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Council observers. The amendment (the ‘Nuuk criteria’) required aspiring observers to submit comprehensive applications detailing how they fulfilled the seven observer criteria, including demonstration of Arctic interests; financial and material contributions to the work of the Council; recognition of the Arctic states’ sovereignty and jurisdiction over the region; and support for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the prevailing legal framework for the Arctic. Furthermore, the Task Force on Institutional Cooperation had produced, during the Swedish chairmanship

in Arctic governance

of goods and services. Domestic and external competition provides the incentives that unleash entrepreneurship and technological progress. But markets cannot operate in a vacuum – they require a legal and regulatory framework that only governments can provide. And, at many other tasks, markets sometimes prove inadequate or fail

in The Third Way and beyond

from the Soviet period (in Staalesen, 2016). Russian companies are also increasingly aware of their environmental obligations as part of their broader social responsibility, although issues remain on how environmental policy is implemented in practice in areas marked by ageing industrial infrastructure and weak regulatory capacity (Kelman et al., 2016). Large state, quiet voice in Arctic politics: 1997–​2007 So, how did Russia bring its post-​Soviet Arctic to the Arctic Council in its first decade of existence? This section examines first Russia’s participation in

in Arctic governance

conditions and for the purposes provided for’ by the provisions of the Treaty, while Art. N TEU renders all parts of the Treaty subject to the same revision rules. And since the TEU rests on two different sets of legal mechanisms – the Community Method and intergovernmental co-operation – the extent to which it has provided for a ‘single institutional framework’ is far from self-evident. However, Demaret recognises that ‘the dividing line between the two types of mechanisms and between their respective fields of application is, in several instances, less than clear-cut’.7

in Theory and reform in the European Union
Open Access (free)

insights which are valid starting points for the purpose of comparison and evaluation.’2 Or, as alternatively put by Keohane and Hoffmann: ‘Attempts to avoid theory . . . not only miss interesting questions but rely on a framework for analysis that remains unexamined precisely because it is implicit.’3 True, a great deal has still 2 Theory and reform in the European Union to be accomplished. But as long as theory-building is at the top of the academic agenda, there is good ground for thinking that important possibilities are deemed to be explored. But what might

in Theory and reform in the European Union
New polity dynamics

principles (see below). As suggested in Chapter 3, flexibility was finally included in the AMT though in a way that precludes the creation of a Europe à la carte by introducing stringent conditions for its application. More specifically, such ‘reinforced co-operation’ should further the objectives of the Union and protect its interests; respect the principles of the Treaties and the single institutional framework; be used only as a last resort; concern at least a majority of EU members; respect the acquis communautaire; not affect the competences, rights, obligations and

in Theory and reform in the European Union

start to be taken to ‘catch up’. The point was made by the US chairmanship team at an early SAO meeting during American leadership. A paper introduced by the chairmanship made the following point about the sheer number of regulatory and knowledge-​based recommendations that have been made:  ‘there have been  –​by one account  –​some 238 recommendations made by the Arctic Council on oil and gas activities’ (US Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, 2016a:  2–​3 (emphasis in original)). This was celebrated in the report as an indication that the Council had effectively

in Arctic governance

the term ‘Third Way’ by several years. At the heart of New Labour’s Third Way is the claim that economic efficiency and social justice can be symbiotic. I argue that the articulation of a particular concept of citizenship is a crucial element of the framework that New Labour believes is necessary in order to achieve this. This argument is supported by evidence drawn from a discursive

in The Third Way and beyond
Open Access (free)
A power perspective on Arctic governance

) identified many of the regulatory gaps that were important in developing the Polar Code to regulate ice-​covered waters, negotiated by Arctic and non-​Arctic states alike within the International Maritime Organization (Brigham, n.d.). The notion of a policy ‘field’ draws upon sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s work, as interpreted by IR researchers. In this perspective, a field delineates a particular realm of interaction with internal rules about appropriate behaviour. Sending (2015) argues that fields in global governance should be understood as organised around concepts of

in Arctic governance
Open Access (free)
Relations between the European Union and Mercosur

agreement. Firstly, Giordano claims, this agreement would allow both regions to deal with a multi-polar global governance system. Secondly, this agreement would set an example for the European Commission on how to develop trade and cooperation relations with other countries and regions. In addition to this, Giordano argues that the inter-regional association agreement would also strengthen the historical links between Latin America/Mercosur, Spain and Portugal. However, more importantly, this agreement would secure a regulatory framework for the EU’s FDI in the region

in The European Union's policy towards Mercosur: