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José Luís Fiori

Westphalia was signed by approximately 150 European ‘territorial authorities’, but at that time there were only six or seven modern states. After the Napoleonic Wars, at the beginning of the ‘imperialist age’ (1840–1914), this number increased due to the independence of American states, and at the end of the Second World War the UN Charter was signed by 50 independent states. It was in the second half of the twentieth century that the inter-state system expanded more rapidly. Today there are almost 200 sovereign states with a seat at the UN

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
Marta Iñiguez de Heredia

all it can against an extremely adverse context. This section examines these two functions of authority claims and the justification of failure found in two main actors: the MONUC/MONUSCO and the Government. MONUC/MONUSCO MONUC was set up with the legalistic wording of the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, but this was in the spirit of addressing the ‘well-being and security of the population’ as well as the ‘adverse impact of the conflict on the human rights situation’ (UN Security Council 1999: 2). Similarly, Resolution 1925

in Everyday resistance, peacebuilding and state-making
Matthew S. Weinert

royal family before formal legal recognition was bestowed. Failure to adhere to the principle led to Concert-authorized interventions, political or military in nature, in Prussia, Naples and Piedmont, Spain, Bologna and Parma, Rome, Hungary and Denmark (see Weinert 2007 : 128–35). More contemporarily, the UN Charter stipulates general requirements

in Recognition and Global Politics
Adjusting to life after the Cold War
Kerry Longhurst

to Chancellor Kohl, enabled Germany through article 24 of the constitution to go beyond minimalist ‘Blue Helmet’ missions to active military support in line with the UN charter. Within these goals both the CDU and the CSU stressed the continuing centrality of NATO’s role. At the heart of this position were, most notably, Kohl and his Defence Minister Rühe, whose conception of the role of the Bundeswehr it was that eventually won through. The Conservative drive for an extended role for the Bundeswehr served three specific aims. • It would enhance the broader

in Germany and the use of force
Kerry Longhurst

remain credible within the alliance an enhanced readiness to partake in collective actions to preserve peace within the framework of the UN Charter would have to be realised. This, he said, would require a re-orientation of the Bundeswehr to include also verfügbar (rapid reaction) forces. Again it was Volker Rühe’s VPR which provided a greater focus to these ideas by delineating force structure into rapid reaction, main defence and basic infrastructure–augmentation forces. Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd 102 30/06/2004 16:25 Page 102 Germany and the

in Germany and the use of force
Henrik Larsen

for autonomous action, backed by needs to develop a capacity for autonomous action backed by credible military forces . . . in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. (Declaration by the European

in Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy
Dominant approaches
M. Anne Brown

). The UN charters indeed represent significant achievements and have acquired the status of customary international law. They can indeed work as a starting-point for certain discussions. And it might even be true that the international rhetoric of rights represents ‘an implicit, submerged, or deflected expression of a sense of moral interdependence’ (Donnelly, 1989: 617). But this is a long way from the assertion that universality of standards has been achieved. What does such a degree of apparent self-confidence reflect? ‘Universality’ is here based on an appeal to a

in Human rights and the borders of suffering
Open Access (free)
Thomas Robb

accordance with international law. As Kissinger convincingly argued: American influence had helped to confine the recognition of borders to an obligation not to change them by force, which was a mere duplication of the UN Charter. Since no European country had the capacity to bring about a forcible change or a policy to that effect, the formal renunciation was hardly a Soviet gain. Even this limited recognition of legitimacy was vitiated by a statement of principles which preceded it ... It declared that the signatory states consider that their frontiers can be changed, in

in A strained partnership?
Open Access (free)
Geoffrey K. Roberts and Patricia Hogwood

This section provides, in the style of a dictionary, details of the political careers of significant West European politicians, especially those who have been head of their country’s government or head of state.

in The politics today companion to West European Politics