-market economy, permitting some assistance to poorer brethren highly desirable. Benefits: regional superpower within a few years; eventual major influence on wider world affairs possible.
To which the article’s author observed, “There is no need to look for such a country: Turkey fits every specification. Moreover, it wants the job.” 1
This chapter will look at Turkey before and after the GulfWar, starting in the mid-1980s and concluding at the end of the 1990s. It will examine, among other things, the Time writer’s glib assertion
Turkey's involvement in the Gulf War in 1991 paved the way for the country's acceptance into the European Union. This book traces that process, and in the first part looks at Turkey's foreign policy in the 1990s, considering the ability of the country to withstand the repercussions of the fall of communism. It focuses on Turkey's achievement in halting and minimising the effects of the temporary devaluation in its strategic importance that resulted from the waning of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union; the skilful way in which Turkey avoided becoming embroiled in the ethnic upheavals in Central Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East; and the development of a continued policy of closer integration into the European and western worlds. Internal politics are the focus of the second part of the book, addressing the curbing of the Kurdish revolt, the economic gains made and the strengthening of civil society. The book goes on to analyse the prospects for Turkey in the twenty-first century, in the light of the possible integration into Europe, which may leave the country's leadership free to deal effectively with domestic issues.
Mobilising the concept of strategic culture, this study develops a framework for understanding developments in German security policy between 1990 and 2003. Germany's contemporary security policies are characterised by a peculiar mix of continuity and change. From abstention in the first Gulf war, to early peacekeeping missions in Bosnia in the early 1990s and a full combat role in Kosovo in 1999, the pace of change in German security policy since the end of the Cold War has been breathtaking. The extent of this change has recently, however, been questioned, as seen most vividly in Berlin's response to ‘9/11’ and its subsequent stalwart opposition to the US-led war on terrorism in Iraq in 2003. Beginning with a consideration of the notion of strategic culture, the study refines and adapts the concept to the case of Germany through a consideration of aspects of the rearmament of West Germany. It then critically evaluates the transformation of the role of the Bundeswehr up to and including the war on terrorism, together with Germany's troubled efforts to enact defence reforms, as well as the complex politics surrounding the policy of conscription. By focusing on both the ‘domestics’ of security policy decision making as well as the changing and often contradictory expectations of Germany's allies, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of the role played by Germany's particular strategic culture in shaping policy choices. It concludes by pointing to the vibrancy of Germany's strategic culture.
This text aims to fill a gap in the field of Middle Eastern political studies by combining international relations theory with concrete case studies. It begins with an overview of the rules and features of the Middle East regional system—the arena in which the local states, including Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Israel and the Arab states of Syria, Jordan and Iraq, operate. The book goes on to analyse foreign-policy-making in key states, illustrating how systemic determinants constrain this policy-making, and how these constraints are dealt with in distinctive ways depending on the particular domestic features of the individual states. Finally, it goes on to look at the outcomes of state policies by examining several major conflicts including the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Gulf War, and the system of regional alignment. The study assesses the impact of international penetration in the region, including the historic reasons behind the formation of the regional state system. It also analyses the continued role of external great powers, such as the United States and the former Soviet Union, and explains the process by which the region has become incorporated into the global capitalist market.
represented a final victory for Western liberal democracy – an unexpected Hegelian
denouement in the knotweed of History. Their euphoria – albeit short-lived –
provided the entrance music for a new ethical order, constructed by the US, with a basis in
liberal humanitarian norms. Without any direct and immediate threat to its hegemony, the US
merged its geostrategy with a humanitarian ethics. In 1991, after the GulfWar, the US invaded
Iraq in the name of humanitarian concern. The following year, to the applause of numerous
humanitarian NGOs, it led a
An Interview with Celso Amorim, Former Brazilian Foreign Minister
?’ But regardless of hypocrisy and selectivity, there was a general acceptance that
there existed this kind of order, in which the US broadly set the terms. At the ILO
[International Labour Organisation], the US refused to sign many of the conventions, but it
demanded that other countries sign. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this order
expanded. This was the world I encountered when I was appointed foreign minister for the first time, by
[Brazilian President] Itamar Franco, just after the GulfWar. US hegemony was almost
in what became the GulfWar. My argument is that Hollywood produced a
particular ‘regime of truth’ 2 about America’s war in Vietnam and that this
body of ‘knowledge’ was ‘articulated’ 3 by George Bush as an enabling
‘memory’ in the build up to the GulfWar.
Vietnam revisionism and the GulfWar
In the weeks leading up to the GulfWar, Newsweek featured a cover showing a photograph of a
It has been said that Turkey’s participation in the Korean War in the 1950s bought it the entrance ticket into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Forty years later, in 1991, Turkey participated in the GulfWar. Not a single Turkish soldier crossed the Iraqi–Turkish border, yet the six or so Turkish divisions that were deployed along the border drew off Iraqi forces from the Kuwaiti battlefield. This was meant by Turkey’s late President, Torgut Ozal, to pave the way towards his country’s accession into the European Union (EU). Was
Virtuousness, virtuality and virtuosity in NATO’s representation of the Kosovo campaign
Jean Baudrillard’s diagnosis of the GulfWar also applies to this
latest expression of organised violence in contemporary politics. 2 This is not to deny
that death and destruction defined the reality in Kosovo and Serbia in
the first half of 1999. After all, NATO planes delivered large amounts
of ordnance upon targets in this area, destroying both military and
civilian infrastructure; killing civilians as well as soldiers. And
cold war, the United States found Turkey to be a much more valuable ally than Greece, particularly in its battle against the Soviet Union and communism. This bias continued well into the late 1980s and 1990s. In order to secure Turkish cooperation during the Gulfwar, Washington put the Cyprus dispute on hold. Ignoring Greece’s insistence on the strong parallels between Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and Turkey’s acting likewise in Cyprus, President Bush announced that Cyprus would not be included in the American search for peace in the Middle East. The dispute in Cyprus