creating intolerance, violence and instability. The impact of technology is also not necessarily
benign, allowing easy communication, yes, but creating a megaphone for prejudice, propaganda,
targeted character attacks and the erosion of trust. But these changes, while important, will
not have the same far-reaching consequences as the change in the distribution of power in the
system as a whole.
The three options outlined above – renegotiated global norms, sectarian norms and a
norm void – are not mutually exclusive, and we might pass through them
This book looks at the theoretical issue of how a democracy can defend itself from those wishing to subvert or destroy it without being required to take measures that would impinge upon the basic principles of the democratic idea. It links social and institutional perspectives to the study, and includes a case study of the Israeli response to Jewish extremism and violence, which tests the theoretical framework outlined in the first chapter. There is an extensive diachronic scrutiny of the state's response to extremist political parties, violent organizations and the infrastructure of extremism and intolerance within Israeli society. The book emphasises the dynamics of the response and the factors that encourage or discourage the shift from less democratic and more democratic models of response.
just as likely that a society will be
intolerant precisely because it has a weak ethos. That is because the ethos
would crumble if it were not protected; it has to be protected from challenges through intolerance. This, indeed, may be how some totalitarian
regimes have acted: because the ethos was so weak, no one is permitted to
consider alternatives, for fear that alternatives would prove too attractive.
If this is right, then tolerance is independent of strength.
So how should we model tolerance? Consider again the firm of accountants, happy in their ‘work hard
City life and community:
complementary or incompatible ideals?
The words ‘city’ and ‘community’ conjure up very different images. The
city is often pictured as an arena where diverse social groups or networks
may co-exist in an atmosphere of mutual toleration, while the community
is seen as a cohesive unit where conformity is fostered at the expense of
diversity, thereby breeding intolerance. So understood, community is an
unattractive ideal, unlikely to endear itself to those with liberal sympathies.
It may be
By expanding the geographical scope of the history of violence and war, this
volume challenges both Western and state-centric narratives of the decline of
violence and its relationship to modernity. It highlights instead similarities
across early modernity in terms of representations, legitimations, applications
of, and motivations for violence. It seeks to integrate methodologies of the
study of violence into the history of war, thereby extending the historical
significance of both fields of research. Thirteen case studies outline the
myriad ways in which large-scale violence was understood and used by states and
non-state actors throughout the early modern period across Africa, Asia, the
Americas, the Atlantic, and Europe, demonstrating that it was far more complex
than would be suggested by simple narratives of conquest and resistance.
Moreover, key features of imperial violence apply equally to large-scale
violence within societies. As the authors argue, violence was a continuum,
ranging from small-scale, local actions to full-blown war. The latter was
privileged legally and increasingly associated with states during early
modernity, but its legitimacy was frequently contested and many of its violent
forms, such as raiding and destruction of buildings and crops, could be found in
activities not officially classed as war.
Introduction: reasonable tolerance
Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione
Theory and practice are often at odds. Yet there is something particularly
strange in the way in which the received theory and the presumed practice
of toleration in contemporary societies seem to go their separate ways.
Theoretical statements on toleration posit at the same time its necessity in
democratic societies, and its impossibility as a coherent ideal.1 In her introduction to a comprehensive collection on tolerance and intolerance in
The revolt of democratic Christianity and the rise of public opinion
Camisard Revolt (1702–4), which, although desperate and
bloody, ultimately failed because of the lack of active sympathy for
it amongst the majority of the Catholic population.
There is no doubt, as other historians have confirmed, that the
Revocation and its aftermath did contribute towards anticlericalism, for the Church was often viewed as more culpable for
the inhuman reality of intolerance than the state. Formerly perfectly
respectable citizens, between 2,000 and 3,000 Huguenots slaved on
The Enlightenment and religion
the galleys of France under Louis XIV and
and limits for that acceptance. It furthermore needs to be stressed that there are two limits involved
here. The first one lies between the normative realm of the practices and
beliefs one agrees with, and the realm of the tolerable practices and beliefs
that one finds wrong but still can accept in a certain way. The second limit
lies between this latter realm and the realm of the intolerable, which is
strictly rejected (the limit of toleration properly speaking).
Another paradox emerges here, which is that toleration necessarily
implies intolerance towards those
Russia or Iran have been left to others. Turkey’s integration in Europe and in the West seems to grow stronger as Turkey’s external adversaries and internal conflicts become weaker and appear to be less threatening. In case Europe develops closer relations with Turkey, it (Europe) should not be concerned that it imports into its own ranks the conflicts mentioned here. Comparison is almost inevitable: Turkey’s European ambitions and achievements get more credit as her Balkan, Arab and Asian neighbors drift more and more towards intolerance, radicalism, less democracy
were worse off than ever. At the 2000 party conference our message of
tolerance lasted three days until the row over zero tolerance of cannabis took
over and internal division and intolerance was left as the enduring image of
These are painful recollections, but they are necessary. Unity and discipline would have limited these problems, but we have to understand that
what they demonstrated was that in a matter of moments, resurrected
negative images of our party can undo the work of months of positive policy
By the time of the election