The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 shook the foundations of the global economy and what began as a localised currency crisis soon engulfed the entire Asian region. This book explores what went wrong and how did the Asian economies long considered 'miracles' respond, among other things. The combined effects of growing unemployment, rising inflation, and the absence of a meaningful social safety-net system, pushed large numbers of displaced workers and their families into poverty. Resolving Thailand's notorious non-performing loans problem will depend on the fortunes of the country's real economy, and on the success of Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC). Under International Monetary Fund's (IMF) oversight, the Indonesian government has also taken steps to deal with the massive debt problem. After Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency's (INDRA) failure, the Indonesian government passed the Company Bankruptcy and Debt Restructuring and/or Rehabilitation Act to facilitate reorganization of illiquid, but financially viable companies. Economic reforms in Korea were started by Kim Dae-Jung. the partial convertibility of the Renminbi (RMB), not being heavy burdened with short-term debt liabilities, and rapid foreign trade explains China's remarkable immunity to the "Asian flu". The proposed sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) (modeled on corporate bankruptcy law) would allow countries to seek legal protection from creditors that stand in the way of restructuring, and in exchange debtors would have to negotiate with their creditors in good faith.
human rights and conflict prevention assume much greater significance, and the EU’s policy is now ‘intended to shape the political complexion and policy preferences of recipient governments’ (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 136). Politicisation really began in earnest with respect to Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War, where the EU’s main aim was support for political and economic reforms. Politicisation reflects the view that sustainable development can take place only in a context of security, democracy and freedom (Council of Ministers, 1991; Arts
supply-side economics which are described above. She also looked for opportunities to set the forces of the state against those of organised labour. Many conflicts occurred, but two are worthy of note as perfect illustrations of how and why she was so determined to win victory in what she saw as the frontline of economic reform. The first concerned a series of disputes which broke out in the printing industry. Two newspaper owners – Eddie Shah and Rupert Murdoch – wished to break the power of the unions in their industry. Unions held a stranglehold in the printing
savings over investment in the period 1990–96. The budget surplus averaged over 1 per cent in the four years prior to the crisis, and credit growth was modest. In short, the traditional economic indicators looked sound. Sources of vulnerability With such an enviable record of development and seemingly sound economic fundamentals, what went wrong? The roots of the crisis can be traced back to the mid-1980s, when Indonesia embarked on an ambitious economic reform program. The reforms were designed to diversify the economy in order to reduce its dependence on the oil
economic reform aside, this influence was long thought to be the best weapon in the antiemigration armoury. Following the pattern of opinion set out in Chapter One, it was a weapon mainly deployed from mid-century onward. An uncoordinated campaign of dissuasion, largely centred on the pulpit pleas of parish clergymen, was regularly given fresh impetus by the published accounts of priests who had either settled in or visited emigrant destinations. The first of such cautionary messages was a frightening, if poorly grounded, exposé of mass Catholic ‘leakage’ proffered in
6 Challenges in waiting Why didst thou promise such a beauteous day, And make me travel forth without my cloak, To let base clouds o’ertake me in my way, Hiding thy bravery in their rotten smoke? (Shakespeare)1 Summary While the Russian economy under its new leader, Boris Yeltsin, began to slide in the early 1990s as a result of an uncertain mix of change and standstill, economic reform in Central European transition countries started to bear fruit in the form of higher growth and adaptation to world markets. Military tensions diminished considerably with the
authoritarian elites and leaders of opposition forces was found to be more effective as a path to democratization in Latin America and southern Europe than it was in CEE, where a ‘thoroughgoing political rejection of the Socialist past and Socialist elite’ was found to provide a more solid basis for democratic governance. Whereas economic reform in the Third World is a hazardous project that could undermine democracy, the opposite was true in CEE, where the progress of reform and democratization were strongly interdependent. However, Bunce also concurs with Kopecky´ and Mudde
’ in the newly (re)launched Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review) in December 1954 (Péter, 1954). There has been a fair number of publications on Péter’s essays of the 1950s and later, and on his contributions to the ideas underlying the economic reforms and reform economics of the 1960s Consumer and consumerism under state socialism 15 (Szamuely, 1986; Árvay et al., 1994). What I focus on here is what he wrote about the consumer. Péter thought it important to take a step beyond what was soon to become the ‘standard list’ of critical complaints against the
, gender empowerment, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants along with a multitude of other programmes are implemented with the aim of preventing future conflict, rebuilding what was destroyed during conflict, and creating new processes and relationships which will prevent a return to violence. At the centre of this peacebuilding agenda is the need to create modes of economic interaction which facilitate and support peace. Economic reform involves a wide variety of practices, from macro-economic stabilisation programming led by institutions
neo-liberal economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s resulted in fundamental changes in the UK economy. 2 Assess the view that Gordon Brown is a cautious rather than a radical Chancellor of the Exchequer. 3 How much consensus on economic policy now exists in the British political system?