This book looks at the theoretical issue of how a democracy can defend itself from those wishing to subvert or destroy it without being required to take measures that would impinge upon the basic principles of the democratic idea. It links social and institutional perspectives to the study, and includes a case study of the Israeli response to Jewish extremism and violence, which tests the theoretical framework outlined in the first chapter. There is an extensive diachronic scrutiny of the state's response to extremist political parties, violent organizations and the infrastructure of extremism and intolerance within Israeli society. The book emphasises the dynamics of the response and the factors that encourage or discourage the shift from less democratic and more democratic models of response.
and of transforming the Jewish national character from a persecuted minority in the diaspora into a sovereign and independent majority in Palestine. The army was given a special role in the transformation of both the Israeli citizen and Israeli society ( Almog, 1993 ), and the process of state development. Over the years, the protracted Arab–Israeli conflict has effectively positioned the state and
democracy. First, in a country such as Israel, the official authorities have not yet forged a clear-cut policy on the central principles by which its future citizens should be educated. Therefore, there is ample space for intervention by non-state institutions seeking to promote an education in democratic values either by means of school courses or less formal avenues. A no less important role is reserved for civil organisations hoping to bridge the various and gaping social abysses of Israeli society. Second, these same non
) On the one hand, Ben-Gurion and his followers, most notably Pinhas Lavon, defence minister (1954–55), Moshe Dayan, Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) chief of staff (1953–58) and Shimon Peres, director general of the Defence Ministry, advocated a more militant and aggressive orientation, not only for Israel’s foreign and military policies but for the structuring of Israeli society in general. This included
, e.g. curtailing the freedom of speech of political opponents, the exclusion of ethnic minorities from society and Israeli politics, a call for a strong leadership that can navigate the country as it sees fit and an increase in religious legislation. Comparative research further accentuates the extremist profile of certain sectors of Israeli society and reveals that adolescent Israeli students tend to score very highly on measures of ethnocentrism and authoritarianism in comparison to students abroad. 31 Quandaries accompanying the efforts to
discourse about single women, and not only in Israeli society. It represents a cosmic linear temporal order, upon which social order is established and regulated. In Zerubavel’s (1981) words, this can be seen as our search for the temporal regularity which makes our life understandable. In this instance the train, the train tracks, and stations all symbolize the regularity of the temporal structure of our social life. Moreover, it also provides single women and their surroundings with the means of measuring their movements in time, and the extent to which they adhere
very far from the liberal democratic vision. A central assumption outlined in the Introduction was that for the ‘defending democracy’ to make the transition from the ‘militant’ to the ‘immunised’ route, it would take more than just a reduction in the intensity of the State’s response to extremism. In order to arrive at the goal of ‘immunisation’, the scope of the response must also be extended and the principal expression of this must be the strengthening and fortifying of the democratic infrastructure of Israeli society. Until liberal democratic ideas are
itself, can become something that is used to sell or buy products and services on the market. In other words, when does a specific experience of an individual come to be regarded as capital in a Bourdieusian sense and beget value? In this case experience in the military and security industry is meaningful within Israeli society, as I explain shortly, and gives someone status. It is then exported
non-liberal ‘ethnic democracy’ – provides fertile grounds for the flourishing of ethnocentric, ultra-national and in fact xenophobic manifestations. These circumstances are strikingly apparent in the field of education, which has been deeply affected by the ethnic character of the Israeli democracy and, in my opinion, may still prove to be the principal control for the State’s aspiration to curb extremism in Israeli society. Both prior to the State’s establishment and in the years following, the Hebrew education system has served as a pawn in the hands of the
alliance of right-wing parties with the Herut at its forefront) was successful in superseding the Labour Party as the party in control of government. During the course of those years, the need for party disqualification did not arise. However, the profound changes that Israeli society went through prepared the ground for political extremism. In the long run, this led the country into confrontation with a racist and anti-democratic party that declared its intentions to essentially change the State’s character by abolishing democracy, deporting its Arab citizens and