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officially from December 1941 – the United States had, with one exception, chosen to remain aloof from European security affairs. The exception had been US involvement in the latter stages of the First World War. Even then, however, there was a distinct undercurrent of ambiguity about the American stance. US participation was as an ‘associated power’ rather than a full ally of France and Great Britain. In addition, as is well known

in The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security

Introduction Kosovo is not a security issue for Europe only: it must be seen in the context of global political processes. In this chapter, I argue that Kosovo was an episode in the long-term process of the domestication and marginalisation of the United Nations (UN) by the United States. These relations of domination are underpinned by Manichean dichotomous myths of good

in Mapping European security after Kosovo

whole thing frankly was very much hyped up by the press’. 25 The US and NATO: parallel structures There is no doubt that the United States had run a parallel national command and planning structure alongside the multinational NATO one during Operation Allied Force . In its After-Action Report on the operation, published in January 2000, the Department of Defense described both structures in detail with

in The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security
Open Access (free)

is also considered here. One of the favourite ‘lessons of Kosovo’ drawn by commentators and observers since 1999 has been to do with the extent to which Operation Allied Force painted up a military ‘capabilities cap’ between the European members of NATO and the United States. As a direct result of this, it is often argued, the member states of the European Union (EU) resolved to develop an autonomous

in The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security

war itself’. 32 During the Cold War, the idea of limited war was the subject of considerable interest, particularly in the United States. 33 Osgood, one of the major contributors to the discussion, defined it in the following way: A limited war is one in which the belligerents restrict the purposes for which they fight to concrete, well

in The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security
Israeli security experience as an international brand

experience in conflict, urban warfare, and dealing with terrorism. As an American journalist wrote: ‘everybody’s favourite soldier of fortune is an Israeli with military experience’ (Johnson 2010 : n.p.). To illustrate this phenomenon, I will start with an example. A security company owned by an Israeli in the United States (US) was asked to set up security checkpoints in New Orleans after hurricane Katrina

in Security/ Mobility
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East Europe then this would be a significant indicator that the institution had had its day, given the credibility that it has invested in the region. However, there is currently no real evidence to suggest that such a process of disengagement is underway, even on the part of the United States, as discussed in Chapter 2 . By the middle of 2002, the international military presence in Bosnia and Kosovo looked set to continue into the foreseeable

in The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security

For over five decades, the Cold War security agenda was distinguished by the principal strategic balance, that of a structure of bipolarity, between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR). This book seeks to draw from current developments in critical security studies in order to establish a new framework of inquiry for security in the Middle East. It addresses the need to redefine security in the Middle East. The focus is squarely on the Arab-Israeli context in general, and the Palestinian-Israeli context in particular. The character of Arab-Israeli relations are measured by the Israeli foreign policy debate from the 1950s to the 1990s. A dialogue between Islam and Islamism as a means to broaden the terrain on which conflict resolution and post-bipolar security in the Middle East is to be understood is presented. The Middle East peace process (MEPP) was an additional factor in problematizing the military-strategic concept of security in the Middle East. The shift in analysis from national security to human security reflects the transformations of the post-Cold War era by combining military with non-military concerns such as environmental damage, social unrest, economic mismanagement, cultural conflict, gender inequity and radical fundamentalism. By way of contrast to realist international relations (IR) theory, developing-world theorists have proposed a different set of variables to explain the unique challenges facing developing states. Finally, the book examines the significance of ecopolitics in security agendas in the Middle East.

Impact of structural tensions and thresholds

. Towards double ‘peaks’: superpower rivalry and decolonisation/non-alignment In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the arrangements for a new world order reflected a multipolar power configuration, the embodiment of which can be found in the Security Council. In economic terms, the United States was clearly the dominant source of power. 1 Yet politically, the colonial powers, the Soviet Union

in The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change

Bassett Moore of Columbia University, the doyen among international lawyers in the US during that period, ‘the most pronounced exception ever made by the United States, apart from cases arising under the Monroe Doctrine, to its policy of non-intervention, is that which was made in the case of Cuba’. 3 As for the justification of the intervention in Cuba on humanitarian grounds, the US government was well aware of this concept and its practice as it had evolved

in Humanitarian intervention in the long nineteenth century