11 Reconciliation after ethnic cleansing: witnessing, retribution and domestic reform John Borneman conditions that might make possible reconciliation after ethnic cleansing? This chapter addresses reconciliation in light of specific ethnic cleansings and ‘ethnicisations’, with a focus on the most recent example in Bosnia. It neither elaborates a specific case nor makes specific historical–cultural comparisons. The potential contribution is theoretical, specifying psycho-social terms and processes integral to reconciliation after violent conflicts. The
In the story of post-Cold War conceptual confusion, the war in and over Kosovo stands out as a particularly interesting episode. This book provides new and stimulating perspectives on how Kosovo has shaped the new Europe. It breaks down traditional assumptions in the field of security studies by sidelining the theoretical worldview that underlies mainstream strategic thinking on recent events in Kosovo. The book offers a conceptual overview of the Kosovo debate, placing these events in the context of globalisation, European integration and the discourse of modernity and its aftermath. It then examines Kosovo's impact on the idea of war. One of the great paradoxes of the war in Kosovo was that it was not just one campaign but two: there was the ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo and the allied bombing campaign against targets in Kosovo and all over Serbia. Serbia's killing of Kosovo has set the parameters of the Balkanisation-integration nexus, offering 'Europe' (and the West in general) a unique opportunity to suggest itself as the strong centre that keeps the margins from running away. Next, it investigates 'Kosovo' as a product of the decay of modern institutions and discourses like sovereignty, statehood, the warring state or the United Nations system. 'Kosovo' has introduced new overtones into the European Weltanschauung and the ways in which 'Europe' asserts itself as an independent power discourse in a globalising world: increasingly diffident, looking for firm foundations in the conceptual void of the turn of the century.
This book deals with the institutional framework in post-socialist, after-empire spaces. It consists of nine case studies and two contributions of a more theoretical nature. Each of these analytical narratives sheds some light on the micro-politics of organised violence. After 1990, Serbs and Croats were competing over access to the resources needed for institution building and state building. Fear in turn triggered ethnic mobilisation. An 'unprofessional' riot of Serbs in the Krajina region developed into a professional war between Serbs and Croats in Croatia, in which several thousand died and several hundred thousand people were forcefully expelled from their homes. The Herceg-Bosnian style of resistance can be surprisingly effective. It is known that most of the heroin transported along the Balkans route passes through the hands of Albanian mafia groups; that this traffic has taken off since summer 1999. The concept of Staatnation is based on the doctrine according to which each 'nation' must have its own territorial State and each State must consist of one 'nation' only. The slow decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet and the Yugoslav empires was partly triggered, partly accompanied by the quest for national sovereignty. Dagestan is notable for its ethnic diversity and, even by post-Soviet standards, its dramatic economic deprivation. The integrative potential of cooperative movements at the republican, the regional and the inter-state level for the Caucasus is analyzed. The book also offers insights into the economics of ending violence. Finally, it addresses the question of reconciliation after ethnic cleansing.
government zone, as was the case in Syria in February 2019 when Russia unilaterally opened two humanitarian corridors to help the displaced population living in Rubkan return to government-held areas, after blockading the camp and obstructing assistance for years. Corridors intended to evacuate a besieged city may also serve war objectives by rendering it a legitimate target (even if this means negotiating the exit of rebel leaders before the final assault, as was the case in Mosul in 2016) or, in extreme cases, endorsing a policy of ethnic cleansing by forcibly emptying a
‘Mass deportations and ethnic cleansing is morally justified to counter this, and these bleeding heart NGO’s [ sic ] will be wholly responsible.’ Then, a second video, ‘La verità sui MIGRANTI’ ( Donadel, 2017 ), was uploaded to YouTube in March 2017 by a 23-year-old Italian right-wing activist and vlogger Luca Donadel. It used a similar methodology as the earlier Gefira video, including tracing the routes of rescue vessels on a map from close to Libya
point is not made. Instead, the risk of supporting the war aims of a party to conflict and, in the worst cases, contributing to ethnic cleansing is highlighted ( Norwegian Refugee Council, 2016 : 38–41). In many contexts, the evacuation of staff may also further war aims, but this point is absent from discussions of the pros and cons of staff evacuations. In sum, policy guidance on evacuating staff asks decision-makers to consider the potential
some cases, this discourse supports sovereignty (Kuwait); sometimes it supports human rights (Kosovo); and sometimes it supports neither (Turkish Kurds). The ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, real and terrible as it was, seems not to have been the overwhelming reason for Western intervention, but rather a convenient pretext. There was no contradiction between Idealpolitik and Realpolitik in Kosovo, as
more than 800,000 Tutsis and many moderate Hutus. 22 The peacemaking intervention of ECOWAS in Liberia headed by Nigeria 23 and NATO’s Kosovo/Serbia operation took place without authorization by the UN Security Council. NATO’s Kosovo/Serbia operation gave rise to a heated discussion not only because of its lack of UN endorsement but also due to the choice of means (high-altitude aerial bombardment), which led to hundreds of civilian deaths, more intense ethnic cleansing by the
became a controversial issue among the various nationalities. It poisoned interethnic relations, which had been strained for centuries owing to conflicting class interests, mainly between Hungarian big land owners and the mainly Romanian farmers which represented Transylvanian social life. In conclusion, although the land reform discussed so far did not incite civil war and can definitely not be considered a form of ‘ethnic cleansing’, it may be said that it encouraged the nationalism of different ethnic groups, deepening enmities which were already present. Yugoslavia
within this context of ethnic polarisation – myths that spoke of ancient national territory and peoples legitimated the creation of ethnic enclaves. Myths were also necessary to justify the presence of the JNA and a wide range of paramilitary groups, such as the Tigers and White Eagles (Serbian), and Autumn Rain and the Croatian Defence Forces-HOS (Croatian). The violent seizing of territory necessitated a barrage of propaganda, to prove that the Bosnian Moslems had somehow brought the horrors of ethnic cleansing on themselves. The Moslems as ‘fallen’ Serbs: ethnic and