. Donilon, ‘The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013’, Asia Society (11 March 2013), https://asiasociety.org/new-york/complete-transcript-thomas-donilon-asia-society-new-york , accessed 10 March 2019; White House, ‘Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice’ (21 November 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/21/remarks-prepared-delivery-national-security-advisor-susan-e-rice , accessed 11 March 2019.
23 In Japan, HenryKissinger is synonymous with the “Nixon Shock” of 1972 when the United States
from the 1973 war and the oil embargo out of the weakness to be acclaimed as a ‘hero of peace’. He personalised relations between states, naively convinced that his embrace of American leaders, including his ‘friend Henry’ (Kissinger), would be enough to change America’s pro-Israeli policy. His eagerness to jettison Soviet support and rely totally on American diplomacy was an eccentrically personal choice that appalled his professional foreign policy advisors. To Sadat, the Russians were ‘crude and tasteless people’ while Egypt’s alienation from the US was unnatural
(2000/01), pp. 128–61, esp. p. 159; and Gideon Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and
Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, 51:1 (1998), pp. 144–72.
Mark Kramer, ‘Neorealism, Nuclear Proliferation, and East-Central European
Strategies’, in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds), Unipolar Politics:
Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University
Institutions of security governance
Press, 1999), pp. 428, 437–8, 462.
15 For a survey of assessments of the PfP, see Henry
them. To get even small Israeli concessions, such as acceptance of the Rogers Plan, the US had to pledge ever more support to Israel (Walt 1987: 108–10). Israel’s arms dependency gave the US little leverage over it owing to the Israelis’ penetration of US domestic politics and a tacit threat to escalate the conflict or even to ‘go nuclear’ if the US abandoned them (Evron 1973: 178–80). President Nixon and his Secretary of State, HenryKissinger, developed a strategy that would make a virtue of Washington’s weak leverage over Israel: by keeping Israel too strong to be
of these origins. Thereafter, commonly experienced systemic forces seemed to divert them on to the same road toward moderation. They shared the defeat of 1967 and the rise to power, in reaction, of newly ‘pragmatic’ leaders – Sadat and Asad – in 1970. Both initiated limited liberalisation at home and inter-Arab détente abroad. Together they launched the October 1973 war and together they started on the path of post-war negotiations with Israel. Together – and only together – they might have reached a comprehensive Middle East peace for, as HenryKissinger remarked