This text aims to fill a gap in the field of Middle Eastern political studies by combining international relations theory with concrete case studies. It begins with an overview of the rules and features of the Middle East regional system—the arena in which the local states, including Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Israel and the Arab states of Syria, Jordan and Iraq, operate. The book goes on to analyse foreign-policy-making in key states, illustrating how systemic determinants constrain this policy-making, and how these constraints are dealt with in distinctive ways depending on the particular domestic features of the individual states. Finally, it goes on to look at the outcomes of state policies by examining several major conflicts including the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Gulf War, and the system of regional alignment. The study assesses the impact of international penetration in the region, including the historic reasons behind the formation of the regional state system. It also analyses the continued role of external great powers, such as the United States and the former Soviet Union, and explains the process by which the region has become incorporated into the global capitalist market.
philosophy of Hegel, I will show that there are resources within a
theory of recognition which point to important questions of
international political theory often ignored by liberal political
theory. In what follows I will develop an understanding of
recognition as a ‘hinge concept’ – one which links economic
relations, the juridical form, moral claims and political
relations, this study will deploy a combination of several to capture its complex reality.
The Middle East is arguably the epicentre of world crisis, chronically war-prone and the site of the world’s most protracted conflicts. It appears to be the region where the anarchy and insecurity seen by the realist school of international politics as the main feature of states systems remains most in evidence and where the realist paradigm retains its greatest relevance. Yet neo-realism’s 1 a-historical tendency to assume states systems to be unchanging
percent. By the end of the decade the American market accounted for 8.8 and 8.3 of all Turkish imports and exports respectively. 68 Turkey exported to the United States a wide range of products, including, despite heavy competition from China’s dirt cheap products, textiles and steel, where Turkish exports increased by 17 percent, and even pasta, with Turkish pasta competing successfully with traditional Italian products. Hoping to expand their profitable trade relations even further, the United States and Turkey opened negotiations over the establishment of a free
In a 1992 issue of Time magazine, in an article on Turkey, the writer inserted the following “ad” in the middle:
Nation to serve as go-between for the Western world and the Middle East and assist in turning suspicion into cooperation. Must be firm U.S.–European ally desirous of still closer ties yet, Islamic in religion and culture, capable of serving as a role model of secularized Western democracy for other Muslim states. Ethnic links with some of those states, booming free-market
The European union’s policy in the field of arms export controls
Sibylle Bauer and Eric Remacle
Walker 1993 ; Schmitt 2000 ).
This process of defence industry Europeanisation has been
determined to a large extent by the post-Cold War reduction in military
expenditure; the fast pace of technological change and spiralling costs of
modern weapons systems; shrinking domestic and export markets; and increased
availability of surplus weapons. Other factors contributing to an increased
co-ordination of export policies are the
Two characteristics formerly featuring prominently in Israeli–Turkish relations have vanished from the scene of late. There is now no trace of the “mistress syndrome,” the low profile, to revert to the terms of the complaint voiced by Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion. 1 Dr Uri Gordon, the first Israeli Ambassador to Turkey – representation at ambassadorial level, not legation, began in late 1991 – who had started on August 1990 as Chargé d’Affaires in the Israeli Legation in Ankara, and became the first Ambassador on 31
the Muslim republics, the special relations with Israel, a rapprochement with Russia – all serve as alternatives to the alienation Turkey faces in Europe. Suffice it to mention the importance of markets for Turkish goods and sources for energy needs among the producing countries around the Caspian Sea. Similarly, lessening the dependence on Arab energy by procuring oil and gas from the Central Asian markets is another incentive for good Turkish–Turkic interaction. Central Asia is of vital political and strategic importance for Ankara: it borders with Iran and Russia
states capital and markets and the non-oil states labour. The resulting economic interdependence would arguably create cross-national business interests with a stake in peace.
However, the practical prospects for Arab–Israeli economic integration appeared quite selective at the end of the 1990s. Israel and the oil-poor Arab states had little in common and Israeli economic relations with Egypt, in spite of their long peace treaty, remained minimal. Amidst continuing political mistrust, the Israeli–American-backed Middle East market was perceived by
The foreign policy of the European Union
is in many ways a puzzle to students of international relations. Doubts
about whether there is in reality a European foreign policy contrast with
empirical observations of the considerable influence exerted by the EU, if
not always in the international system at large, then at least in Europe.
Such observations imply that the EU has a ‘foreign policy’ of