of a Russo-Turkish war.29 The failure of British foreign policy during the Chatham ministry can be ascribed to internal factors as well as the unfavourable international scene, the distractions of party politics at home and the need to devise measures for India and America. Yet when the new Parliamentary session began in

in George III
Sweden and the lesser powers in the long eighteenth century
Erik Bodensten

Press, 1969); Michael Roberts, Splendid Isolation, 1763–1780: The Stenton Lecture 1969 (Reading: University of Reading, 1970); Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, pp. 135–162; Jeremy Black, A System of Ambition? British Foreign Policy 1660–1793 (Harlow: Longman, 1991), pp. 204ff; Wilson, ‘The German’, 786–787; Wilson, German Armies, pp. 311–312, 326; Scott, The Birth, pp. 146–147. Sweden received very substantial British subsidies in 1805–1816; Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser, pp. 594, 852–856; Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, pp. 366–368, passim; Jan Glete, ‘The

in Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation in Europe, 1494–1789
Political re-alignments
Peter D.G. Thomas

, 114–16. BL Add. MSS. 32978, fos 235–41. BL Add. MSS. 32988, fo. 49. Lawson, George Grenville, pp. 258–69. O’Gorman, Rise of Party, pp. 220–8. BL Add. MSS. 32990, fo. 57. BL Add. MSS. 32990, fo. 107. Thomas, John Wilkes, pp. 68–76. Thomas, John Wilkes, pp. 76–86. Walpole, Memoirs, III, 146. Legg, British Diplomatic Instructions, pp. 101–5. Corr. of George III, II, 44. For a detailed examination of the Corsica question see Escott, Thesis, pp. 134–218. Scott, British Foreign Policy, pp. 112–24. Thomas, Townshend Duties Crisis, pp. 76–8. Thomas, Townshend Duties Crisis

in George III