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The European Union and its member states

This book takes up traditional approaches to political science. It aims to offer a mixture of conventional and specific analyses and insights for different groups of readers. In view of the European Union's multi-level and multi-actor polity, the book highlights the complex procedural and institutional set-up of nation states preparing and implementing decisions made by the institutions of the European Community (EC). In looking at the emerging and evolving realities of the European polity, it shows how European institutions and Member States (re-)act and interact in a new institutional and procedural set-up. It explores how governmental and non-governmental actors in different national settings adapt to common challenges, constraints and opportunities for which they are mainly themselves responsible. The book discusses the Belgian policy toward European integration as a significant demonstration of its commitment to multilateralism and international co-operation in security and economic affairs. Attitudes to European integration in Denmark, Germany, Finland, Greece, and Spain are discussed. Tendencies towards 'Europeanisation' and 'sectoralisation' of the ministerial administration during the process of European integration and the typical administrative pluralism of the Italian political system seem to have mutually reinforced each other. Strong multi-level players are able to increase their access and influence at both levels and to use their position on one level for strengthening their say on the other. German and Belgian regions might develop into these kinds of actors. A persistent trend during the 1990s is traced towards stronger national performers, particularly in terms of adaptations and reactions to Maastricht Treaty.

From model to symbol

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the European Union (EU) stands out as an important regional organization. This book focuses on the influence of the World Bank on the EU development cooperation policy, with special emphasis on the Lomé Convention. It explains the influence of trade liberalisation on EU trade preferences and provides a comparative analysis of the content and direction of the policies developed towards the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP), the Mediterranean, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. It looks at the trade-related directorates and their contribution to the phenomenon referred as 'trade liberalisation'. This includes trends towards the removal or elimination of trade preferences and the ideology underlying this reflected in and created by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organisation (GATT/WTO). The book examines the role of the mass media because the media are supposed to play a unique role in encouraging political reactions to humanitarian emergencies. The bolting on to development 'policy' of other continents, and the separate existence of a badly run Humanitarian Office (ECHO), brought the lie to the Maastricht Treaty telling us that the EU really had a coherent development policy. The Third World in general, and Africa in particular, are becoming important components in the EU's efforts to develop into a significant international player. The Cotonou Agreement proposes to end the preferential trade margins accorded to non-least developed ACP states in favour of more liberal free trade agreements strongly shaped by the WTO agenda.

Bureaucratic politics in EU aid – from the Lomé leap forward to the difficulties of adapting to the twenty-first century

, usually impelled by a creative President such as Roy Jenkins (Economic and Monetary Union) and, most spectacularly, Jacques Delors (the setting up of the single European market in 1993, the European Union and the Maastricht Treaty). Under weaker Presidents, however, the Commission was revealed to be perhaps the least accountable European institution of all, and this caused periodic crises of legitimacy as well as policy, most strikingly in 1999 under Jacques Santer. In the Treaty of Rome, the presence of the kernel of what was later to become a development policy was

in EU development cooperation

of the single market) and of a new co-operation procedure upgrading (under certain conditions) the legislative role of the EP, can be said to correspond to what neofunctionalists originally had in mind: the regional centralisation of authoritative decision-making driven by the expansive logic of integration and, eventually, the emergence of a new European ‘political community’. Reflections on the TEU This section considers the state of theorising European integration in the 1990s in relation to the political and constitutional physiognomy of the Maastricht Treaty

in Theory and reform in the European Union

unconstitutional to some extent. At the very least a confusing picture is presented: the Land representatives in the German delegation in Brussels receive a double status; to the outsider they are representatives of the federal government, but internally they are representatives of the Länder.20 The negotiation and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) The Maastricht Treaty on the EC and EU, which we will refer to as the Treaty on European Union (TEU), represents a new stage in the process of European integration.21 It was designed not only to adapt the EC to a new Europe

in The Länder and German federalism
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Partial offsets and unfinished business

3 The Amsterdam reforms Partial offsets and unfinished business Introduction As a result of the IGC 1996/97, the member governments of the Union signed in Amsterdam, in June 1997, the Treaty which partially reformed the Maastricht Treaty. All those who linked the outcome of the review conference with the construction of a democratically organised European polity, or even regarded it as an opportunity for a more or less permanent clarification of the physiognomy of the Union, have no real grounds for celebration as realism, in the end, seems to have had its way

in Theory and reform in the European Union
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In pursuit of influence and legitimacy

February 1986. But the Maastricht Treaty was first voted down by a narrow majority of 50.7 per cent on 2 June 1992. By the time it was accepted in a second referendum on 18 May 1993 by 56.7 per cent of the electorate, Denmark had secured four exemptions or reservations at the Edinburgh summit in December 1992.1 One of these dealt with EMU, where Denmark decided not to take part in the third phase. The three other reservations dealt with citizenship of the Union, JHA co-operation and defence policy. Denmark would not join the Western European Union (WEU) and would take

in Fifteen into one?
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Flexible and pragmatic adaptation

deepening of the European integration process is carried by a broad consensus. For instance, Luxembourg was one of the first states to ratify the Maastricht Treaty by a large majority, and thus openly demonstrated its deep commitment to the introduction of a single European currency, a CFSP and progress in the JHA area. However, even the smallest Member State is sometimes susceptible to reservations about the idea of integration. In particular, the concept of citizenship of the European Union, which was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, according to which EU citizens

in Fifteen into one?
Structuring self-made offers and demands

-building To test different theory-led expectations and their impact on the Member States,1 in view of the Maastricht Treaty, we proceed in two steps. First, we explore the evolution of EC/EU primary law, e.g. treaty provisions. With regard to the institutional and procedural design ‘before’ and ‘after’ the TEU we scrutinise forms of decision-making rules within the EC/EU from its foundation. More precisely, we look at the evolution of decisionmaking rules in the Council of Ministers and the decision-making procedures involving the Council and the EP. We thus sketch the

in Fifteen into one?
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A never-ending story of mutual attraction and estrangement

on Article 28 §3 of the Greek Constitution passed by a vote of simple majority in Parliament. There was debate over ratification, with arguments that a three-fifths majority or even a constitutional referendum was needed to operate the transfer of sovereignty that accession entailed. This debate was sidetracked when in 1981 PASOK gained government and was keen not to jeopardise Greek accession. Future calls for referendum ratification of the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty were ignored at minimal political cost.4 In the first phases of Greek

in Fifteen into one?