María José Sarrabayrouse Oliveira

The military coup of March 1976 in Argentina ruptured the prevailing institutional order, with the greater part of its repressive strategy built on clandestine practices and tactics (death, torture and disappearance) that sowed fear across large swathes of Argentine society. Simultaneously, the terrorist state established a parallel, de facto legal order through which it endeavoured to legitimise its actions. Among other social forces, the judicial branch played a pivotal role in this project of legitimisation. While conscious of the fact that many of those inside the justice system were also targets of oppression, I would like to argue that the dictatorship‘s approach was not to establish a new judicial authority but, rather, to build upon the existing institutional structure, remodelling it to suit its own interests and objectives. Based on an analysis of the criminal and administrative proceedings that together were known as the Case of the judicial morgue, this article aims to examine the ways in which the bodies of the detained-disappeared that entered the morgue during the dictatorship were handled, as well as the rationales and practices of the doctors and other employees who played a part in this process. Finally, it aims to reflect upon the traces left by judicial and administrative bureaucratic structures in relation to the crimes committed by the dictatorship, and on the legal strategies adopted by lawyers and the families of the victims.

Human Remains and Violence: An Interdisciplinary Journal
Open Access (free)
Arthur B. Gunlicks

. Though the degree of party discipline varies to some Intro 27/5/03 11:39 am Page 3 Introduction 3 extent among different parties and countries, the parties are typically rather strongly disciplined. The reason, of course, is that the stability of the cabinet depends largely on the disciplined support it receives in the parliament, which has the right to call for a vote of no-confidence in the government under certain conditions. In all democracies, including parliamentary systems, there is a separation of powers between the judicial branch and the other branches

in The Länder and German federalism
Executive versus legislative power
Cameron Ross

Political Charge in Russia (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 99. A number of regions and republics entrench the separation of powers in their constitutions and charters. Thus according to article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Altai state powers is divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. Organs of these three branches function independently and have no right to interfere in each other’s areas of competence. Analogous norms are stipulated in the charters of Sverdlovsk and Nizhegorod oblasts, St Petersburg, Khanty-Mansi AO, and many other

in Federalism and democratisation in Russia
Towards atypology of the treatment of corpses of ‘disappeared detainees’ in Argentinafrom 1975 to 1983
Mario Ranalletti

criminal and administrative trial regarding operational irregularities at the judicial morgue of the city of Buenos Aires in relation to bodies sent there by military authorities during the dictatorship.50 In this case, it was the judicial branch of the military dictatorship itself that highlighted the attempts made to transform the ‘exceptionalism’ of state terrorism into bureaucratically and procedurally regulated normality. A case study: the Buenos Aires city judicial morgue Recounting an episode that was subject to a criminal investigation – and reconstructed in

in Destruction and human remains
The European Union and social democratic identity
Gerassimos Moschonas

, executives, ministerial bureaucracies, local authorities, and the judicial branch (Bartolini 2005b: 2). Parties – and parties alone – have prevented the Balkanisation of representation and the autonomisation of subsystems within national political systems (by controlling governments and parliaments, by their ability to discipline governmental and parliamentary coalitions, by a degree of control over administration and local political personnel, even – sometimes – by controlling certain major interest groups) (see Bartolini 2005b: 17). Thus, institutional harmonisation and

in In search of social democracy