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For over five decades, the Cold War security agenda was distinguished by the principal strategic balance, that of a structure of bipolarity, between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR). This book seeks to draw from current developments in critical security studies in order to establish a new framework of inquiry for security in the Middle East. It addresses the need to redefine security in the Middle East. The focus is squarely on the Arab-Israeli context in general, and the Palestinian-Israeli context in particular. The character of Arab-Israeli relations are measured by the Israeli foreign policy debate from the 1950s to the 1990s. A dialogue between Islam and Islamism as a means to broaden the terrain on which conflict resolution and post-bipolar security in the Middle East is to be understood is presented. The Middle East peace process (MEPP) was an additional factor in problematizing the military-strategic concept of security in the Middle East. The shift in analysis from national security to human security reflects the transformations of the post-Cold War era by combining military with non-military concerns such as environmental damage, social unrest, economic mismanagement, cultural conflict, gender inequity and radical fundamentalism. By way of contrast to realist international relations (IR) theory, developing-world theorists have proposed a different set of variables to explain the unique challenges facing developing states. Finally, the book examines the significance of ecopolitics in security agendas in the Middle East.

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The international system and the Middle East

-state ideology, political Islam, which, like Arabism, conditioned regime legitimacy on defence of regional autonomy against Western domination. De-colonisation and the Cold War De-colonisation and the bi-polar Cold War between the USA and the USSR transformed the terms of international penetration in the Middle East. To be sure, given the exceptional concentration of Western interests there – oil, transit routes, and the protection of Israel – the Western great powers had no intention of leaving the region in the wake of Arab

in The international politics of the Middle East

2504Chap10 7/4/03 12:57 pm Page 185 10 Russia, the CIS and Eurasian interconnections John P. Willerton and Geoffrey Cockerham Central to post-Soviet Eurasian security calculations and economic stabilisation efforts are Russia’s power interests and efforts to reclaim a leadership role in the region. Since the break-up of the USSR, states of the FSU have pursued foreign policies based upon their own mix of interests and preferences rather than those of a central set (Moscow) of policy-makers. It is hardly surprising that more than a decade after the Soviet

in Limiting institutions?

Reclamation and Water Resources, based in Moscow.21 While disagreements existed, there was a single and final arbiter – Moscow.22 Downstream Kazakh, Turkmen and Uzbek SSRs were allocated the majority of the waters for irrigation, while the upstream Kyrgyz and Tajik SSRs were compensated by energy supplies from their neighbours. With the break up of the USSR, ‘[a]ll of a sudden, a very complex water management problem became a very complex transboundary water management problem’.23 In other water-scarce areas the water problem and its management have gradually evolved in

in Limiting institutions?
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Redefining security in the Middle East

United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR). It also served as the core framework of analysis. In that respect, the ‘core’ was prioritized, both analytically and politically, over what were considered local or regional disputes raging in an area broadly defined as the ‘Third World’, now more widely known as the developing world. The latter category was considered theoretically insignificant insofar as

in Redefining security in the Middle East

arms from the number two state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), enabling them to pursue nationalist foreign policies, and to dilute economic dependency. Moreover, as Thompson (1970) has shown, the Middle East is a partial exception to Galtung’s feudal model in that, while fragmented economically and politically, it enjoys trans-state cultural unity which nationalist states have exploited to mobilise regional solidarity against the core. Thus, the conjuncture of the Cold War and the spread of Pan-Arabism allowed Nasser’s Egypt to sufficiently roll back

in The international politics of the Middle East

result of the war’s outcome exacerbated these imbalances. Potential Soviet restraints on Iraq – a Cold War function of preventing local conflicts from escalating into superpower confrontation – had declined as Iraq became less dependent on Soviet arms and the USSR disengaged from the area under Gorbachev. In this situation, the map imposed on the region, specifically, the Iraqi giant contiguous with the Kuwaiti midget, was a structural invitation to war (Hiro 1991b; Khalidi 1991b). Formation of an anti-Iraq Middle East coalition Without creation

in The international politics of the Middle East

). Nasser overplayed his hand in the crisis of spring 1967 in part because he had become complacent about his ability to manipulate bi-polarity. With the Suez precedent in mind, he miscalculated that the US would restrain Israel for fear a war would inflame Arab opinion against the West or bring confrontation with the USSR. Nasser’s defence minister, General Shams ad-Din Badran apparently misled him into believing the Soviets had promised intervention to deter Israel; but, in fact, it was Moscow that would be deterred when war broke out by fear of a confrontation with

in The international politics of the Middle East
The dynamics of multilateralism in Eurasia

bandwagoned towards the United States. Neil MacFarlane, ‘Realism and Russian Strategy after the Collapse of the USSR’, in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds), Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 218–60. 12 See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). 13 See Lisa Martin, ‘The Rational State Choice’, in Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, pp. 91–117. 14 See Robert O. Keohane, International

in Limiting institutions?

symbolise non-predatory bandwagoning with PfP signatories seeking close relations with the once-threatening NATO institution they opposed as part of the Warsaw Pact and former USSR during the Cold War. This broad Euro-Atlantic, European and Eurasian post-Cold War structural transformation affects the way its members have defined NATO’s new missions, specifically via PfP. NATO members and PfP signatories synchronised their threat perceptions over the last half of the 1990s and formed the practical cooperative security needed to change NATO as an institution. Second, PfP

in Limiting institutions?