In the aftermath of conflict and gross human rights violations, victims have a right to know what happened to their loved ones. Such a right is compromised if mass graves are not adequately protected to preserve evidence, facilitate identification and repatriation of the dead and enable a full and effective investigation to be conducted. Despite guidelines for investigations of the missing, and legal obligations under international law, it is not expressly clear how these mass graves are best legally protected and by whom. This article asks why, to date, there are no unified mass-grave protection guidelines that could serve as a model for states, authorities or international bodies when faced with gross human rights violations or armed conflicts resulting in mass graves. The paper suggests a practical agenda for working towards a more comprehensive set of legal guidelines to protect mass graves.
international law committed against Serbia in respect of Kosovo?55 Moreover, what of the other members of the international community, both those which supported and sustained the former Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Milosevic,56 and those which failed to intervene to stop the ethnic cleansing and other atrocities?57 And, finally, can the independence and impartiality of the ICTY be credibly maintained? Both Milosevic and the amici have challenged the legitimacy of the process on the grounds of bias. Can it withstand the critiques of those who consider that the trial is merely
contested. This goes to the heart of issues of legality and legitimacy for international trials. For much of its history ‘international criminal law’, if it has existed at all, has been rudimentary, indeterminate, and ineffectual.3 It existed in the nether regions of international humanitarian law, which existed in the nether regions of public international law. A system of ‘international criminal justice’ might be thought to require some consensus on the existence and values of the ‘international community’. The existence of such a community in this sense and its values
By expanding the geographical scope of the history of violence and war, this volume challenges both Western and state-centric narratives of the decline of violence and its relationship to modernity. It highlights instead similarities across early modernity in terms of representations, legitimations, applications of, and motivations for violence. It seeks to integrate methodologies of the study of violence into the history of war, thereby extending the historical significance of both fields of research. Thirteen case studies outline the myriad ways in which large-scale violence was understood and used by states and non-state actors throughout the early modern period across Africa, Asia, the Americas, the Atlantic, and Europe, demonstrating that it was far more complex than would be suggested by simple narratives of conquest and resistance. Moreover, key features of imperial violence apply equally to large-scale violence within societies. As the authors argue, violence was a continuum, ranging from small-scale, local actions to full-blown war. The latter was privileged legally and increasingly associated with states during early modernity, but its legitimacy was frequently contested and many of its violent forms, such as raiding and destruction of buildings and crops, could be found in activities not officially classed as war.
Anglophobia in Fascist Italy traces the roots of Fascist Anglophobia from the Great War and through the subsequent peace treaties and its development during the twenty years of Mussolini’s regime. Initially, Britain was seen by many Italians as a ‘false friend’ who was also the main obstacle to Italy’s foreign policy aspirations, a view embraced by Mussolini and his movement. While at times dormant, this Anglophobic sentiment did not disappear in the years that followed, and was later rekindled during the Ethiopian War. The peculiarly Fascist contribution to the assessment of Britain was ideological. From the mid-1920s, the regime’s intellectuals saw Fascism as the answer to a crisis in the Western world and as irredeemably opposed to Western civilisation of the sort exemplified by Britain. Britain was described as having failed the ‘problem of labour’, and Fascism framed as a salvation ideology, which nations would either embrace or face decay. The perception of Britain as a decaying and feeble nation increased after the Great Depression. The consequence of this was a consistent underrating of British power and resolve to resist Italian ambitions. An analysis of popular reception of the Fascist discourse shows that the tendency to underrate Britain had permeated large sectors of the Italian people, and that public opinion was more hostile to Britain than previously thought. Indeed, in some quarters hatred towards the British lasted until the end of the Second World War, in both occupied and liberated Italy.
Deal legislation implemented by the Roosevelt administration and had then held office as assistant Attorney General in the criminal division in the Justice Department. This turned out to be a most unsatisfactory appointment. Keenan lacked the knowledge of international law and did not possess the ability or industry required in preparing a highly complex prosecution. 138 The Tokyo trial of Japanese leaders, 1946–48 Instead, the bulk of the detailed preparation of the prosecution case was fulfilled by other lawyers, notably by Arthur Comyns Carr, Keenan’s British
gave the appearance of respecting them and social conventions enough to cede to their demands. However, the suggestion that this German could have been hallucinating and the lack of proof appears rather provocative and mischievous in tone. The municipality refused to pay the 150,000-franc fine, seeing it as contrary to international law. It asked the Kommandant ‘to please transmit the present letter to M. the Head of the German Headquarters’.41 The German response was to send twenty-five municipal councillors of Roubaix to Güstrow as hostages. It is not clear when
examine international trials for war crimes – what are sometimes referred to as breaches of international humanitarian law – and human rights violations. The twentieth century witnessed the creation of an apparently impressive range of international tribunals with authority to consider such offences: the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the African Court of Human Rights. All of these, however, adjudicated state responsibility for violations of international law; they did not have
with Yugoslavia in February 1999 to reach an agreement over Kosovo had been more than a series of ultimata that had been exceedingly difficult for the Yugoslav leadership to accept, such as the one demanding right of access of NATO troops to any part of Yugoslavia.9 Europe after Kosovo was in many ways different from what it had been before the conflict. In launching the war, NATO’s nineteen members – all democracies – were aware that they were abandoning a basic principle in international law, forbidding an attack against a country that had not violated
deny this at his trial, much of which was devoted to demonstrating what a noble fellow he was, and how decently the British had treated him. His trial was, legally, very curious. He was not charged either with OSA or DORA offences. Instead, by a decision of the Cabinet on 8 October, he was charged with commission of a war crime, specifically war treason. The theory was that engaging in espionage rendered him liable under the international law of war, after a trial, to the penalty of death, or some more lenient sentence.33 Spies, unlike other combatants who had become