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nation. Dogu Ergil supplies a fascinating description of the efforts to supply an alternative Turkish ideology to the so-called defunct past: In the absence of a medieval high culture that could be labeled “Turkish”, the nationalist elite found their glory in a history that never was. The search for, and consolidation of, a new national identity were carried to such extremes in the 1930s that theories like the Sun Theory of Language were concocted. According to this “theory”, all languages emerged out of Turkish. As a reminder of those days, the

in Turkey: facing a new millennium
A political–cultural approach

‘grand strategy’ definition of foreign policy – ‘that foreign policy is about national identity itself: about the core elements of sovereignty it seeks to defend, the values it stands for and seeks to promote abroad’. With all the symbolic trappings of sovereignty and statehood, foreign policy plays a significant role in the socio-political imagination of a collective identity. Key foreign policy speeches frequently contain

in Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy

on foreign policy behaviour. National identity ‘serves not only as the primary link between the individual and society, but between a society and the world’ (Pritzel 1998 : 19). In the case of the EU, its foreign and security policy rests on a shared European ‘identity’ which has evolved gradually and, at times, fitfully, over the last few decades. This emerging sense of European identity is

in Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy

forge a common national identity among their populations. Where the drive to bring state and nation into correspondence is obstructed, irredentist conflicts tend to destabilise regimes and foster inter-state conflict. Nowhere is the divergence of identity and state sharper than in the Middle East. There popular identification with many individual states has been contested by strong sub- and supra-state identities, diluting and limiting the mass loyalty to the state typical where it corresponds to a recognised nation (Ayoob 1995: 47–70; Hudson 1977: 33

in The international politics of the Middle East
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deficiencies of constructivism by adding greater empirical content. The thrust of the investigation was to illustrate how ‘social factors’ could often shape policies in ways contradictory of those which other theories would normally suggest.19 In this pursuit Katzenstein et al. identified two determinants of national security policy-making: the ‘cultural–institutional’ and the broader ‘national identity’ aspect. The volume made a welcome contribution to thinking on culture and security, and also went some way towards developing a convincing and workable methodology with which

in Germany and the use of force
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-building. When citizenship was based on Turkishness, members of other ethnic groups living in Turkey had to accept it, keeping, if they wished, the religious and cultural parts of their ethnic group and peacefully or forcefully losing the non-cultural-religious parts (i.e. political and national identities). Accordingly, during the twentieth century millions of Kurds have integrated into the Turkish society, economy, culture, and politics. Two million marriages were held between Turks and Kurds. 22 Still, 90 percent of the Kurds living in Turkey in the

in Turkey: facing a new millennium
Explaining foreign policy variation

state, which has varied from Ataturk’s authoritarian regime to today’s fragmented parliamentary system, explains little variation in its foreign policy. Turkey’s state formation experience set it on a status quo, West-centric tangent. Ataturk’s successful war of independence against the Western designs on Anatolia imposed by the Treaty of Sèvres spared Turkey colonial subjugation and enabled establishment of a territorial state within boundaries that satisfied Turkish national identity. The consequent eclipse of former alternative identities

in The international politics of the Middle East

bourgeoisie. No bourgeois class formed to balance the state elite or with a stake in economic infitah as in Egypt where this class helped subordinate nationalist ambitions to participation in the world economy (Bromley 1994: 139–41). Lacking a class base, the regime remained threatened by deep-seated sectarian-ethnic cleavages which, in the absence of a secure Iraqi national identity, could only be contained by extraordinary means. Autonomous civil society was eradicated and citizens incorporated in all-encompassing totalitarian structures of

in The international politics of the Middle East

Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd 30/06/2004 16:25 Page 25 2 Stunde Null and the ‘construction’ of West German strategic culture Interest politics alone . . . cannot account for Germany’s pacifistic military security policy, nor does it provide a satisfactory explanation of Bonn’s approach to national sovereignty or its aversion to unilateralism. One must look beyond material and political interests to the politics of national identity in post war Germany, which unfolded in searing domestic political debates over rearmament, reunification, and

in Germany and the use of force