Building on earlier work, this text combines theoretical perspectives with empirical work, to provide a comparative analysis of the electoral systems, party systems and governmental systems in the ethnic republics and regions of Russia. It also assesses the impact of these different institutional arrangements on democratization and federalism, moving the focus of research from the national level to the vitally important processes of institution building and democratization at the local level and to the study of federalism in Russia.
This chapter brings together the principles of attention and distributive justice and argues for a welfare democracy. It explains that welfare democracy is a system of deliberative democracy within which discursive debate occupies a much greater role in the operation of welfare services and it represents an egalitarian alternative to conservatism. This chapter concludes that both associative and deliberative approaches to democracy are essential to a new politics of equality.
An Interview with Celso Amorim, Former Brazilian Foreign Minister
approached human rights – to do
with our good relations with Iran, for example. There was a tension, but I don’t think
there was an ontological contradiction. I think it is possible to work for a more democratic
order – diffusing power, creating a more stable balance of power – while
strengthening and democratising certain value systems. Doing so in a cooperative way, too. People
might say it was just Brazil trying to extend its power and join the [UN] Security Council. But,
in projecting soft power, I believe we were also promoting positive things: South
Democracy and democratisation
Since the early 1970s a ‘third wave’ of democratisation has swept the
world. In the period 1972–94 the number of democratic political systems
doubled from 44 to 107. And by the mid-1990s 58 per cent of the
world’s states had adopted democratic governments.1 These momentous
developments have led political scientists to re-examine the theoretical
literature on democratisation, and to compare the current transitions in
the post-communist bloc with earlier transitions in Latin America
against neo-liberalism will only have a limited effect if labour does
not succeed in breaking the mega-trend towards ‘more capitalism’, which
is at the root of the neo-liberal project.
Studying the history of socialist and democratic theories is an important
precondition for articulating and popularising these theories in contemporary politics. This chapter therefore takes a historical approach. It evaluates
some of the more important projects of economic and industrial democratisation in the past. Its focus is on projects in highly developed capitalist states
stress the negative side, federalism is the problem rather
than the solution, particularly in multinational states where ethnic boundaries coincide with boundaries of the federal subjects. Federalism, according to this scenario, is much more likely to intensify the nationalist
grievances it is supposed to ameliorate. As Smith notes:
Federalism and democratisation in Russia
Federalism provides incentives for structuring group/class conflicts along
territorial lines, [and] when the territories in question are spatial surrogates
Federalism and democratisation in Russia
whom they were supposed to be controlling. Moreover, governors in
many regions captured control over the appointment of the representatives. In some cases bilateral treaties actually gave the governors the right
to appoint their own presidential representatives or to approve presidential nominees. Indeed, in some cases presidential representatives were
actually high ranking members of regional elites. Thus, for example, in
Stavropol¢ Krai we had the absurd sitation whereby the presidential
Democratisation, nationalism and security in former Yugoslavia
Paul Latawski and Martin A. Smith
at peace-building in the former Yugoslavia 2 by focusing on the challenges to
efforts to bring lasting stability posed by democratisation, ethnic
nationalism and the promotion of security.
peace-building roles in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia
The deployment of the NATO IFOR to
Bosnia in 1995 in the wake of the Dayton agreement and associated UNSC
Resolutions marked the beginning of the Alliance
Social democracy has made a political comeback in recent years, especially under the influence of the ‘Third Way’. Not everyone is convinced, however, that ‘Third Way’ social democracy is the best means of reviving the Left's project. This book considers this dissent and offers an alternative approach. Bringing together a range of social and political theories, it engages with some contemporary debates regarding the present direction and future of the Left. Drawing upon egalitarian, feminist and environmental ideas, the book proposes that the social democratic tradition can be renewed but only if the dominance of conservative ideas is challenged more effectively. It explores a number of issues with this aim in mind, including justice, the state, democracy, new technologies, future generations and the advances in genetics.
The conflict in Kosovo represents a significant watershed in post-Cold War international security. Interpreting its political and operational significance should reveal important clues for understanding international security in the new millennium. This text analyses the international response to the crisis in Kosovo and its broader implications, by examining its diplomatic, military and humanitarian features. Despite the widely held perception that the conflict in Kosovo has implications for international security, unravelling them can be challenging, as it remains an event replete with paradoxes. There are many such paradoxes. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) entered into the conflict ostensibly to head off a humanitarian catastrophe, only to accelerate the catastrophe by engaging in a bombing campaign; the political aims of all the major players contradicted the military means chosen by them in the conflict. The Russian role in the diplomatic efforts demonstrated that NATO did not want Russia to be involved but in the end needed its involvement. Russia opposed the bombing campaign but ultimately did not have enough power or influence to rise above a role as NATO's messenger; the doctrinal hurdles to achieving ‘immaculate coercion’ by use of air power alone seemed to tumble in the face of apparent success; it is ultimately unclear how or why NATO succeeded.