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national interests ( ibid .: 25–6): 1) Russia and China, the two great ‘revisionist powers’; 2) North Korea and Iran, two ‘rogue states’ that undermine geopolitical equilibrium in Northeast Asia and the Middle East; 3) ‘Jihadist terrorist groups’ and international criminal organisations that propagate violence and traffic drugs and arms. The document offers an extensive list of actions to be undertaken by the US to achieve strategic objectives and confront rivals, from controlling borders to increasing military expenditure and protecting competitive

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
Israel and a Palestinian state

, represented by the Palestinian Authority (PA), is clearly an international actor; however, the PA’s status is uncertain in the face of the collapse of the peace process. 8 The peace process reached a crisis in the latter part of 2000 and the winter of early 2001 when Palestinians and Israelis were unable to resolve final status issues, and the second intifada broke out. 9 If the peace process were to collapse completely

in Redefining security in the Middle East
Open Access (free)
Television and the politics of British humanitarianism

The immediate consequence of this shift was an internal review of the government’s administrative machinery for emergency relief. A policy paper in early 1974 opened with the revealing statement that ‘the problem of disaster relief in developing countries is one of which governments are becoming increasingly aware’. 60 This reform process took on a more radical character following the election of a

in Global humanitarianism and media culture

the many; as such, it was an obstacle to rather than an impetus to democratisation. The Arab–Israeli peace process dead-ended and arms races actually accelerated. While the intractability of regional conflicts and problems helped derail the benign promise of globalisation, an equally important factor was the way the much-intensified penetration of American hegemonic power was applied in the region. There is much debate over whether a world hegemon exercises its power in a largely self-interested way or whether successful hegemony means satisfying the interests of a

in The international politics of the Middle East

It is frequently claimed that foreign policy making in Middle East states is either the idiosyncratic product of personalistic dictators or the irrational outcome of domestic instability. In fact, it can only be adequately understood by analysis of the multiple factors common to all states, namely: (1) foreign policy determinants (interests, challenges) to which decision-makers respond when they shape policies; and (2) foreign policy structures and processes which factor the ‘inputs’ made by various actors into a policy addressing these

in The international politics of the Middle East

gap are likely to grow more insistent. Even those who are complacent about the inequality of wealth will be compelled to pay attention to the narrowing gap of power. World redistribution? Would a major global redistribution be a bad thing? The answer, from a western point of view, depends on whether more equality is brought by a zero-sum allocation – the poor taking from the rich – or by growth – where the rich stay rich but the poor get richer too. Zero-sum redistribution can happen when highly competitive industries in poor countries destroy industries in advanced

in Limiting institutions?
Open Access (free)

marketisation of humanitarianism (specifically monetised humanitarian action) has inevitably shaped the competitive commodification of both ‘distant suffering’ and ‘caring at a distance’ by the mass media. In turn, humanitarian organisations have become ‘market’ players. For Ian Smillie and Larry Minear ( 2004 ) the ‘humanitarian enterprise’ refers to ‘the global network of organisations involved in assistance and

in Global humanitarianism and media culture

, historically, a common suprastate identity had embraced local communities and a mosaic of identity groups around an imperial centre, Western imperialism’s creation of artificially bounded states divided the region into a multitude of competing state units. Instead of the natural processes of sorting out boundaries through war and dynastic marriage which took place in the northern world, the boundaries of the modern Middle East state system were arbitrarily imposed and frozen by the Western powers according to their own needs, not indigenous wishes (Ayoob 1995: 33). This

in The international politics of the Middle East

in the creation of the ‘Shanghai Five’ in 1996, a grouping that was subsequently enlarged with the addition of Uzbekistan in 1999 and formalised in 2001 with the creation of the SCO.5 The Shanghai process generated cooperation agreements in various issue areas, ranging from border disputes to economic cooperation to anti-terrorism measures. In this way, China established a firm diplomatic presence in the region. The September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, 105 2504Chap6 7/4/03 12:40 pm Page 106 Security threats however, have had a lasting

in Limiting institutions?
Explaining foreign policy variation

that the public largely defers to or is readily manipulated by such elites. Mansfield and Snyder (1995) suggest that in unconsolidated democracies, where electoral success may depend on playing the nationalist card, competitive politics may actually introduce higher levels of bellicosity into the policy-making process. The test cases in the Middle East which arguably best approximate the democratic-pluralist model are Israel and Turkey by virtue of their higher levels of institutionalisation, tolerance of opposition, and regular use of competitive elections in elite

in The international politics of the Middle East