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Maja Zehfuss

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on 22 April 1999, in Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bulletin , no. 19, 23 April 1999, p. 193. 80 ‘The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept’, agreed at the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7–8 November 1991, section 15, available online: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c911107a

in Mapping European security after Kosovo
Open Access (free)
Paul Latawski and Martin A. Smith

, rather, is to examine and assess the impact of the Kosovo crisis on the continuing evolution and development of key issues relating to post-Cold War European security overall. In measuring this impact the discussions begin, logically, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This was the chosen instrument through which its member states sought to achieve their objective of compelling the government of President

in The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security
Paul Latawski and Martin A. Smith

NAC-S(99)64) . Website reference www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm; The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (Press Release NAC-S(99)65) . Website reference www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm . 97 The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures (Brussels, NATO, 1989), p. 377. 98 N. Butler, ‘NATO at 50

in The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security
Paul Latawski and Martin A. Smith

). 8 Quotations taken from the text of the treaty reprinted in The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures (Brussels, NATO, 1989), p. 376. 9 The presence of non-democracies in NATO’s ranks remained a bone of contention. See ‘Heirs of Pericles’ in ‘Knights in shining armour? – A survey of NATO

in The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security
The evolving European security architecture
Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, Michael J. Tsinisizelis, Stelios Stavridis, and Kostas Ifantis

This chapter discusses the institutions that are considered central in the debate on European security, namely the Union, the Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Western European Union. It examines the interrelationship between these institutions, and deals with European integration using the perspective of security and foreign policy. The chapter then addresses the issue of the Union's role in a post-Cold War world, as well as the institutional responses to the geostrategic and geopolitical challenges of system change in the fields of European defence, foreign policy and security. Finally, it studies European ‘security architecture’ and identifies what the Union is in terms of its international behaviour.

in Theory and reform in the European Union
Iver B. Neumann

The Weberian principle of the state as possessing a legitimate monopoly on violence is fading. Sovereigns no longer hold this monopoly; it now belongs to the international community. This chapter investigates the effects of this fading of legitimacy. Expanding on a framework suggested by the Copenhagen School of international relations, the chapter argues that the Kosovo war is a crucial part of two on-going shifts. In Kosovo, the states going to war as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Alliance represented themselves as 'humanity', the implication being that Serbia was cast as an enemy not only of human rights but of humanity. The Kosovo war defines the epoch exactly because it focused on the simultaneously existing conflict lines upon which politics is constituted. Serbia's attempts to legitimise its stance as a warring state defending the idea of state sovereignty was represented as an anachronism.

in Mapping European security after Kosovo
Open Access (free)
Virtuousness, virtuality and virtuosity in NATO’s representation of the Kosovo campaign
Andreas Behnke

Jean Baudrillard's diagnosis of the Gulf War applies to the expression of organised violence in contemporary politics. This chapter describes that Kosovo campaign lends evidence to the suspicion that war as such no longer 'takes place', but that it has transmogrified into a different game with a different logic. As Paul Patton argues in his Introduction to Baudrillard's The Gulf War, virtual war, the war over truth rather than territory, is an integral part of modern warfare. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has conducted an epistemic war to secure its privileged moral status, fighting against the systemic anarchy of the international system, the inherent ambivalence and undecidability that necessitates and demands the political designation of identity. The chapter analyses NATO's virtuoso campaign to virtualise Operation Allied Force in order to represent itself as the virtuous actor in the messy reality of war.

in Mapping European security after Kosovo
Open Access (free)
Reflections in a distorting mirror
Christoph Zürcher

This chapter presents an anatomical comparison of the conflicts in Chechnya and Kosovo, emphasising the remarkable similarity between the two. It focuses on to the responses of Russia and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to the respective Chechen and Kosovo problems. The chapter discusses rationales and motives can, in the absence of any convincing Realist interests, best explain NATO's and Russia's decision to go to war. It shows how Chechnya and Kosovo are linked, both by Realpolitik and, perhaps more directly, by each being the focal point of an on-going war of interpretation. The outcome of each of these wars of interpretation may influence the European security landscape more than the 'hot war' in Kosovo. Both the Chechen and the Kosovo conflict are essentially a by-product of the breakdown of the Soviet and Yugoslav ethno-federations.

in Mapping European security after Kosovo
Democratisation, nationalism and security in former Yugoslavia
Paul Latawski and Martin A. Smith

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has taken a prominent security role in international attempts to make work the political settlements in Bosnia, Kosovo and, to a lesser extent, Macedonia. Just as NATO's ‘humanitarian intervention’ over Kosovo highlighted the normative tension between the doctrine of non-intervention in sovereign states versus efforts to promote respect for human rights that transcend state boundaries, the subsequent efforts at peace-building have revealed other normative conundrums. For NATO and other international institutions, this has made South East Europe a normative labyrinth where democracy, ‘stateness’, identity and security are difficult to bring together. This chapter examines the international attempts at peace-building in the former Yugoslavia by focusing on the challenges to efforts to bring lasting stability posed by democratisation, ethnic nationalism and the promotion of security. It also discusses the Dayton agreement and its impact on human rights and multiculturalism in Bosnia, the Stability Pact, and nationalism's relationship to democratic norms.

in The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security

The conflict in Kosovo represents a significant watershed in post-Cold War international security. Interpreting its political and operational significance should reveal important clues for understanding international security in the new millennium. This text analyses the international response to the crisis in Kosovo and its broader implications, by examining its diplomatic, military and humanitarian features. Despite the widely held perception that the conflict in Kosovo has implications for international security, unravelling them can be challenging, as it remains an event replete with paradoxes. There are many such paradoxes. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) entered into the conflict ostensibly to head off a humanitarian catastrophe, only to accelerate the catastrophe by engaging in a bombing campaign; the political aims of all the major players contradicted the military means chosen by them in the conflict. The Russian role in the diplomatic efforts demonstrated that NATO did not want Russia to be involved but in the end needed its involvement. Russia opposed the bombing campaign but ultimately did not have enough power or influence to rise above a role as NATO's messenger; the doctrinal hurdles to achieving ‘immaculate coercion’ by use of air power alone seemed to tumble in the face of apparent success; it is ultimately unclear how or why NATO succeeded.