David Rieff

established global order has been greatly exaggerated, then you will doubt that those changes are likely to pose any existential challenge to the humanitarian international, be it in terms of the efficacy of what relief groups do in the field or in terms of the political and moral legitimacy they can aspire to enjoy. But if, on the contrary, you believe that we are living in the last days of a doomed system – established in the aftermath of World War II and dominated by the US – then the humanitarian international is no more likely to survive (or to put

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
An Interview with Celso Amorim, Former Brazilian Foreign Minister
Juliano Fiori

War. US hegemony was almost incontestable. The US of course still faced certain political challenges, but the concepts guiding international relations at this time, authored by the US, were dominant. We would hear about ‘reaching out’ and, later, Obama’s formulation ‘leading from behind’, but always leading. Returning to the main change we see today… of course, there are forces that have been working for a long time… Trump arrives and says: ‘No, I don’t want a global order. I prefer global disorder.’ I am referring here only to what is manifest

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
Editor’s Introduction
Juliano Fiori

of liberal order, pointing to the humanitarian hypocrisy of the US. But as they vie for leadership of the multilateral system, they also attempt to resignify it, demonstrating almost no concern for liberal ideals themselves. Liberalism might yet be recovered as the basis for global order. But it is unlikely that liberal institutions undermined in recent years can recover their legitimacy; and it is unclear what will emerge in their stead. ‘The crisis’, Gramsci noted, referring to the detachment of the masses from traditional ideologies and

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
Corporations, Celebrities and the Construction of the Entrepreneurial Refugee Woman
Annika Bergman Rosamond and Catia Gregoratti

beyond borders. Yet, UNHCR-endorsed corporate and celebrity humanitarians are located within immense privilege and power, as well as being immersed in the colonial, gendered and capitalist logics of humanitarianism, rather than being wedded to the transformation of the global order and decoloniality ( Bergman Rosamond, 2015 , 2016 ). Directly relevant is also the contention that humanitarian actors, many of whom are located within a neoliberal feminist logic

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
Marie-Luce Desgrandchamps, Lasse Heerten, Arua Oko Omaka, Kevin O'Sullivan, and Bertrand Taithe

by a rhetoric that was resonant of the political campaigns of decolonisation, it was animated by the vision of an independent state, of nationalism and the right to self-determination as a human right. As a political campaign and in its rhetoric, Biafra was in many respects a revenant of many decolonisation projects. However, global order had of course changed, the political forums in which the Biafrans tried to formulate these claims have changed. Many of these forums

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs

By expanding the geographical scope of the history of violence and war, this volume challenges both Western and state-centric narratives of the decline of violence and its relationship to modernity. It highlights instead similarities across early modernity in terms of representations, legitimations, applications of, and motivations for violence. It seeks to integrate methodologies of the study of violence into the history of war, thereby extending the historical significance of both fields of research. Thirteen case studies outline the myriad ways in which large-scale violence was understood and used by states and non-state actors throughout the early modern period across Africa, Asia, the Americas, the Atlantic, and Europe, demonstrating that it was far more complex than would be suggested by simple narratives of conquest and resistance. Moreover, key features of imperial violence apply equally to large-scale violence within societies. As the authors argue, violence was a continuum, ranging from small-scale, local actions to full-blown war. The latter was privileged legally and increasingly associated with states during early modernity, but its legitimacy was frequently contested and many of its violent forms, such as raiding and destruction of buildings and crops, could be found in activities not officially classed as war.

Some questions for Rainer Bauböck
Joseph H. Carens

we not imagine a global political assembly with powers (including agenda-setting powers) specified by a constitution, representatives elected by universal suffrage on a global basis, and so on? Let me be clear. I am not recommending global democracy as just outlined as an ideal or arguing that it is a necessary feature of a just global order. One can certainly raise challenges to such an idea from many different

in Democratic inclusion
Obama, Trump and the Asia Pacific political economy
Michael Mastanduno

” with their own conceptions of regional or global order. It may compete or at times cooperate with those states but does not expect to incorporate them into its own order. Balance of power or hegemony? For roughly seventy years, the United States has resolved this fundamental grand strategic question. During the Cold War, successive US administrations pursued a global balancing strategy against the Soviet Union but embedded within it regional hegemonic strategies in Western Europe and East Asia. The latter included the creation of durable alliances and the re

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Order and security in post-Cold War Europe
Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, Michael J. Tsinisizelis, Stelios Stavridis, and Kostas Ifantis

means of delivery, and human rights abuses, pose profound challenges to the viability of a new global order, as they are more than capable of contributing to violence and other forms of coercion. Contrary to other global challenges (the communications revolution, water shortages, access to energy resources, financial flows), they call directly into question the very authority of the state and are therefore potentially, if not openly, subversive. This multifaceted conception of security entails a multifaceted approach to security itself. While an exclusively state

in Theory and reform in the European Union
Open Access (free)
Jeremy C.A. Smith

important insights into the modernity of authoritarian and totalitarian logics and the abiding tensions of democracy. But, more powerfully, the commitment to democratic projects is an orienting position for contemporary civilisational analysis, a place to stand in respect of the global order. Others mentioned in these pages, such as Arjomand, Arnason and Spohn, reveal their currency when they address problematics of modernity in the twentieth and twenty-​first centuries. In each of these accounts, contemporary civilisational analysis has shown some relevance to

in Debating civilisations