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The powerful but elusive concept of the nation is investigated here. It is distinguished from the ‘state’ and the relationship between them is examined. Other elements which make the nation are considered, such as religion, language, government, cultural and historical ties, and finally the subjective but still important ‘sense of nationhood’. There is also an analysis of
. Most important, a common Arabic language – the critical ingredient of nationhood – existed. The ‘awakening’ of Arab identity was a product of the spread of mass education and literacy, especially in the 1950s and often by the Egyptian teachers recruited across the Arab world who helped form the educated middle class. The spread of a standardised Arabic in newspapers and radio made the language more homogeneous, stunting the evolution of national dialects as the linguistic basis of separate nations. The recent advent of Arab satellite TV has sharply reinforced cross
by France. As he puts it, “political legitimacy in a democratic polity is not derived from nationhood or voluntary association but from popular self-government, that is, citizens’ participation and representation in democratic institutions that track their collective will and common good” (p. 41). I shall return later to Bauböck's rejection of nationhood as a basis for jurisdiction, but first I want to try to unpack these
India, a discursive construction of national identity articulated the position of a community unevenly incorporated into an imperial economy. Economic ideas that offered a critique of prevailing socio-political conditions allowed anti-colonial activists to become the ‘authors of the political economy of nationhood’. 28 Some of the most effective authors of a national political economy in Ireland emerged from the co-operative movement. Irish co-operators differed from their counterparts in Britain in that they were more concerned with a culture of production over
replacement. The American Revolution and, especially, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars played a vital role in the development of modern nationalism. Before these conflicts an individual’s loyalty was essentially to another individual (the monarch, for example). Most aspects of Europe’s ancien régime were overthrown during the French Wars and a sense of nationhood was stimulated in most nations
the nation, they meant that it was vested in the people born in France. However, the second wave of nationalism, beginning in the late nineteenth century, thought of the nation as a Volk – as a group tied by their shared nationhood, not by their being born in a certain state. In its first manifestation at the origins of the civic tradition, the nation was decidedly subordinate to the bourgeois state and attendant rights held by
contributions to the literature of the Irish Revival. Like his contemporaries, Æ anticipated the implementation of some form of political independence for Ireland after the war and he therefore made his case for a version of Irish nationhood that included a major role for co-operative societies as centres of social and economic development. Æ wrote in an idiosyncratic style that incorporated his abiding interest in mysticism and he defined the state as ‘a physical body prepared for the incarnation of the soul of the race. The body of the national soul may be spiritual or
struggles in Israel-Palestine, which have found expression in documents like the Hamas Covenant and Hezbollah Manifesto (which appear to provide no place for Jewish nationhood in ‘Muslim’ lands and scarcely more space for individual Jews). In place of comparison, a method of choice is to contrast the existing state of Israel to an abstract idea of what the state ought to be and then decree that it falls short. According to this rhetoric, the state ought to be
profound differences of context and forms of social ordering – that process may only be achieved through mutual accommodation over the very long term. (Webber, 2000: 70) It is now at least a legal and constitutional potential that ‘Australian nationhood is no longer forged within an exclusively non-indigenous crucible’ fuelled by ‘a vision of a single people’ but through a broader, more open, conception of participation (Webber, 2000: 77, 88). The Mabo (and the Wik) decision also focused attention emphatically on a fundamental
phasing out of birthright citizenship itself. If we are concerned about equality between citizens independently of how they have obtained their status and about the power of states to strip citizens of their membership, then it is much better if the third generation of emigrant origin no longer acquires citizenship by descent than if the second generation is put on provisional citizenship. Stakeholder citizenship and liberal nationhood