For over five decades, the Cold War security agenda was distinguished by the principal strategic balance, that of a structure of bipolarity, between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR). This book seeks to draw from current developments in critical security studies in order to establish a new framework of inquiry for security in the Middle East. It addresses the need to redefine security in the Middle East. The focus is squarely on the Arab-Israeli context in general, and the Palestinian-Israeli context in particular. The character of Arab-Israeli relations are measured by the Israeli foreign policy debate from the 1950s to the 1990s. A dialogue between Islam and Islamism as a means to broaden the terrain on which conflict resolution and post-bipolar security in the Middle East is to be understood is presented. The Middle East peace process (MEPP) was an additional factor in problematizing the military-strategic concept of security in the Middle East. The shift in analysis from national security to human security reflects the transformations of the post-Cold War era by combining military with non-military concerns such as environmental damage, social unrest, economic mismanagement, cultural conflict, gender inequity and radical fundamentalism. By way of contrast to realist international relations (IR) theory, developing-world theorists have proposed a different set of variables to explain the unique challenges facing developing states. Finally, the book examines the significance of ecopolitics in security agendas in the Middle East.
The modernised gacaca court system as it functioned in Rwanda is often referred to in terminology and descriptions as if it were identical, or at least similar, to the traditional conflictresolution mechanism known as the gacaca that has existed in Rwandan society since pre-colonial times. It, therefore, often carries the connotation of a customary and quasi non-judicial mechanism with primarily a restorative objective. The image of palavers under the oldest tree in the village is never far away. However, the relation between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ gacaca
Zaïre. Le vécu d’une réfugiée rwandaise ( Paris : L’Harmattan ).
Verwimp , P. ( 2003 ), ‘ Testing the Double Genocide Thesis for Central and Southern Rwanda ’, Journal of ConflictResolution , 47 : 4 , 423 – 42 .
Verwimp , P. ( 2013 ), Peasants in Power: The Political Economy of Development and Genocide in Rwanda ( Dordrect : Springer ).
The organisation of war-escalation in the Krajina region of Croatia 1990–91
Hannes Grandits and Carolin Leutloff
reform and institutional
formation in the process of societal transformation. The leader–followeroriented perspective was chosen to avoid the hypothesis that conﬂict escalation
The analysis of the year before the outbreak of open war in June 1991 is sub24
War-escalation in the Krajina region 1990–91
divided into three sections focusing on distinct phases in the development: ﬁrst
the popularisation and institutionalisation of national front-lines, secondly, the
mobilisation for violent conﬂictresolution and, ﬁnally, the importance of the
management and conflictresolution can work. Where security interests are
constructed in mutually exclusive ways, neo-realist objections to neo-liberal
In the hot spots of Eurasia, security dilemmas continue to exist within and
between states because states and groups define their security in mutually
exclusive ways. In ethnic conflicts such as those in the Balkans, institutional
arrangements to manage conflict will remain fragile as long as and to the
degree that ethnic attitudes and goals remain mutually hostile. Furthermore,
even the fragile
Caucasian) level, to resolve common problems (the
Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus – CMPC); (3) although the
idea of the Common Caucasian Home had never been realised in practice, it has
been discussed: cooperative organisations had contributed to conﬂictresolution
in the Caucasus.
Both processes – the growth of competitive ethno-national movements and
the development of diﬀerent cooperative organisations – reﬂect a multi-level
choice of identity among the population of this region, who ascribe themselves
to a local community, to a tribe, to an ethnos
stress that the BA is not about maintaining
the ‘British’ constitutional system. Compromise, it is argued, is based
upon the creation of a new and renewable constitutional settlement.9 In
reality, however, the ability of the BA to dilute the rationale of ethnosectarianism is over-emphasised.10
In economic and cultural terms, the endorsement of equalisation, as
outlined in the BA, is represented as being capable of diluting the logic
for ethnically defined labour markets and claims of cultural disaffection.
In terms of ‘conflictresolution’, the aim of the BA is to
, conflictresolution would come to replace simple bargaining. At least three forms of
conflictresolution could be distinguished (Haas 1961 : 367–9; Lindberg 1963 : 11–12). The first, ‘lowest common
denominator bargaining’, resembled the style traditionally associated
with inter-governmental diplomacy, with the overall outcome determined by
the least cooperative state. The two other forms of conflictresolution both
historical materialism, feminism, environmentalism, postcolonialism and
postmodernism. This dissident trend, a broad canvas referred to as
‘critical security studies’, has shed light on some of the
emerging patterns of conflict that have dramatically altered both the
contours of security and the possibilities for conflictresolution in
the post-Cold War era. The task of revisiting the subject of security
political solutions have usually been abandoned in favour of providing some form of ‘temporary’ military security. The role of the OSCE missions
and of the HCNM, by contrast, is ideally to enter into a situation long before
it reaches the violent stage. By trying to assure full rights for all citizens in
multinational states and by providing facilities for mediation and conflictresolution at the grassroots level, these institutions seek to head off incidents
before they reach the boiling point.
A further limitation of NATO is that it is still viewed with considerable