the western system of security governance into Eurasia delegitimise it? Will
the heterogeneity of the states occupying the geopolitical space of ‘Eurasia’
push all states towards a renewed embrace of the sovereignty norm and the
system of alliances it inevitably engenders?
These questions are important because the evolution of international
politics in Eurasia is not peripheral to Europeansecurity and is central to the
successful expansion of the Atlantic security community into eastern
Europe, including the Russian Federation. The postwar security order
recognise that EU and NATO decisions are not
separable as the two institutions best equipped to serve as primary guarantors of the new Europeansecurity order.18 To achieve this goal, each institution should also reach out to European states that already belong to the
other. Thus, by 2005–7, most European members of an enlarged NATO are
likely to be in the EU, while most members of an enlarged EU will probably
have joined NATO, thus extending the boundaries of a Greater Europe to the
Baltic region, central Europe and Slovenia. By that time, too, the reorganisation of a
, the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP), the EuropeanSecurity and Defence Policy (ESDP), the attempts to
reform NATO through the EuropeanSecurity and Defence Identity (ESDI),
the negotiations with prospective new EU members in central and eastern
Europe, along with the struggle to recast the EU’s constitution. In effect, the
EU seems determined to make itself the dominant institution in the new panEurope.3 Europe’s big ambitions leave it rather vulnerable. Completing the
European Union on a pan-European scale will require, at the very least, a
long period of
Joseph Kruzel, deputy assistant
secretary of defence for Europe and NATO, and General John Shalikashvili,
chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, who had served previously as NATO
supreme allied commander of Europe. Though the initial demand for PfP
reflected a desire to provide a short-term alternative to expanding NATO’s
membership, the concept eventually evolved so that it truly changed early
post-Cold War thinking about multilateral Europeansecurity cooperation.
At its core, the PfP is premised on a belief that the more civilian strategists
and military operators
. When combined with the ‘human dimension’ that
infuses all of the OSCE’s work, this conflict-prevention capacity constitutes
the special contribution that only the OSCE brings to the Europeansecurity
‘architecture’. This is an especially important function that needs to be
nurtured and strengthened with the active support of the OSCE’s largest,
wealthiest and most powerful participating states, especially the United
The special role of the OSCE
In the field of medicine, the principle that ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a
pound of cure’ has long been
Future of Security and Development, 4 (New York: St Martin’s
Press in association with UNU/WIDER, 2000), pp. 26–50.
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation
37 Assembly of the WEU, Parliamentary Cooperation, p. 4.
38 Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework for
Analysis’, Review of International Studies, 21:4 (1995), pp. 359–87, esp. p. 378.
39 Buzan, ‘Logic of regional security’, p. 21.
40 ‘Charter for EuropeanSecurity’ (Istanbul: OSCE, November 1999), para. 13. For
the OSCE’s role in this context