This book focuses on the ways in which the British settler colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa treated indigenous peoples in relation to political rights, commencing with the imperial policies of the 1830s and ending with the national political settlements in place by 1910. Drawing on a wide range of sources, its comparative approach provides an insight into the historical foundations of present-day controversies in these settler societies.
Julie Evans, Patricia Grimshaw, David Philips, and Shurlee Swain
business expanded, to the extent that their workload became a burden,
the officers were likely to tend towards support for the colonies’
self-government in local affairs rather than engage in a struggle for
control, and usually accepted the advice of the governors in place.
Very near the start of our period, in the later 1830s,
British imperialpolicies towards the rights of the Indigenous peoples
Colonial subjects and the appeal for imperial justice
Charles V. Reed
Chapter five examines a different kind of ‘royal tour’, the pilgrimage of colonial subjects ‘home’ to Great Britain in order to petition the queen/king for justice. Culturally imbued with the notion of the Great (White) King/Queen, colonial subjects brought their cases against British or settler governments in the colonies to the metropole in hopes of inspiring imperial intervention against colonial injustices and abuses. Through an examination of two visits by British subjects – the 1884 visit of the Maori King to London and the 1909 delegation in opposition to the Union of South Africa – and their failures to inspire change in imperial policy (in the case of the Union of South Africa) or even an audience (in the case of the Maori King), the chapter demonstrates how ‘imperial networks’ short-circuited when the empire came home.
By expanding the geographical scope of the history of violence and war, this
volume challenges both Western and state-centric narratives of the decline of
violence and its relationship to modernity. It highlights instead similarities
across early modernity in terms of representations, legitimations, applications
of, and motivations for violence. It seeks to integrate methodologies of the
study of violence into the history of war, thereby extending the historical
significance of both fields of research. Thirteen case studies outline the
myriad ways in which large-scale violence was understood and used by states and
non-state actors throughout the early modern period across Africa, Asia, the
Americas, the Atlantic, and Europe, demonstrating that it was far more complex
than would be suggested by simple narratives of conquest and resistance.
Moreover, key features of imperial violence apply equally to large-scale
violence within societies. As the authors argue, violence was a continuum,
ranging from small-scale, local actions to full-blown war. The latter was
privileged legally and increasingly associated with states during early
modernity, but its legitimacy was frequently contested and many of its violent
forms, such as raiding and destruction of buildings and crops, could be found in
activities not officially classed as war.
It is not uncommon for scholars to claim the birth of development occurred in the post-war period, often marked by President Truman’s Inaugural Address of 1949. 7 This assertion can come as a surprise to historians who have looked at the increasing focus on development in the European empires from the late nineteenth century. Historians of British imperialism have described how science was firmly implicated in the rise of colonial development as a goal of imperialpolicy, beginning around 1895, when Joseph Chamberlain was appointed Secretary of State for the
people in general really thought, was
organized on a sufficiently large scale not only to be valid
social science, but also to offer a reliable source for future
historians.6 Reasonably accurate public opinion polling only
came into general use after 1945.
Long before that, Social Darwinism, which assumed that
a democratic Britain had the right to rule over many millions
who did not have any say in Imperialpolicy, was explicitly
challenged by the early socialist H. G. Wells, as for instance
in his novel The War in the Air (1908). Wells was not a
trained historian, but
imperialpolicy (in the case of the Union of South Africa) or even an
audience (in the case of the Maori king), the chapter demonstrates how
‘imperial networks’ short-circuited when the empire came
home. Moreover, the chapter explores the ways imperial culture failed –
contrary to the traditional narrative – as a result of the lack of
interest and ambivalence of metropolitan politics and culture.
system and a convenient counter in the great and
noble game of party.32
Fawcett was accused of failing to understand the vast difference between
‘municipal management’ and ‘supreme power over Imperialpolicy’.33
The imperial nation was represented as consisting of two separate
spheres, the public (imperial or international) and the private (internal
or ‘domestic’). Correspondingly, women were argued to be capable of
dealing with ‘domestic’ affairs, but not with matters of imperial or
While she clearly was capable of understanding the
Raiding war and globalization in the early modern world
pamphlet collections at the Bibliothèque nationale de France
[hereafter BNF], the Bibliothèque historique de la ville de Paris [BHVP], and various
municipal libraries in France offer additional evidence.
13 Sandberg, War and Conflict, pp. 171–92.
14 D. Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early
Modern Europe (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 139–95.
15 P. S. Fichtner, Terror and Toleration: The Habsburg Empire Confronts Islam, 1526–1850
(London, 2008); G. Agoston, ‘Information, Ideology and Limits of ImperialPolicy:
The riots that occurred in the British West Indian colonies during the 1930s have been endowed with much significance by both historians of British imperialism and historians of the Caribbean. Accounts of imperialpolicy tell how these events were crucial in allowing the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Malcolm MacDonald, to get his way in passing the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. 3 This Act is considered a turning point in colonial policy as it marked a shift to a more assertive, interventionist form of imperialism that aimed to transform