established globalorder has been greatly exaggerated, then you will doubt that
those changes are likely to pose any existential challenge to the humanitarian international, be
it in terms of the efficacy of what relief groups do in the field or in terms of the political
and moral legitimacy they can aspire to enjoy.
But if, on the contrary, you believe that we are living in the last days of a doomed system
– established in the aftermath of World War II and dominated by the US – then the
humanitarian international is no more likely to survive (or to put
An Interview with Celso Amorim, Former Brazilian Foreign Minister
War. US hegemony was almost
incontestable. The US of course still faced certain political challenges, but the concepts
guiding international relations at this time, authored by the US, were dominant. We would hear
about ‘reaching out’ and, later, Obama’s formulation ‘leading from
behind’, but always leading.
Returning to the main change we see today… of course, there are forces that have been
working for a long time… Trump arrives and says: ‘No, I don’t want a globalorder. I prefer global disorder.’ I am referring here only to what is manifest
of liberal order, pointing to the humanitarian hypocrisy of the US. But as they vie
for leadership of the multilateral system, they also attempt to resignify it, demonstrating
almost no concern for liberal ideals themselves.
Liberalism might yet be recovered as the basis for globalorder. But it is unlikely that
liberal institutions undermined in recent years can recover their legitimacy; and it is unclear
what will emerge in their stead. ‘The crisis’, Gramsci noted, referring to the
detachment of the masses from traditional ideologies and
Corporations, Celebrities and the Construction of the Entrepreneurial
Annika Bergman Rosamond and Catia Gregoratti
beyond borders. Yet, UNHCR-endorsed
corporate and celebrity humanitarians are located within immense privilege and
power, as well as being immersed in the colonial, gendered and capitalist logics of
humanitarianism, rather than being wedded to the transformation of the globalorder
and decoloniality ( Bergman Rosamond,
2015 , 2016 ). Directly relevant is
also the contention that humanitarian actors, many of whom are located within a
neoliberal feminist logic
Lewis Hine’s Photographs of Refugees for the American Red Cross, 1918–20
Sonya de Laat
citizenry of photography. From June 1918 to April 1919, the American photographer Lewis Wickes Hine made photographs of refugees and other European civilians affected by World War I while working overseas for the American Red Cross (ARC). Refugees emerged as a new humanitarian subject in direct result of the changing globalorder that came with World War I. Hine’s photographs and the ARC’s use of them, both shaped and restricted public imagination with regard to refugees, and international spectators’ responses to them. Here, I explore Hine’s refugee photographs and more
Marie-Luce Desgrandchamps, Lasse Heerten, Arua Oko Omaka, Kevin O'Sullivan, and Bertrand Taithe
by a rhetoric that
was resonant of the political campaigns of decolonisation, it was animated by the
vision of an independent state, of nationalism and the right to self-determination
as a human right. As a political campaign and in its rhetoric, Biafra was in many
respects a revenant of many decolonisation projects.
However, globalorder had of course changed, the political forums in which the
Biafrans tried to formulate these claims have changed. Many of these forums
By expanding the geographical scope of the history of violence and war, this
volume challenges both Western and state-centric narratives of the decline of
violence and its relationship to modernity. It highlights instead similarities
across early modernity in terms of representations, legitimations, applications
of, and motivations for violence. It seeks to integrate methodologies of the
study of violence into the history of war, thereby extending the historical
significance of both fields of research. Thirteen case studies outline the
myriad ways in which large-scale violence was understood and used by states and
non-state actors throughout the early modern period across Africa, Asia, the
Americas, the Atlantic, and Europe, demonstrating that it was far more complex
than would be suggested by simple narratives of conquest and resistance.
Moreover, key features of imperial violence apply equally to large-scale
violence within societies. As the authors argue, violence was a continuum,
ranging from small-scale, local actions to full-blown war. The latter was
privileged legally and increasingly associated with states during early
modernity, but its legitimacy was frequently contested and many of its violent
forms, such as raiding and destruction of buildings and crops, could be found in
activities not officially classed as war.
imagine a global political assembly with powers (including agenda-setting
powers) specified by a constitution, representatives elected by universal
suffrage on a global basis, and so on?
Let me be clear. I am not recommending global democracy as just
outlined as an ideal or arguing that it is a necessary feature of a just globalorder. One can certainly raise challenges to such an idea from many different
Obama, Trump and the Asia Pacific political economy
” with their own conceptions of regional or globalorder. It may compete or at times cooperate with those states but does not expect to incorporate them into its own order.
Balance of power or hegemony? For roughly seventy years, the United States has resolved this fundamental grand strategic question. During the Cold War, successive US administrations pursued a global balancing strategy against the Soviet Union but embedded within it regional hegemonic strategies in Western Europe and East Asia. The latter included the creation of durable alliances and the re
(accessed 12 January 2018).
de Coning , C. and M.
Peter (eds) ( 2019 ) United Nations
Peace Operations in a Changing GlobalOrder ( Cham : Palgrave
Ejdus , F. ( 2017 ) ‘“Here is your mission, now own
it!” The rhetoric and practice of local ownership in EU
interventions’, European Security