This book deals with the institutional framework in post-socialist, after-empire spaces. It consists of nine case studies and two contributions of a more theoretical nature. Each of these analytical narratives sheds some light on the micro-politics of organised violence. After 1990, Serbs and Croats were competing over access to the resources needed for institution building and state building. Fear in turn triggered ethnic mobilisation. An 'unprofessional' riot of Serbs in the Krajina region developed into a professional war between Serbs and Croats in Croatia, in which several thousand died and several hundred thousand people were forcefully expelled from their homes. The Herceg-Bosnian style of resistance can be surprisingly effective. It is known that most of the heroin transported along the Balkans route passes through the hands of Albanian mafia groups; that this traffic has taken off since summer 1999. The concept of Staatnation is based on the doctrine according to which each 'nation' must have its own territorial State and each State must consist of one 'nation' only. The slow decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet and the Yugoslav empires was partly triggered, partly accompanied by the quest for national sovereignty. Dagestan is notable for its ethnic diversity and, even by post-Soviet standards, its dramatic economic deprivation. The integrative potential of cooperative movements at the republican, the regional and the inter-state level for the Caucasus is analyzed. The book also offers insights into the economics of ending violence. Finally, it addresses the question of reconciliation after ethnic cleansing.
Potentials of disorder in the Caucasus and Yugoslavia
Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher
explained but, in a more general
sense, the diﬀerent response of the post-socialist societies to the conﬂicts that followed the collapse of the central state.
This volume deals with the institutional framework in post-socialist, afterempire spaces. The volume consists of nine case studies and two contributions of
a more theoretical nature. Each of these analytical narratives sheds some light
on the micro-politics of organisedviolence. All case studies are taken from the
Caucasus and Former Yugoslavia. This has allowed, implicitly, and at times
directly, the use of a
Virtuousness, virtuality and virtuosity in NATO’s representation of the Kosovo campaign
Jean Baudrillard’s diagnosis of the Gulf War also applies to this
latest expression of organisedviolence in contemporary politics. 2 This is not to deny
that death and destruction defined the reality in Kosovo and Serbia in
the first half of 1999. After all, NATO planes delivered large amounts
of ordnance upon targets in this area, destroying both military and
civilian infrastructure; killing civilians as well as soldiers. And
Bordering intimacy is a study of how borders and dominant forms of intimacy, such as family, are central to the governance of postcolonial states such as Britain. The book explores the connected history between contemporary border regimes and the policing of family with the role of borders under European and British empires. Building upon postcolonial, decolonial and black feminist theory, the investigation centres on how colonial bordering is remade in contemporary Britain through appeals to protect, sustain and make family life. Not only was family central to the making of colonial racism but claims to family continue to remake, shore up but also hide the organisation of racialised violence in liberal states. Drawing on historical investigations, the book investigates the continuity of colonial rule in numerous areas of contemporary government – family visa regimes, the policing of sham marriages, counterterror strategies, deprivation of citizenship, policing tactics, integration policy. In doing this, the book re-theorises how we think of the connection between liberal government, race, family, borders and empire. In using Britain as a case, this opens up further insights into the international/global circulations of liberal empire and its relationship to violence.
Armenia and was accompanied by ethnic cleansing on
all sides. In Georgia, the nationalising Georgian state was challenged by two
Institutions and the organisation of stability and violence
ethno-national secessionist movements, in Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, which
spiralled into wars accompanied by ethnic cleansing.
Violence, transition and state weakness
Between 1989 and 1991, both federations imploded. How was the emergence of
organisedviolence visible both shortly before and after the break-up linked to this
extreme form of state weakness?
overlooked. The type of violence
that has emerged in Kosovo and in Chechnya resembles in many ways the
violent conflicts in Africa or Latin America of the last decade. They
belong to a type of violence that Mary Kaldor has labelled ‘new
wars’, that is a type of organisedviolence that blurs the
distinction between war (defined as violence between states or organised
political groups), organised crime and
State–society relations and conflict in post-socialist Transcaucasia
of this thesis.
All these wars involved a permanent blurring of the distinction between
organisedviolence for political purposes and organised crime. This statement not
only refers to paramilitary groups and criminal bands, but also holds true for the
so-called ‘regular forces’. First, despite diﬀerences in status they all stood out for
their surprisingly low degree of professionalism. Secondly, nearly all of them
lacked a clear chain of command, which might have ensured a certain level of
discipline. For example, in sharp contrast to the internal structure of
capacities of each of these actors. The similarities between the
two conflicts range from their background – the institutional legacy
of the socialist ethno-federations – to the new type of violence that
likens Kosovo and Chechnya to many of the conflicts in Africa and Latin
America in the 1990s. Zürcher quotes Mary Kaldor in calling this
phenomenon ‘new war’, a type of organisedviolence that blurs
the distinction between war
society, without requiring any institutionalised negotiation. Thus the
advanced capitalist democracies are ‘despotically weak but infrastructurally
51 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State
Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
52 On Russian state weakness as leading to the emergence of ‘mafia’ groups which
exert partial control over organisedviolence and taxation, see Vadim Volkov,
‘Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-Communist Russia’, Europe–Asia Studies, 51:5
, which was
considered normal not too long ago, used to act.
The Copenhagen School and violisation
It is unlikely that war as a form of
intensified conflict between different human collectives will disappear.
Sometimes such conflicts result in the use of violence, which is itself
met with violence. As a consequence, war becomes a reality, and
organisedviolence forces itself into