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problem was that currency traders and investors were skeptical
that the wide-ranging measures would be implemented by Suharto. The
widely held (and generally correct) perception was that the wily Suharto
had signed up to the program only reluctantly, and that he did not intend
to follow through with a program that would hurt the business interests
and the vast ﬁnancial empire controlled by his children (estimated to be
worth around US$30 billion),38 and the interests of his close associates
(Eklof 1999, 126–7). In fact, even before the IMF team had left Jakarta, one