Introduction The United States under Donald Trump has been charting a radically new course in Asia, a region that has long relied on America for stability and maintaining the balance of power. In the first half of his presidential term of 2017–21, the forty-fifth president reversed or sought to reverse many of the long-standing policies and initiatives pursued by Barack Obama and his predecessors, with potential long-term implications. A multilateral and multifaceted engagement strategy in the region is being replaced by a transactional approach to security
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) has been a recipient of international humanitarian aid from international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) since 1995. In recent years, multilateral and unilateral sanctions in response to the DPRK’s nuclear programme have created a new layer of difficulty for humanitarians looking to engage with the authoritarian state. This paper explores how sanctions are affecting humanitarian work in practice, utilising interviews with practitioners. The research first surveys documentation, particularly from IOs, to establish how humanitarians understand contemporary need inside the country. Next, this paper examines the impacts of sanctions on aid efforts, with a particular focus on multilateral United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and unilateral American measures. Unpacking humanitarian challenges and potential ways to navigate the sanctions regime provides a foundation for academics and humanitarian practitioners to better understand both the DPRK and possible avenues for principled, effective aid.
Brazil to a position of protagonism in multilateral negotiations. He is convinced that the country will fulfil its potential as a major global power that can influence other states with a democratic and egalitarian vision. But he also recognises challenges ahead. A framed photo of Amorim and Lula perched on the top shelf of an eclectic bookcase, both men smiling widely. The following day, Amorim would travel to the southern Brazilian city of Curitiba, where he would visit Lula in prison. And he would receive news of a declaration by the UN
once authored, not because of his own idiosyncratic way of doing politics but because of the strategic realignment that his presidency represents. According to Trump, his administration’s security strategy is guided by ‘principled realism’. The apparent incoherence of his foreign policy is as indicative of what this entails as his specific interactions with other governments. With every diplomatic encounter imagined as a stand-alone opportunity to strike a winning ‘deal’, the norms-based, multilateral system of global governance becomes
exercise of its power, through force and the active division and dispersion of its competitors, boycotting every kind of multilateral or regional agreement or bloc, from the European Union to UNASUR, from NAFTA to the BRICS. Can this new American strategy be reversed? It is difficult to tell, but it is important to understand that it didn’t come from nowhere, nor is it the exclusive work of President Trump. The polarisation of American society and the internal divisions within the American establishment will likely increase in the coming years, but it
across Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore ( Koplitz et al. , 2016 ). The excess all-cause mortality due to short-term exposure to particulate matter (PM2.5) polluting the air was estimated at 11,880 deaths (95 per cent CI, 6,153–17,270) ( Crippa et al. , 2016 ). Local NGOs and multilateral agencies based in Indonesia responding to people suffering the choking haze had little knowledge, understanding or guidance of how to reduce the impact for the community in need. The second
Introduction During the 2014 West African Ebola epidemic, an estimated US$ 10 billion was spent to contain the disease in the region and globally. The response brought together multilateral agencies, bilateral partnerships, private enterprises and foundations, local governments and communities. Social mobilisation efforts were pivotal components of the response architecture ( Gillespie et al. , 2016 ; Laverack and Manoncourt, 2015 ; Oxfam International, 2015
’ and populist governance ( Winston and Winston, 2020 ) and by the deterioration of the multilateral institutions on which famine prevention and humanitarian response has been based ( Hopgood, 2019 ). Famine has always had political consequences. In perhaps the most infamous contemporary case, the famine in Ethiopia in 1984–85 was deliberately kept out of view by the governing regime because it coincided with the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of
’s official response to the cuts and its acute financial crisis, while acknowledging that other international responses, such as bilateral and multilateral discussions between UNRWA and potential donors and various diplomats, have been ongoing throughout this period. Understandably, given UNRWA’s financial circumstances following the announcement of the cuts, the campaign sought to encourage existing and ‘non-traditional’ state and non-state actors to commit funds to ensure that the rights and needs of Palestinian refugees were met. By examining the
– whether bilateral, multilateral or through pooled funds – should be dependent on at least bi-annual (twice yearly) updates of events on the ground’ ( 2010 : xxi) to ensure effective resource utilisation. Conditional modalities need to be carefully considered, as some ways of working (e.g. payment for results) may not be suitable or have negative, unintended consequences ( Clist and Dercon, 2014 ). In recognising uncertainty and complexity in the South Sudanese context, and the probability of non-linear outcomes, donors should encourage an on-going open dialogue with