Democratization is a major political phenomenon of the age and has been the focus of a burgeoning political science literature. This book considers democratization across a range of disciplines, from anthropology and economics, to sociology, law and area studies. The construction of democratization as a unit of study reflects the intellectual standpoint of the inquirer. The book highlights the use of normative argument to legitimize the exercise of power. From the 1950s to the 1980s, economic success enabled the authoritarian governments of South Korea and Taiwan to achieve a large measure of popular support despite the absence of democracy. The book outlines what a feminist framework might be and analyses feminist engagements with the theory and practice of democratization. It also shows how historians have contributed to the understanding of the processes of democratization. International Political Economy (IPE) has always had the potential to cut across the levels-of-analysis distinction. A legal perspective on democratization is presented by focusing on a tightly linked set of issues straddling the border between political and judicial power as they have arisen. Classic and contemporary sociological approaches to understanding democracy and democratization are highlighted, with particular attention being accorded to the post-1989 period. The book displays particularities within a common concern for institutional structures and their performance, ranging over the representation of women, electoral systems and constitutions (in Africa) and presidentialism (in Latin America). Both Europe and North America present in their different ways a kind of bridge between domestic and international dimensions of democratization.
climate characterised by both stagnation
Changes in the party system
Belated industrialisation, the Socialist–Communist split and longstanding
ideological divisions have all been cited as factors delaying the formation
of modern, disciplined party machines in France. Long into the twentieth
century, the political system incubated numerous parties, most of them
Beyond the mainstream: la gauche de la gauche
with weak structures and limited militant bases. Under the Fifth Republic,
revision of the electoralsystem forced parties to combine in
what should be the nature of those allegiance arrangements) and how the PS should seek to restructure the electoralsystem,
thus reshaping the balance of forces within the French party system.
This chapter considers how PS factionalism and organisational changes
structure the internal debate, and shape the PS approach to the two
dimensions of political strategy. The final section examines a series of
significant episodes in the PS’s development in the 1990s and explores
the processes of interaction between intra-party politics and opportunities
for party system
differences of interpretation and emphasis with
regard to, in particular: first, elections, electoralsystems
and constitutionalism; and second, the relationship between
democratization and development.
Elections, electoralsystems and constitutionalism
Very considerable attention has been devoted to the study
of elections, and not least in the period 1950–65 when electoral procedures were used to determine, or at least to
legitimate, ‘the form, rate and direction of the decolonization
process’ (Cohen 1983: 73). Later, as Cohen (1983) notes, the
tendency for military
Union. Electoralsystems The
president is elected by direct universal suffrage for a term of six years
and may not serve more than two terms.
Elections to the Nationalrat are based
on a system of proportional representation, the ‘enforced’
preference voting system, with a 4 per cent threshold. Term of office: four
electorate in the
domestic arena are undoubtedly legitimist and represent the traditional
bastions of conservative right-wing support in France. Older, male, petty
bourgeois and agriculturally based, the electorate does not differ substantially from the traditional core support of the RPR (Ivaldi, 1999b:
643). Its score of 13.1 per cent represented the dual positive effect of
the proportional electoralsystem combined with the importance of
charismatic heads of the national-constituency lists. However, the elections
also represented the first time since the onset of the
agreed that, in 2001, tactical voting by Labour supporters enabled the Liberal
Democrats to retain some of the seats they first won in 1997 while Liberal
Democrat voters returned the favour for Labour to do the same.9 The
Conservative Party also simultaneously suffered from the workings of the
first-past-the-post electoralsystem, as we shall see later on.
Given this outcome in 2001, and looking ahead to the next general
election in 2005/6, the Conservatives will need a uniform national swing to
them of at least 6.5 per cent. A swing of 9 per cent will make the
that demands for reform were hardening. This was
demonstrated by growing support for the Liberal Democrats, who strongly
advocated reform, for campaign groups such as Charter 88 and for Scottish
and Welsh Nationalists.
The principles of Labour’s reform
We can divide Labour’s reform programme into the following processes.
Democratisation. Too much of the British political system was seen as undemocratic. The prime targets were the unelected House of Lords, and the notoriously unrepresentative electoralsystem.
Decentralisation. As we have seen above, Labour
rules of the game favour a bipolarised party system, as we shall see later
on when we briefly consider the 2002 elections. In historical terms, these
institutional factors were even more important. With the emergence of
strong, stable governments encouraged by the 1958 constitution, parties
were deprived of their former capacity for Byzantine political manoeuvre
in an Assembly-dominated regime.
A separate but related institutional argument highlights the role of
the two-ballot electoralsystem in parliamentary elections (Bartolini, 1984).
By its discriminatory effects
, the number
of parliamentary parties is largely influenced by the mechanical process
of translating votes into seats (Charlot, 1993).
Analysis of vote transfers between the two rounds of legislative elections
points out the substantial effect of the bipolar constraints imposed by
the second ballot, the impossibility of minor parties gaining sufficient
support to win parliamentary representation, and the tendency for the
electoralsystem to manufacture parliamentary majorities for parties that
have not necessarily received majority support from the voters. The