” (Friedman 1994 : 15ff, 37ff, 190 quote; 1995 ; 2005 ; 2007 ).
But Friedman’s world-systems and view of cycles in the relationship between rise and decline, modernity and tradition, cannot be taken on board without scepticism. For it is remarkable that the nineteenth-century belief in progress and industrial expansion coincided with historicised architecture, the establishment of museums, and a reappearance of traditions. The relationship between modernity and tradition is not a simple dichotomy.
Between modernity and tradition
“You can be a museum, or you can be
northern European bog body sacrifices, as promoted by Glob’s seminal 1969 volume. He queried the forensic analysis of Iain West (the lead pathologist) in the original monograph, preferring the scepticism of Robert Connolly (the physical anthropologist), who published his own brief assessment of the violence (Connolly 1985 ) prior to the British Museum volume (Stead et al. 1986 ). Connolly did not dismiss the skull fractures, but attributed the breaking of the neck not to a garotte but to a final blow on the back of the head/upper neck. He saw the ‘ligature’ as a
Re-thinking Ludwik Fleck’s concept of the thought-collective according to
the case of Serbian archaeology
this should not induce scepticism, but rather revive the dependency of
cognition on the thought-collective. Through understanding this relationship, it is possible to understand when and how facts change (Fleck,
1981: xxvii–viii). Once a thought-collective is established, the scientific
observations that stem from it become strictly defined by the collective’s limitation to the boundaries set within its established viewpoints.
The thought-collective therefore actively resists all contradictions of its
established world view, through several distinct phases:
! Democracy and dialogue! Justifications may also be given in formal decisions about archaeological investigations or the protection of buildings, and may then include references to legislation or conventions. But where the first and canonical culture of heritage is geared to expressing justifications using rhetoric, arguments, or statutory provisions, the second and critical culture of heritage wants to put in question marks as an expression of scepticism.
There is a long tradition of reflecting on what history is, can be, or should be, on the development of history, and
variation across time and space, must therefore be met with scepticism – including my own attempts.
In the debate, dividing lines appear between left and right that may be linked to academic environments in Frankfurt and Münster in Germany, respectively. Classic positions concerning the relationship between high and popular culture, and between theoretical education and practical experience, come to the fore as well. And the hard rhetoric, the slogans, the crisis, and the comparison with religion are comprehensible when it is understood that it is all really about