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This book focuses on the paradoxical character of law and specifically concerns the structural violence of law as the political imposition of normative order onto a "lawless" condition. The paradox of law which grounds and motivates Christoph Menke's intervention is that law is both the opposite of violence and, at the same time, a form of violence. The book develops its engagement with the paradox of law in two stages. The first shows why, and in what precise sense, the law is irreducibly characterized by structural violence. The second explores the possibility of law becoming self-reflectively aware of its own violence and, hence, of the form of a self-critique of law in view of its own violence. The Book's philosophical claims are developed through analyses of works of drama: two classical tragedies in the first part and two modern dramas in the second part. It attempts to illuminate the paradoxical nature of law by way of a philosophical interpretation of literature. There are at least two normative orders within the European ethical horizon that should be called "legal orders" even though they forego the use of coercion and are thus potentially nonviolent. These are international law and Jewish law. Understanding the relationship between law and violence is one of the most urgent challenges a postmodern critical legal theory faces today. Self-reflection, the philosophical concept that plays a key role in the essay, stands opposed to all forms of spontaneity.
perpetrators that participating in CRSV/M is considered a grave violation of the international law, and the prosecution approach should be the same as is the case in obtaining justice for CRSV against women ( Lewis, 2009 : 49). Encouraging men to speak about their CRSV experiences, particularly to the humanitarian service providers, may make them more inclined to offer the care and support they need. Therefore, the move towards a language that is vividly gender-inclusive recognises that both men
unlawful but European institutions are endorsing it. So SOS says: ‘No! Actually, according to international law, these are the obligations of states.’ It’s kind of a vigilante of the Mediterranean. Right now, my problem with NGOs like MSF and Save the Children and Oxfam is not what they do out in the field. It is that their staff generally don’t act as citizens. They go out to Uganda or DRC or whatever but they don’t engage with politics in their own home countries. Perhaps this is a result of the way NGO workers see themselves. My PhD research was
. UN Security Council ( 2019 ), ‘ Aid Operations under Increasing Threat as State, Non-State Combatants Ignore International Law, Humanitarian Affairs Chief Warns ’, Security Council, SC/13760, 8499th Meeting (PM) .
kind of formulation, which justifies additional measures for staff on the basis of the services they provide for others, sits uncomfortably with the principle of humanity, according to which ‘human value is based on life not utility’ ( Slim, 2015 : 56). Legal Frameworks Differences in legal status do not offer a convincing explanation of differences in security/protection strategy. International law does offer additional
newfound attention to the targeting of humanitarian and medical actors in conflict zones, not only in Afghanistan, but also in Syria, Yemen and elsewhere, as well as renewed calls for legal accountability. As the incident highlighted, however, a notable gap exists between the lofty theoretical promise of international law – and its domestic corollaries – and the difficulties of achieving accountability in practice. On the one hand, the legal clarity of international law regarding the protection of humanitarian action in armed conflict from deliberate attack is
Chinese assertiveness. The blocking of effective action on Syria at the security council, including preventing a referral of Assad to the ICC, was the result. It is a long time since Kosovo in 1999, the high point of the post-Cold War humanitarian international, when the Western-led coalition broke international law but justified it by retrospectively arguing their actions were ‘illegal but legitimate’. Imagine China making the same argument about its treatment of the Uighurs, as many as one million of whom, it is said, now languish in re
about: her ship, the international law of the sea, Europeans’ moral responsibilities, and conditions faced by migrants in Libya. At the same time, she convincingly claimed that she preferred her actions to do the talking for her. The role of Rackete has also been important in that it deflected emotions away from the migrants rescued by the NGOs – and thus away from an asymmetrical extension of compassion – towards the rescuers. The deflection of emotions away from the migrants may also have helped to subvert humanitarianism’s tendencies to perpetuate ‘the neo
for a set of humanitarian values ( Walker, 2004 ; Wortel, 2009 ). Humanitarianism is a culture that values humanity in all its forms, that champions non-discrimination, that advances restraint in war and many other values codified in international law. ‘Promoting’ ( Bugnion, 2003 : xxvii) or ‘spreading’ ( Slim, 1998 ) this humanitarian culture, therefore, inevitably requires transforming cultural values and practices that
humans truly were naturally violent and that violence came easily to them, would there not be more cases of violent outrage and self-destruction among impoverished communities? What is more, most of the extreme cases of human slaughter throughout history have taken place within the bounds of domestic and international law. They have been fully in keeping with the prevailing normative claims to truth and its ritualised performances. Very rarely does violence come to us in a truly sporadic or spontaneous way. All political violence has a history and most often it is