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positions ‘because of their opposition to management's growing accumulation of risky and illiquid assets’. Antoncic's public speeches as early as December 2006 had warned of ‘a seemingly overwhelming sense of complacency’, ‘with volatility low, corporate spreads growing ever tighter, and markets all but ignoring bad news’, although she was careful to defend her own company. 27 It is true that Lehman had an impressive risk management structure, and an array of stress tests to determine the potential financial consequences of an

in Lehman Brothers
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January to September 2008

to $17.50 by then, and a few contracts were out on $5 January options. The article noted that the ‘speculation is also being aided’ by David Einhorn as a result of his speech. On 4 June The New York Times noted that he had ‘pilloried the venerable Lehman Brothers in an effort to drive down the bank's stock price, which he is betting against’. He was succeeding. The stock had already fallen by 59 per cent over the previous twelve months. While he was criticizing Lehman Brothers, he was also working with a financial public relations company to promote his book

in Lehman Brothers
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with a room full of government officials during the Lehman weekend’, trying to make it clear what the ramifications of letting Lehman go would be. His input clearly had little impact. 51 On 15 October 2008, Russo heard a speech given by Chairman Bernanke, who stated that Hank Paulson had never once considered that it was appropriate to put taxpayer's money on the line with … in resolving Lehman's Brothers' ‘huge hole on its balance sheet’ that he realized the inconsistencies in the statements made about the alleged lack of

in Lehman Brothers

other issues, the lack of liquidity in the market place. 26 Disruptions in the market and valuation Geithner remarked in a speech to the Economic Club in New York that the funding and balance sheet pressures on banks were intensified by the rapid breakdown of securitization and structured finance markets. Banks lost the capacity to move riskier assets off their balance sheets, at the same time they had to fund, or prepare to fund, a range of contingent commitments

in Lehman Brothers
Why China survived the financial crisis

) notes, “about two-thirds of the SOEs are losing money and 90 per cent of the bad loans by China’s state banks are with SOEs.” 43 Reuters News Service, “Full Text: China’s Central Bank Governor’s Speech January 27, 1999.” Lardy (1998, 115–17), notes that the share of non-performing loans that is accounted for by the most impaired categories of loans has increased. Specifically, the sum of the share of loans that are outstanding to firms that have already gone through bankruptcy and been liquidated without the bank recovering their loans, the so-called “dead loans,” and

in The Asian financial crisis
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Crisis, reform and recovery

of accountability . . . naturally we were quickly and severely disciplined by the market (Chuan Leekpai, Prime Minister of Thailand, in a speech on March 11, 1998).1 When Thailand, the paradigmatic economic success story, fell victim to the crisis, many analysts were dumbfounded – instinctively blaming the pervasive cronyism and corruption for the country’s troubles. However, as it turned out, cronyism, corruption, clientelism and weak corporate governance were only part of the problem. After all, these problems existed while Thailand notched up impressive growth

in The Asian financial crisis
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The evolving international financial architecture

country requests such a release. Some 80 per cent of member countries now issue PIN reports, which share with the public the IMF Executive Board’s assessment of the annual “economic health check” carried out under Fund surveillance. In addition, public users can access a wealth of institutional information and data, including members’ financial positions vis-à-vis the Fund, numerous letters of intent, Policy Framework papers, speeches by management, the IMF publications database and full texts of hundreds of IMF publications. Yet, important as these reforms are, they are

in The Asian financial crisis
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Issues, debates and an overview of the crisis

was much of the credit directed to the property sector, which “eventually weakened the financial position of the banks, as this lending led to a property glut,” but bank-lending increasingly took “the form of ‘connected’ (state-directed) lending rooted in the long-standing intimate link between the government and business” (Athukorala 1998, 92–3). Thus, instead of responding appropriately when the financial crisis struck (for a start, limiting the self-aggrandizing projects and connected lending), Mahathir’s first reaction was to find scapegoats. In a fiery speech on 20

in The Asian financial crisis
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Crisis, reform and recovery

companies clustered around one holding company. The parent company is usually controlled by one family. That is, the company founder and his family on average own about 10 per cent, and through cross-shareholdings control another 30 per cent to 40 per cent, of the group member firms in the top thirty chaebols. In 1998, the top 40 chaebols grouped a total of 671 companies. 13 In a televised speech given on 6 January 1995, President Kim Young-Sam stated, “Fellow citizens, globalization is the shortcut which will lead us to building a first-class country in the 21st century

in The Asian financial crisis