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‘stealth and furtiveness, lying and denial’ (Bok, 1986: 8). This characterisation oversimplifies a more nuanced reality, as secrecy is closely entwined with a more positive notion of privacy, while publicity can be associated with manipulation and distortion (Bok, 1986). There are also broad swathes of social and political activity where confidentiality is accepted and deemed necessary, from the work of juries to peace negotiations, and even staunch advocate of openness and transparency Jeremy Bentham qualified the power of publicity with the need to prevent injustice

in Science and the politics of openness

terrorism; Turkey, which acts firmly against anti-Israeli terrorism on its soil, is entitled to Israeli support against the PKK. Prime Minister Netanyahu, ruling out Israeli–Syrian peace that did not include a Syrian undertaking to halt support for the PKK, likewise conformed with Ankara’s views. Turkey displayed growing unease as it observed Israeli–Syrian peace negotiations, including the possibility of Israel lobbying in the United States for Syria’s removal from the lists of states that support terrorism or trade in drugs, without Syria

in Turkey: facing a new millennium

and therefore endanger the entire European economy. They also made it clear that ‘the party considered France – strong, armed, and in their view aggressive – a much greater danger to European stability than was Germany.’90 Certainly MacDonald argued that the Versailles Treaty would result in ‘unsettlement and war’ and referred to the Paris peace negotiations as ‘a heartless farce sinking into a melancholy tragedy’.91 However, Labour’s major contribution to the post-war settlement was over its drive to create a League of Nations, which was founded at the Paris Peace

in The Labour Party and the world, volume 1
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between Damascus and Ankara. But before “the miracles,” a different atmosphere predominated over the two countries’ relations. Ankara was concerned lest Syria’s peace negotiations with Israel, started in Madrid in October 1991, let alone a peace agreement, would remove Damascus from the list of nations supporting terrorism without Syria first withdrawing its assistance from the PKK. 60 Moreover, Turkey feared that a Syrian–Israeli peace accord would make Damascus more powerful in its conflicts with Turkey: Damascus was probably interested in the peace talks with Israel

in Turkey: facing a new millennium
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different reasons. British efforts at finding a peaceful solution had been for naught, and Turkish action had endangered British sovereign bases in Cyprus. It also raised the spectre of a wider war between Turkey and Greece that would undermine NATO. Following the Turkish invasion, Callaghan again offered the auspices of the British government to broker a peace settlement.77 After a further round of diplomatic negotiations, which produced UN Security Council Resolution 353, Callaghan called for peace negotiations on neutral territory. After much wrangling over location

in A strained partnership?