African cities and collaborative futures: Urban platforms and metropolitan
logistics brings together scholars from across the globe to discuss the nature
of African cities – the interactions of residents with infrastructure, energy,
housing, safety and sustainability, seen through local narratives and theories.
This groundbreaking collection, drawing on a variety of fields and extensive
first-hand research, offers a fresh perspective on some of the most pressing
issues confronting urban Africa in the twenty-first century. Each of the
chapters, using case studies from Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, South
Africa and Tanzania, explores how the rapid growth of African cities is
reconfiguring the relationship between urban social life and its built forms.
While the most visible transformations in cities today can be seen as
infrastructural, these manifestations are cultural as well as material,
reflecting the different ways in which the city is rationalised, economised and
governed. How can we ‘see like a city’ in twenty-first-century Africa,
understanding the urban present to shape its future? This is the central
question posed throughout this volume, with a practical focus on how academics,
local decision-makers and international practitioners can work together to
achieve better outcomes.
infrastructure were strategic targets as part of a distinct military tactic that we, as humanitarian practitioners, have borne witness to. As an extension to the aforementioned concept of a ‘weaponisation of healthcare’ ( Fouad et al. , 2017 ), we present four examples throughout the course of the Syrian conflict which evidence the direct application of a military tactic aimed at civilian infrastructure in addition to corresponding patterns in attacks on health facilities.
Destruction of property, history, culture, and collective memory. Lost dignity of the population
encouraged late-capitalism to move beyond the South’s
enclaves and the special economic zones established during the 1980s as part of the
North’s deindustrialisation ( Amsden, 1990 ).
Private finance is investing in what are called infrastructural ‘mega-corridors’
( Hildyard and Sol, 2017 ). With China’s Belt
and Road Initiative just one example, this is a huge near-global expansion. Except Antarctica,
no region is excluded with continental – even transcontinental – infrastructure
plans in existence that seek to reappropriate the biosphere
push from many corners of the humanitarian sphere to develop electronic documentation
for this setting, and some teams have achieved this, at least in part. However we have
to be very clear why we are doing this. If we are doing this simply because we can, that
is not a good enough justification: electronic documentation is cost-heavy in terms of
equipment and training and is also prone to failures which can impede speed and
efficiency. Many teams simply will not have the resources and infrastructure to
Lessons Learned for Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
After decades of conflict, an agreement in 2005 set in motion the processes that would lead South Sudan to become an independent nation-state in 2011. After an initial period of optimism, conflict re-emerged; first over control of oil resources in 2012, and then in the form of a civil war, starting in 2013. The conflict has caused the displacement of millions of people internally and internationally as refugees. Compounded by the lack of basic infrastructure and services, limited capacity, and minimal governmental presence outside of Juba
Frédéric Le Marcis, Luisa Enria, Sharon Abramowitz, Almudena-Mari Saez, and Sylvain Landry B. Faye
populated urban areas in the
country, hosted two of the city’s largest Ebola Treatment Units (ETU),
ELWA 2 and ELWA 3, 7 near the
SKD Stadium. It has been described elsewhere how ETUs – specific
infrastructure for the isolation of patients from infectious diseases –
were used in previous filoviruses epidemic emergencies ( Boumandouki et al. , 2005 ; Gomez-Temesio, 2018 ; Milleliri et al.,
2004 ; Park and Umlauf 2014 ).
A Framework for Measuring Effectiveness in Humanitarian Response
Vincenzo Bollettino and Birthe Anders
destroyed, diverted, or programs have to be scaled down to minimise risk to personnel. However, whether in complex emergencies or in response to natural disasters, militaries often play an important role in humanitarian relief efforts, sometimes by providing search and rescue and airlift capabilities or by restoring damaged infrastructure. Indeed, in most of today’s crises, humanitarian organisations operate in the same environment as a range of military and non-state armed actors.
Coordination is often easier in natural disaster settings than in conflict, as there is a
The Politics of ‘Proximity’ and Performing Humanitarianism in Eastern DRC
(post)colonial global inequity ( Fassin, 2007 ; Geissler, 2013 ). In MSF, ‘national staff’ – employees who are recruited within their country of origin rather than flown in for short-term ‘missions’ – account for 92% of employees ‘in the field’ ( Fox, 2014 : 106). If MSF is a dispersed collection of individuals, Congolese employees are MSF’s permanent human infrastructure in North Kivu: drivers, guards, logisticians, doctors, nurses, pharmacists, technicians. Senior decision-making positions (such as heads of mission and project coordinators) are held by foreign
the country known as Hutu Power, built a security infrastructure, handed out weapons, and trained militia groups, so the tools that they needed to carry out genocide were in place.
But according to Guichaoua’s research, there was not a well-developed, specific plan to carry out genocide. In fact, in the aftermath of Habyarimana’s assassination, there was a power struggle among various national leaders. One group used the president’s death as an opportunity to launch an attack on people they saw as the primary threats to their power – opposition politicians
of resources into the military and the nuclear programme, underpin the DPRK’s inability to provide for its population. The humanitarian community is unable to offer solutions that directly address the structural drivers of need. For example, documents and statements from humanitarian agencies cite environmental factors, such as mountainous terrain, a lack of arable land and dry conditions, and insufficient agricultural inputs and infrastructure as the key reasons for the DPRK’s food shortages ( FAO, 2019 ; Froberg, 2018 ; WFP, 2018 ). However, these explanations