All political argument employs political concepts. They provide the building blocks needed to construct a case for or against a given political position. Justifications of oppression in the name of liberty are no mere products of the liberal imagination, for there are notorious historical examples of their endorsement by authoritarian political leaders. This book explores two approaches to rights: the interest-based (IB) approach, and the obligation-based or Kantian view. Both are shown to offer coherent justifications that can avoid turning all political concerns into a matter of rights. The concept of social justice emerged in both at the start of the twentieth century, and justified institutions for the democratic modification for market outcomes, on utilitarian, maximin or common good grounds. The book explores whether people do in fact have good and justifiable reasons for complying with laws that go beyond mere fear of punishment, and, if so, whether they are bound or obligated by those reasons to comply. It discusses national ties and how they are supposed to act as glue that holds the state together in the eyes of its citizens. The book also explores the link between the weakening of states and this change in criminal policies, and outlines their implications for individual rights. Theorists have used the idea of social exclusion to advocate an approach to social justice that sees increased labour-market participation as the key to equal to citizenship. The contemporary understandings of the public-private distinction and feminist critiques of these are also examined.
government in the US would find it
hard to throw its weight around when China is always available – in South East Asia, in
Africa, in Central Asia – to provide financing and diplomatic support with few strings
attached (and to threaten forms of retaliation when such inducements fail). The rise of Trump
can even be explained as a reaction to a sense of gathering national decline, hence his campaign
slogan: ‘Make America Great Again’. Why does the normative void matter? In the past, many states abided by international law as
much for fearof
their own country.
The issue I want to discuss in this chapter is whether people
do in fact have good and justifiable reasons for complying with laws that go
beyond mere fearofpunishment, and, if so, whether they are bound or
obligated by those reasons to comply.
1 One main argument for a duty to obey the law:
Socrates had to decide whether to