For over five decades, the Cold War security agenda was distinguished by the principal strategic balance, that of a structure of bipolarity, between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR). This book seeks to draw from current developments in critical security studies in order to establish a new framework of inquiry for security in the Middle East. It addresses the need to redefine security in the Middle East. The focus is squarely on the Arab-Israeli context in general, and the Palestinian-Israeli context in particular. The character of Arab-Israeli relations are measured by the Israeli foreign policy debate from the 1950s to the 1990s. A dialogue between Islam and Islamism as a means to broaden the terrain on which conflict resolution and post-bipolar security in the Middle East is to be understood is presented. The Middle East peace process (MEPP) was an additional factor in problematizing the military-strategic concept of security in the Middle East. The shift in analysis from national security to human security reflects the transformations of the post-Cold War era by combining military with non-military concerns such as environmental damage, social unrest, economic mismanagement, cultural conflict, gender inequity and radical fundamentalism. By way of contrast to realist international relations (IR) theory, developing-world theorists have proposed a different set of variables to explain the unique challenges facing developing states. Finally, the book examines the significance of ecopolitics in security agendas in the Middle East.
Obama, Trump and the Asia Pacific political economy
, 61 : 1 ( 2009 ), pp. 121 – 54 .
3 M. Mastanduno , ‘ Partner politics: Russia, China, and the challenge of extending US hegemony after the ColdWar ’, Security Studies , 28 : 3 ( 2019 ), pp. 479 – 504 .
4 See R. Jervis , ‘ International primacy: Is the game worth the candle? ’ International Security , 17 : 4 ( 1993 ), pp. 53 – 4 .
5 White House, ‘National Security Strategy of the United States’ (September 2002), www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf , accessed 13 March 2019.
6 See P. Trubowitz , Politics and Strategy: Partisan
action is not particularly supportive of institutionalised security cooperation or the wholesale embrace of the European system
of security governance.
At the same time, this security dilemma has become less intense and
inverted along Eurasia’s western frontier. Within Europe, the postwar security dilemma of military insecurity has been replaced by the post-ColdWarsecurity dilemma of ensuring political and economic stability along its
borders. The nations of western Europe fear the negative consequences of
political and economic insecurity in eastern Europe and
events gave rise to some strong criticisms of
NATO’s apparent lack of collective interest; with arguments being made
that this demonstrated the institution’s unsuitability for dealing
with post-ColdWarsecurity crises in the wider Europe. More specifically,
the limitations of PfP as a promoter of stability amongst the partner states
were criticised. 49
Although by no means all observers took this view, 50 NATO members
Paths to peace for
NATO’s partnerships in Eurasia
Joshua B. Spero
This chapter examines the role of multilateral cooperative efforts and institutionalised security cooperation in the Eurasian area through a study of
NATO’s PfP programme. In terms of measuring the capacity to increase
Eurasian security, the general track record of the post-ColdWarsecurity
institutions in non-traditional areas of societal democratisation, economic
modernisation, civil and cross-border war prevention, and Eurasian integration presents a
German security policy since 1989. The aim of this chapter, consequently, is to consider the concept of strategic culture in greater detail
and to locate it within the ﬁeld of security studies.
Neo-realism and German normalisation
As the Cold War came to a close, a frenzy of analysis on the future
of German security policy emerged. Consideration of how German
post-ColdWarsecurity policy might develop reﬂected a far broader
and fundamental discussion, within the discipline of international
Longhurst, Germany and the use of force
naval forces in the monitoring of the UN embargo against
Yugoslavia in the Adriatic.
The court’s ultimate decision
In mapping the trajectory of change in Germany’s post-ColdWarsecurity policy, the Constitutional Court’s decision of 12 July 1994 is of
central signiﬁcance. This decision essentially ratiﬁed the CDU–CSU
strategy of incrementally extending the Bundeswehr’s remit, without
recourse to constitutional amendments. The decision gave a clear
green light to further Bundeswehr deployments by dismissing SPD and
FDP objections to the Bundeswehr’s involvement in
successive reform documents and eﬀorts to reshape the Bundeswehr to meet new post-ColdWarsecurity challenges, continuity
rather than change characterised the policy and politics of conscription. This static situation in Germany stands in stark contrast to change
elsewhere in Europe and sets Berlin aside from its main partners in
terms of the personnel structures of its national armed forces. The
diminishing utility of conscription has already been recognised by many
other European states, where moves have been underway since the ending of the Cold War to abolish the
contemporary operations of US foreign policy. Having steadily, if unevenly, transformed the landscape of the region from at least the middle of the nineteenth century, from Alaska to Guam to the Philippines to Japan and beyond, the United States maintains its pursuit of regional imperial hegemony today. It does so through institutionalised and consensual networks of partners and allies, enabled by the availability and application of political/economic and military power to extend control from the centre out to vulnerable frontiers. Washington’s ColdWarsecurity frameworks
I N ITS
FORMATIVE stages, the study of the theory and
practice of security in all the world’s regional subsystems,
including that of the Middle East, was defined primarily by the logic of
superpower rivalry. For over five decades, the ColdWarsecurity agenda
was distinguished by the principal strategic balance, that of a
structure of bipolarity, between the