This book reviews a variety of approaches to the study of the European Union's foreign policy. Much analysis of EU foreign policy contains theoretical assumptions about the nature of the EU and its member states, their inter-relationships, the international system in which they operate and the nature of European integration. The book outlines the possibilities for the use of discourse analysis in the study of European foreign policy. It sets out to explore the research problem using a political-cultural approach and seeks to illuminate the cognitive mind-maps with which policy-makers interpret their political 'realities'. The book provides an overview and analysis of some of the non-realist approaches to international relations and foreign policy, and proposes an analytical framework with which to explore the complex interplay of factors affecting European foreign policy. The book suggests one way of seeking theoretical parsimony without sacriﬁcing the most deﬁning empirical knowledge which has been generated about Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) over the years. It argues that while the sui generis nature of CFSP presents an acute problem for international relations theory, it is less pronounced with regard to traditional integration theory. The book discusses the dimensions of European foreign policy-making with reference to the case of arms export controls. Situated at the interface between European studies and international relations, it outlines how the EU relates to the rest of the world, explaining its effort towards creating a credible, effective and principled foreign, security and defence policy.
this evolution: the European Security and
DefencePolicy (ESDP); and the emergence of a neo-conservative strand
in US foreign policy thinking.
Eﬀorts at emboldening the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy with a military dimension had been largely ineﬀectual until the end
of the 1990s, when the project was given a greater impetus by the war
in Kosovo together with a renewed Franco-British commitment to the
project. The events of 1999 compelled EU member states to create a
viable military component to empower their collective external role and
voice in the world
’s position on the war, which took the
place of the usual resolutions on foreign and defencepolicy, thus limiting debate on the prosecution of the war.
However, behind the scenes, from 1943 onwards the Labour
government ministers were actively involved in planning British postwar foreign policy. Attlee was particularly influential in discussions on
the future of Germany and the post-war settlement. In 1943 Churchill
made him chair of all the War Cabinet sub-committees dealing with
British post-war international policy, namely the committee on
current 15 EU
countries, including Great Britain; more globally engaged, with an increasingly common (but still incomplete) foreign policy that would reflect the
improved cohesion of EU countries, but with none of the political will
required for evoking yet a common defencepolicy; somewhat stronger, with
some early elements of a common security policy in place, including institutions but also minimal capabilities for rapid deployment in and beyond
Europe; and more united as a reborn superpower, though not as an emerging superstate.
Going west: an ever closer union
One of the most frequently cited
‘lessons’ of the Kosovo crisis has been the alleged extent to
which it spurred West European leaders to address a perceived need for
Europe to do more for its own military security. Member states of the
European Union decided to establish a ‘European Security and DefencePolicy’ (ESDP) in the months following Operation Allied Force .
Daalder and O’Hanlon have written
September seemed to some to have set back
the evolution of the ESDP. Marta Dassù and Nicholas Whyte have, for
example, written that, since then, ‘the idea of a ‘common’
European defencepolicy has almost instantly receded and given way to a
renewed bilateralism in transatlantic relationships’. 10 There was
increased friction within the EU in the period immediately following 11
September, when the major powers (France, the FRG and
This substantially updated and revised edition offers a comprehensive overview of the challenges confronting the political system as well as the international politics of the European Union. It draws from a spectrum of regional integration theories to determine what the Union actually is and how it is developing, examining the constitutional politics of the European Union, from the Single European Act to the Treaty of Nice and beyond. The ongoing debate on the future of Europe links together the questions of democracy and legitimacy, competences and rights, and the prospects for European polity-building. The aim is to contribute to a better understanding of the emerging European polity and the questions that further treaty reform generates for the future of the regional system. The authors also assess the evolving European security architecture; the limits and possibilities of a genuine European foreign, security and defence policy; and the role of the EU in the post-Cold War international system. Common themes involve debates about stability and instability, continuity and change, multipolarity and leadership, co-operation and discord, power capabilities and patterns of behaviour. The book traces the defining features of the ‘new order’ in Europe and incorporates an analysis of the post-September 11th context.
Anglophobia in Fascist Italy traces the roots of Fascist Anglophobia from the Great War and through the subsequent peace treaties and its development during the twenty years of Mussolini’s regime. Initially, Britain was seen by many Italians as a ‘false friend’ who was also the main obstacle to Italy’s foreign policy aspirations, a view embraced by Mussolini and his movement. While at times dormant, this Anglophobic sentiment did not disappear in the years that followed, and was later rekindled during the Ethiopian War. The peculiarly Fascist contribution to the assessment of Britain was ideological. From the mid-1920s, the regime’s intellectuals saw Fascism as the answer to a crisis in the Western world and as irredeemably opposed to Western civilisation of the sort exemplified by Britain. Britain was described as having failed the ‘problem of labour’, and Fascism framed as a salvation ideology, which nations would either embrace or face decay. The perception of Britain as a decaying and feeble nation increased after the Great Depression. The consequence of this was a consistent underrating of British power and resolve to resist Italian ambitions. An analysis of popular reception of the Fascist discourse shows that the tendency to underrate Britain had permeated large sectors of the Italian people, and that public opinion was more hostile to Britain than previously thought. Indeed, in some quarters hatred towards the British lasted until the end of the Second World War, in both occupied and liberated Italy.
the EU must conform to a number of conditions
according to the Treaty of Rome. These are:
1 They must accept all existing EU legislation.
2 They must be members of NATO (to avoid any conflict of interest over
foreign and defencepolicy).
3 They must have adequate safeguards for human rights.
4 They must have democratic political systems.
5 Their economies should be basically capitalist. This does not prevent some
public ownership of industry and public services, but, essentially, free
markets must be allowed to operate. Otherwise, Europe would no longer be
-depth political history of the evolution
of Labour’s foreign policy in the twentieth century, with volume one
based on extensive archival research, using Labour Party, Trades Union
Congress (TUC), and government papers.19 While giving centre-stage
to Labour’s foreign policy, it also includes an assessment of certain
aspects of Labour’s defencepolicy. Studying foreign policy is itself no
easy task, given that definitions of foreign policy range in their scope.20
For certain issues and for certain time periods, foreign and defencepolicy are inextricably linked and so any