Eurasian security governance has received increasing attention since 1989. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the institution that best served the security interests of the West in its competition with the Soviet Union, is now relatively ill-equipped resolve the threats emanating from Eurasia to the Atlantic system of security governance. This book investigates the important role played by identity politics in the shaping of the Eurasian security environment. It investigates both the state in post-Soviet Eurasia as the primary site of institutionalisation and the state's concerted international action in the sphere of security. This investigation requires a major caveat: state-centric approaches to security impose analytical costs by obscuring substate and transnational actors and processes. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon marked the maturation of what had been described as the 'new terrorism'. Jervis has argued that the western system of security governance produced a security community that was contingent upon five necessary and sufficient conditions. The United States has made an effort to integrate China, Russia into the Atlantic security system via the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation has become engaged in disseminating security concerns in fields such as environment, energy and economy. If the end of the Cold War left America triumphant, Russia's new geopolitical hand seemed a terrible demotion. Successfully rebalancing the West and building a collaborative system with Russia, China, Europe and America probably requires more wisdom and skill from the world's leaders.
NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation on 22 April 1999, in Presse- und
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bulletin , no. 19, 23
April 1999, p. 193.
‘The Alliance’s New Strategic
Concept’, agreed at the North Atlantic Council in Rome,
7–8 November 1991, section 15, available online: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c911107a
Russia in terms of business, but also in sensitive areas including in
the military and intelligence domains.
Another interpretation draws attention to the persistent
friction between the West, particularly in its institutional forms such
as the European Union (EU) and NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation (NATO)
and Russia, whether over questions of wider Euro-Atlantic security, such
as that caused by the
Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic
Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation (19–20 November 2010),
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm . A
Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy , Brussels (12 December 2003), www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
, rather, is to examine and assess the impact of the Kosovo
crisis on the continuing evolution and development of key issues relating to
post-Cold War European security overall.
In measuring this impact the discussions begin, logically, with
the NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation (NATO). This was the chosen
instrument through which its member states sought to achieve their objective
of compelling the government of President
, from the inter-war period, to be one of ideological division
and confrontation – no longer mainly between fascism and communism,
but between communism on the one hand, and capitalism and democracy on the other.
The United States’ creation of the NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation
(NATO) in 1949 together with eleven West European countries merely
confirmed the American commitment to the old continent as manifested
through the Marshall Plan. Based on the Washington agreement, NATO
committed the participating countries to consider ‘an attack on one of
them as an attack
Quotations taken from the text of the treaty
reprinted in The NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation: Facts and
Figures (Brussels, NATO, 1989), p. 376.
The presence of non-democracies in NATO’s
ranks remained a bone of contention. See ‘Heirs of Pericles’
in ‘Knights in shining armour? – A survey of NATO
The Weberian principle of the state as possessing a legitimate monopoly on violence is fading. Sovereigns no longer hold this monopoly; it now belongs to the international community. This chapter investigates the effects of this fading of legitimacy. Expanding on a framework suggested by the Copenhagen School of international relations, the chapter argues that the Kosovo war is a crucial part of two on-going shifts. In Kosovo, the states going to war as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Alliance represented themselves as 'humanity', the implication being that Serbia was cast as an enemy not only of human rights but of humanity. The Kosovo war defines the epoch exactly because it focused on the simultaneously existing conflict lines upon which politics is constituted. Serbia's attempts to legitimise its stance as a warring state defending the idea of state sovereignty was represented as an anachronism.
Virtuousness, virtuality and virtuosity in NATO’s representation of the Kosovo campaign
Jean Baudrillard's diagnosis of the Gulf War applies to the expression of organised violence in contemporary politics. This chapter describes that Kosovo campaign lends evidence to the suspicion that war as such no longer 'takes place', but that it has transmogrified into a different game with a different logic. As Paul Patton argues in his Introduction to Baudrillard's The Gulf War, virtual war, the war over truth rather than territory, is an integral part of modern warfare. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has conducted an epistemic war to secure its privileged moral status, fighting against the systemic anarchy of the international system, the inherent ambivalence and undecidability that necessitates and demands the political designation of identity. The chapter analyses NATO's virtuoso campaign to virtualise Operation Allied Force in order to represent itself as the virtuous actor in the messy reality of war.