In May 1958, and four years into the Algerian War of Independence, a revolt again appropriated the revolutionary and republican symbolism of the French Revolution by seizing power through a Committee of Public Safety. This book explores why a repressive colonial system that had for over a century maintained the material and intellectual backwardness of Algerian women now turned to an extensive programme of 'emancipation'. After a brief background sketch of the situation of Algerian women during the post-war decade, it discusses the various factors contributed to the emergence of the first significant women's organisations in the main urban centres. It was only after the outbreak of the rebellion in 1954 and the arrival of many hundreds of wives of army officers that the model of female interventionism became dramatically activated. The French military intervention in Algeria during 1954-1962 derived its force from the Orientalist current in European colonialism and also seemed to foreshadow the revival of global Islamophobia after 1979 and the eventual moves to 'liberate' Muslim societies by US-led neo-imperialism in Afghanistan and Iraq. For the women of Bordj Okhriss, as throughout Algeria, the French army represented a dangerous and powerful force associated with mass destruction, brutality and rape. The central contradiction facing the mobile socio-medical teams teams was how to gain the trust of Algerian women and to bring them social progress and emancipation when they themselves were part of an army that had destroyed their villages and driven them into refugee camps.
By expanding the geographical scope of the history of violence and war, this volume challenges both Western and state-centric narratives of the decline of violence and its relationship to modernity. It highlights instead similarities across early modernity in terms of representations, legitimations, applications of, and motivations for violence. It seeks to integrate methodologies of the study of violence into the history of war, thereby extending the historical significance of both fields of research. Thirteen case studies outline the myriad ways in which large-scale violence was understood and used by states and non-state actors throughout the early modern period across Africa, Asia, the Americas, the Atlantic, and Europe, demonstrating that it was far more complex than would be suggested by simple narratives of conquest and resistance. Moreover, key features of imperial violence apply equally to large-scale violence within societies. As the authors argue, violence was a continuum, ranging from small-scale, local actions to full-blown war. The latter was privileged legally and increasingly associated with states during early modernity, but its legitimacy was frequently contested and many of its violent forms, such as raiding and destruction of buildings and crops, could be found in activities not officially classed as war.
Muslim reactions to the Ordinance, to which the latter replied that an urgent propaganda campaign was required to prepare Algerian opinion before the final decree was published in September 1959.82 The Algiers government sent out 15,000 questionnaires to the SAS and EMSI teams on 20 February and the responses were synthesised into 432 local reports and then into a global assessment by the Islamic specialist Captain L. P. Fauque in a restricted publication, Stades d’évolution de la cellule familiale musulmane d’Algérie.83 In July Delouvrier signed a joint circular with
European scale had changed a good deal: the Netherlands gradually emerged as the principal enemy of Louis XIV, and he began to arrange French diplomacy in Europe as a tool to enable large-scale warfare against the Dutch. This constellation would ultimately commit the Fürstenberg brothers and Christoph Bernhard to the same political camp. Soon after the end of the War of Devolution (1667–1668), Wilhelm von Fürstenberg shifted into high gear as Louis XIV’s principal negotiator in the empire to broker subsidy alliances with German princes – alliances that should, on the
national in the NHS. Klein argues that there has been ‘oscillating progress between devolution and centralisation, and back again’ in NHS policy from the organisation’s inception, caused by the conflicts between dependence on public funds and the devolution motivated by their perceived inadequacy. 42 Richard Biddle has traced the local impact of the Hospital Plan of 1962, identifying first ‘optimism’ and subsequently ‘anger’ in Reading over its ‘hierarchical regionalism’ amid public-sector interest in economic and social
ongoing development of health devolution. 21 Activism was shaped by the idea that the NHS was an ideal. Reflecting on this, respondents suggested that the ‘good strong brand’ of the NHS attracted many people to this cause, or that campaigning was ‘easier in some ways because most people want to keep the NHS’. Respondents also emphasised that, while other campaign groups had to define ‘more narrowly what they are “for”’, for NHS campaigners, specifically, ‘its [sic] enough to say you are for “it”’. Thomson
Swinford Union’. 13 A year after the IAOS's foundation Plunkett looked to build upon that achievement by engineering political agreement over the devolution of agricultural policymaking from Westminster to Dublin. The subsequent foundation of the DATI in 1899 represented a landmark in Ireland's political history and evidence of Plunkett's tenacity as he introduced a second major agency of agricultural progress to Ireland. Although described by critics as ‘the Institution that teaches hens how to lay eggs’, the Department helped to develop the theory
Colbert may have thought that they needed a lesson in respect for new laws. Besides, the king was about to depart for Flanders and the War of Devolution, and the government may have wished to take a strong stand at a critical moment. But all we know for sure is that the 22 Compulsory registration king decided in early July to employ coercion in the provincial parlements and to begin with the Parlement of Dijon.16 On 8 August 1667, the comte d’Amanzé, the king’s lieutenant general in Burgundy, entered the Parlement with the intendant Claude Bouchu at his side. When the
, accidia, resonates with 1920s literary representations of English degeneracy. The landlord’s relation to his place in England after the second world war is compressed in his claustration, a possession of the manor through panoramic vision from the country house that is his sign of ownership, the ‘physical helplessness’ which Sara Suleri reads ‘as a synecdoche for imperial devolution’, 109 and the
geography. The interaction between ‘human mobility’, ‘violence’, and ‘state-power devolution’ transformed Vietnamese politics, undermining traditional-style statecraft during the 1830s. Minh Menh’s projection of administrative centralization, territorialization, and cultural assimilation stirred tremendous local hostility towards the central elite. The local gentry were drawn into politics, shifting the balance of power between the centre and localities and threatening the survival of both dynasty and state. By focusing on the militias and local violence, this chapter