Search results

Martina Mercinelli and Martin J. Smith

The construction of an underground car park beneath the main square of Turin, Italy in 2004 led to the unearthing of the skeletonised remains of twenty-two individuals attributable to the early eighteenth century. At this time the city was besieged during the War of the Spanish Succession in a hard-fought battle that resulted in unexpected triumph for the Piedmontese, a victory that marked a fundamental turning point in Italian history. The current study assesses the strength of evidence linking the excavated individuals to the siege and assesses their possible role in the battle through consideration of their biological profiles, patterns of pathology and the presence of traumatic injuries. This article presents the first analysis of evidence for the siege of Turin from an anthropological point of view, providing new and unbiased information from the most direct source of evidence available: the remains of those who actually took part.

Human Remains and Violence: An Interdisciplinary Journal
John J. Hurt

4 The ordeal of the parlementaires To fund the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1714), Michel Chamillart, the controller general, increased current taxes, invented new taxes, borrowed heavily and manipulated the currency, the customary methods long called into use by hard-pressed finance ministers.1 Like Pontchartrain, but with greater frequency, he also extracted large sums from the parlements; and his successor, Nicolas Desmarets, continued to pursue them financially. Long before the war ended, the magistrates had reached the limits of their financial

in Louis XIV and the parlements
John J. Hurt

supposed that the parlements remained free of office creations all during the reign, which, if true, would have compensated the judges for the effects of the 1665 edict. However, their immunity on this point did not much outlive Colbert himself.36 The need to finance the War of the League of Augsburg (1689–1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713/1714) obliged Colbert’s successors to create venal offices in the thousands and to extend venality into the recently acquired province of Franche-Comté. Not since the 1630s, under Richelieu, had new, and increasingly

in Louis XIV and the parlements

By expanding the geographical scope of the history of violence and war, this volume challenges both Western and state-centric narratives of the decline of violence and its relationship to modernity. It highlights instead similarities across early modernity in terms of representations, legitimations, applications of, and motivations for violence. It seeks to integrate methodologies of the study of violence into the history of war, thereby extending the historical significance of both fields of research. Thirteen case studies outline the myriad ways in which large-scale violence was understood and used by states and non-state actors throughout the early modern period across Africa, Asia, the Americas, the Atlantic, and Europe, demonstrating that it was far more complex than would be suggested by simple narratives of conquest and resistance. Moreover, key features of imperial violence apply equally to large-scale violence within societies. As the authors argue, violence was a continuum, ranging from small-scale, local actions to full-blown war. The latter was privileged legally and increasingly associated with states during early modernity, but its legitimacy was frequently contested and many of its violent forms, such as raiding and destruction of buildings and crops, could be found in activities not officially classed as war.

Peter H. Wilson

the use of port facilities, transit for troops or war materials across another party’s territory, or for the supply of intelligence or expertise. The recent literature on the ‘contractor state’ has noted the significance of entrepreneurs, who were often more important in supplying the material needs of armies and navies than procurement from state-owned factories or yards.16 To date, this literature has 1999). For a detailed example of the role of non-state actors as brokers for international loans, see Aaron Graham, ‘The War of the Spanish Succession, the Financial

in Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation in Europe, 1494–1789
Open Access (free)
Thomas Salmon’s Modern History
Ben Dew

. Partnered with improvements in the collection of tax revenue, the expansion of borrowing caused a substantial increase in annual government expenditure, which climbed from £1.8 million in 1688 to £6.2 million in 1695, and after 1710 remained consistently over £5 million.4 Access to such financial resources played a vital part in securing British successes in the Wars of the Grand Alliance and Spanish Succession, and enabled the English and, later, British state to fund larger and more permanent bureaucracies and armies. This, in turn, helped to protect the state from

in Commerce, finance and statecraft
Sweden and the lesser powers in the long eighteenth century
Erik Bodensten

–787, 791–792; Wilson, German Armies, pp. 97–100. The problems with receiving subsidies 121 During the latter part of the seventeenth century, for example, Brandenburg provided troops for the emperor in the wars against France and the Ottoman Empire in exchange for subsidies, but also in exchange for various forms of political, diplomatic, and legal assistance. To crown it all, so to speak, in November 1700, just before the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), the electoral prince Friedrich I (1657–1713) concluded a subsidy agreement with the

in Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation in Europe, 1494–1789
Anuschka Tischer

’ (verkappte Subsidien).14 It is remarkable that Sweden used at least 14 per cent of its French subsidies not for military but for diplomatic expenses, in particular for financing its delegation during the peace talks in Osnabrück.15 On the other hand, in an earlier study on the role of subsidies in the War of the Spanish Succession, Max Braubach referred to them as a ‘substitute’ (Ersatz) for pensions, a judgement made on the basis of a short overview of the historical development and function of the two.16 Both views have their pros and cons and should be discussed further

in Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation in Europe, 1494–1789
Open Access (free)
Raiding war and globalization in the early modern world
Brian Sandberg

’, Journal of Modern History, 65:2 (1993). 27 Parrott, The Business of War, pp. 196–259; P. H. Wilson, The Thirty Years War: Europe’s Tragedy (Cambridge, MA, 2009), pp. 399–407. 28 J. Ostwald, Vauban Under Siege Engineering Efficiency and Martial Vigor in the War of the Spanish Succession (Leiden, 2007); G. Satterfield, Princes, Posts and Partisans: The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands (1673–1678) (Leiden, 2003); Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, pp. 538–46. 29 BNF, Mss. fr. 3562, f˚ 23. 30 D. Dessert, La royale: Vaisseaux et marins du Roi

in A global history of early modern violence
Open Access (free)
War, National Debt, and the Capitalized State
Tim Di Muzio and Richard H. Robbins

for the same power, the bank’s owner-managers worked to solidify their exclusive rights. In the Bank of England’s recharter of 1697, Parliament agreed that no other bank should be erected while the Bank of England remained in operation. As Parliament needed to finance more foreign wars, additional protections were included in renewed charters: In 1708, during the War of Spanish Succession and again in exchange for a fresh loan, the Bank obtained from Parliament its most significant protection from competition: the legal prohibition of associations of more than six

in Debt as Power