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Gadamer . . . Truth here is seen in terms of the capacity of forms of articulation to ‘disclose’ the world.5 For Bernstein, too, ‘art and aesthetics . . . appear as somehow more truthful than empirical truth . . . more rational than methodological reason, more just than liberal justice . . . more valuable than principled morality or utility’.6 This is not to argue that art, and the world disclosed in art, are simply ‘more true’ than truth as correspondence, that ‘art and aesthetics are true while truth-only cognition, say in its realisation in the natural sciences, is

in The new aestheticism

utopian invention, carries with it (like all utopias) the negative recognition that the world of the senses from which it is freeing itself is imperfect, or fallen. Such a recognition would certainly accord with Sidney’s Protestantism. But from the perspective of our discussion, this movement beyond history may be read as an attempt to offer a truly historical cognition of the world. In this allusion to a truth beyond a mimetic relation to the world, Sidney is also able to combat charges that poets are liars. Sidney argues that ‘though he [the poet] recount things not

in The new aestheticism
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An introduction

possibility of its having a transformative potential. As Bernstein argues: if art is alienated from truth and goodness by being isolated into a separate sphere, then that entails that ‘truth’ and ‘goodness’ are alienated, separated from themselves. Aesthetic alienation, then, betokens truth’s and reason’s internal diremption and deformation. . . . Art’s exclusion from first-order cognition and moral judgement is, then, a condition of its ability to register (in a speaking silence) a second-order truth about first-order truth.35 Inadmissible to forms of criticism generated

in The new aestheticism
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Old things with new things to say

to ‘know’ them? Might we develop a more nuanced understanding of scientia  –​one that would help us to grasp pre-​Enlightenment modes of cognition? Such research would not only be concerned with understanding the past; it also connects with important twenty-​first-​century concerns about how we, as humans, use and abuse the nonhuman world in our pursuit of knowledge and technological advancement.6 Nonhuman things embroiled in ongoing processes of creation or alteration, things that may be fragile or broken, accidental or malfunctioning things, things with a life

in Nonhuman voices in Anglo-Saxon literature and material culture

at the time Kant wrote the first critique and Kant uses it in this work to discuss an ‘immediate’ relationship between cognition and an object as opposed to a mediated relationship between the two, as is provided by concepts and judgements. The reason why Kant here is not just presenting an account of sensibility per se is his transcendental purpose. As Kant puts it: Since that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but its form

in The new aestheticism

simply, education: the forming and informing of a self in the spirit of growth, development, and imagining the possibility that the world and its objects might be otherwise than they are. Another word for this, of course, is metaphor; but metaphor as a practice of thought, or, in the words of Ricoeur, as a process of ‘cognition, imagination, and feeling’31: in my own terms, a thinking that is always hospitable to otherness, and is thus ‘companionable’. A useful way of characterising the play at issue here is to see it as dance. Valéry, in particular, made great play

in The new aestheticism
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Hamlet, adaptation and the work of following

interchangeably now with the antique form of he (‘a’) in Barnado’s: ‘Looks a not like the King?’ (46). Here and in his preceding observation that the entity appears ‘In the same Shakespeare’s genius 141 figure like the King that’s dead’ (44), Barnado relies on a form of recognition that is also a form of re-cognition, i.e. a form of cognition that is based on comparison. Marcellus picks up the same comparison moments later, asking Horatio ‘Is it not like the King?’ (61). Yet Horatio’s response to Marcellus, ‘As thou art to thyself ’ (62), teasingly suggests that, insofar as

in The new aestheticism
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Gender and a new politics in Achebe

On Achebe’s endorsement of Ikem’s views, and on his revisionist liberalism, see David Maughan-Brown, unpublished paper, ‘Anthills of the Savannah’s solution to The Trouble with Nigeria’, ACLALS Triennial Conference, University of Kent, Canterbury, 29 August 1989, pp. 4–5. 11 As Ikem discovers in his second encounter with Braimoh, the taxi-driver. The ceaseless circlings of such cognitions about ‘the people’ are of course a measure of Achebe’s political pessimism. See Ascherson, ‘Betrayal’, p. 3. 12 Rutherford, ‘Interview’, p. 3. 13 On interpreting the past

in Stories of women
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categories we could, he argues, not even begin to have cognitive dilemmas, because we would have no forms of objectivity of the kind present in maths that organise the material of cognition in ways about which we can disagree. 11 T. W. Adorno, Philosophische Frühschriften (Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 1), (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973), p. 366. 12 The most obvious source of this idea is Nietzsche’s 1873 essay ‘On truth and lie in the extramoral sense’. 13 T. W. Adorno, Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979), p. 53. There are close parallels

in The new aestheticism
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Between Adorno and Heidegger

nature of that event, and is not to be read as the inadequacy specifically of Heidegger’s political judgements.36 Adorno too, perhaps no less inadequately, announced in 1949: ‘Cultural criticism finds itself up against the last level of a dialectic between culture and barbarism: to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric and this also eats up the cognition which expresses why it became impossible to write poetry today.’37 He subsequently came to modify the claim in his Aesthetic Theory, for which aesthetic activity seemed the only possible form of insurrection or

in The new aestheticism