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Open Access (free)
US–UK relations in the era of détente, 1969–77
Author: Thomas Robb

This is the first monograph length study that charts the coercive diplomacy of the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford as practiced against their British ally in order to persuade Edward Heath’s government to follow a more amenable course throughout the ‘Year of Europe’ and to convince Harold Wilson’s governments to lessen the severity of proposed defence cuts. Such diplomacy proved effective against Heath but rather less so against Wilson. It is argued that relations between the two sides were often strained, indeed, to the extent that the most ‘special’ elements of the relationship, that of intelligence and nuclear co-operation, were suspended. Yet, the relationship also witnessed considerable co-operation. This book offers new perspectives on US and UK policy towards British membership of the European Economic Community; demonstrates how US détente policies created strain in the ‘special relationship’; reveals the temporary shutdown of US-UK intelligence and nuclear co-operation; provides new insights in US-UK defence co-operation, and revaluates the US-UK relationship throughout the IMF Crisis.

José Luís Fiori

the State Department, together with the Pentagon, the CIA and other security and intelligence organs of the US government, as well as the Department of Commerce and the Department of the Treasury. To grasp its importance, it is necessary to distinguish it from the eccentric and unpredictable character of Donald Trump. But it is also necessary to recognise that it would take a character like Trump to bring about such a break from the history and tradition of US foreign policy. From a strictly academic perspective, the new strategy document looks

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
Heikki Patomäki

of the US foreign policy of the 1990s, and show how Boutros-Ghali seemed to offend all of them. These offences explain why the US wanted to get rid of Boutros-Ghali. In addition to drawing on explanatory theories, I supplement this evidence by an analysis of published UN documents, that is, press releases, speeches, reports and agendas. I also utilise a number of second-hand sources that make

in Mapping European security after Kosovo
Open Access (free)
Thomas Robb

from Henry Kissinger, who served as US national security adviser (1969–75) and US secretary of state (1973–77) under presidents Richard M. Nixon (1969–74) and Gerald R. Ford (1974–77), gives the impression that the US−UK special relationship functioned in a cooperative manner during his years in office. Moreover it suggests that British policy-makers could also exercise a decisive influence upon the course of US foreign policy. Readers will find that a quite different picture emerges in the following chapters. During the period under examination, the US−UK special

in A strained partnership?
Order and security in post-Cold War Europe
Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, Michael J. Tsinisizelis, Stelios Stavridis, and Kostas Ifantis

became natural to most Americans actively involved in international affairs, and public opinion polls suggest that it became part of the US foreign policy landscape.28 Throughout the history of Atlantic relations, the question of ‘leadership and followership’ has dogged the steps of policy-makers and has constrained the lines of policy itself. While it might be argued that during the 1950s and 1960s the sheer preponderance of US power rendered such issues redundant, it was by no means clear that structural power could eliminate the diversity of national role

in Theory and reform in the European Union
Open Access (free)
Thomas Robb

. Indeed, throughout 1969–72 US–UK officials engaged in detailed bilateral discussions on these topics. It was only in 1973–74 when wider US–UK political differences intensified that these differences assumed greater importance. Where US–UK differences on MBFR were once viewed as natural policy divergences that could be negotiated, they were now seen as further proof of a more uncooperative US−UK relationship. Kissinger and Schlesinger viewed British differences as indicative of wider British attempts to undermine US foreign policy. Initially, however, they were viewed

in A strained partnership?
Open Access (free)
Francisco E. González and Desmond King

the United States because of its profound commitment to individual liberty and a free society: ‘the idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than the idea of submission to authority’ (in Etzold and Gaddis 1978: 388). Anti-communism and anti-totalitarianism drove US foreign policy from 1947 and dictated the content of ‘Americanism’ as the defence of individualism and democracy. This agenda is signalled in a 1950 memorandum from the National Security Council describing Americanism as a doctrine adhered to at home and abroad: ‘The

in Democratization through the looking-glass
From Afghanistan to Iraq
Kerry Longhurst

. One of the many effects of that day was the emergence of a fundamental difference between US and German perspectives regarding the use of force and how best to combat the sources of global terrorism. The transformation that US foreign policy underwent after (and arguably even before) September 11 brought into focus the peculiarities and continuities present within German security thinking. The Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd 80 30/06/2004 16:25 Page 80 Germany and the use of force next section discusses at some length the evolution of US

in Germany and the use of force
Thomas Robb

US had also undergone a re-assessment of its global position and the Nixon administration had reconfigured US foreign policy with its détente agenda. The Paris Peace Accords (January 1973) officially ended the US’s involvement in Vietnam, and superpower détente had resulted in the opening to the PRC and the establishment of US–Soviet bilateral diplomacy. 1973, therefore, presented new circumstances in which US–UK relations would be conducted, and it was the adaptation to this that created a number of problems for US–UK relations.2 First, Britain’s membership of the

in A strained partnership?
Thomas Robb

existing Washington bureaucracy was actively seeking to undermine his policies. In order to overcome this, Nixon wanted to replace all of the existing bureaucrats with his own appointees.23 On matters related to foreign policy, 02_Strained_partnership_024-072.indd 26 18/11/2013 09:37 Re-assessing foreign policy 27 Nixon was determined to centralise its creation and execution from within the White House. Nixon believed that a sort of inertia had enveloped US foreign policy, and it was only through the White House that foreign policy could be properly debated and re

in A strained partnership?