Telegraph reporter and a regular in conflict zones ( Deedes, 2004 ). But another aspect of the
Congolese context heightens this dependency: the number of armed groups in North and
South Kivu and their fragmentation. The Kivu Security Tracker database, a website
curated by researchers from the Congo Research Group (affiliated with the New York
University Center on International Cooperation) and Human Rights Watch, lists 160
armed groups active in North and South Kivu provinces. 13 And though
. The anti-Sevres formula thus produces an overwhelming Kemalist unity, and excludes any deviations:
[I]nstead of smoothing relations between the various elements in our society, our political cadres have long intentionally or unintentionally encouraged the deepening of the fragmentation among those elements through left-right, secular-fundamentalist, Alawite-Sunni differentials, favoritism towards certain religious sects, political flirting with local notables, regional variations in industrialization and regional discrepancies in income
The European union’s policy in the field of arms export controls
Sibylle Bauer and Eric Remacle
Treaty, seems to support this trend.
Therefore, variable geometry is not only an indication of fragmentation of
the Union but also an element of the continuing process of integration.
The delicate balance between
integration and fragmentation is shaping a very peculiar model of foreign
policy-making which cannot simply be described as a traditional
international organisation nor as a state
process disrupted a multiplicity of regional ties while reorienting many economic and communications links to the Western ‘core’. In reaction, new supra-state ideologies, expressive of the lost cultural unity, were increasingly embraced: Pan-Arabism by the Arabic-speaking middle class and political Islam among the lower middle classes. Both, at various times, challenged the legitimacy of the individual states and spawned movements promoting the unification of states as a cure for the fragmentation of the recognised community. The result has been that the Arab world
bases, treaties) in return for formal independence which, together with irredentist dissatisfaction with borders, invariably tarnished their legitimacy.
For the Arab states, the continued presence of imperial powers in the region, extreme economic dependence and limited military capabilities meant the international system sharply constrained state options. As long as societies were unmobilised, domestic constraints were weaker, yet owing to intra-elite fragmentation and low institutionalisation many regimes were too unstable and narrow-based to
region’s strategic transit routes, oil resources, the creation of Israel, a Western bridgehead, and the relative power vacuum issuing from regional fragmentation – all continued to draw in external powers.
Leon Carl Brown (1984: 3–5, 16–18) has argued that the Middle East became a penetrated system , one subject to exceptional influence and intervention from the outside but which could not be fully subordinated or absorbed. Fred Halliday (1988) observes that, from the time of the Eastern question, great power competition over the Middle East has
understanding the persistence of highly unequal core–periphery relations even after the retreat of imperial armies from the region, is Galtung’s (1971) structural model of imperialism. In his view, two mechanisms sustain penetration by the Western ‘core’: (1) the core created and left behind client elites and classes which have an interest in dependent relations, and (2) regional states were linked to the core, in feudal-like north–south relations, while horizontal (south–south) relations were shattered. Indeed, imperialism’s fragmentation of the Middle East into a multitude
resolutions, normally reached by consensus, were reflective of the lowest common denominator and their implementation was dependent on the cohesion of the ‘Arab triangle’ powers. Reflective of the growing Arab fragmentation after Egypt’s separate peace shattered the triangle, was the decline in the effectiveness of summits in the 1980s when they were often boycotted by key feuding states. But Saudi Arabia filled the vacuum, using financial incentives agreed at summits to preserve some cohesion or to heal splits. Thus, the Arab summit of May 1989 healed the split over Egypt
’s federal system has allowed lines of responsibility to blur and disappear. This fragmentation is compounded by the absence of an agreed plan or of close coordination among policy-making bodies. Thus, despite the 1973 plan, there was no coordinated strategy for actualising intentions articulated for Aboriginal health until the release of the first National Aboriginal Health Strategy ( NAHS ) in 1989. But the Strategy was not able to overcome the difficulties created by the fragmentation of responsibility, and the lack of long-term planning and accountability for
political fragmentation in the world and in Europe is at variance
with the systemic integration of a multicultural world society’
(Habermas 2012 : 7). But these two things are
not more contradictory than the right of adults, including gays and
lesbians, to form their own, legally protected family units and live
in a world of ever-expanding social networks. Similarly, the