This book explains the beginnings of net neutrality regulation in the United States and Europe, and some of the current debate over access to Specialised Services: fast lanes with higher Quality of Service (QoS). It examines the new European law of 2015 and the interaction between that law and interception/privacy. The book takes a deep dive into UK self- and co-regulation of net neutrality. In each of the national case studies, initial confusion at lack of clarity in net neutrality laws gave way to significant cases, particularly since 2014, which have given regulators the opportunity to clarify their legislation or regulation. The majority of such cases relate to mobile net neutrality, and in particular so-called 'zero rating' practices. The book compares results and proposes a regulatory toolkit for those jurisdictions that intend effective practical partial or complete implementation of net neutrality. It sets out a future research agenda for exploring implementation of regulation. The book outlines competition policy's purpose, referring to the exceptionally rigorous recent analysis of competition law suitability to regulate net neutrality by Maniadaki. Having analysed regulatory tools with little chance of success, it then examines what communications regulators actually do: regulating telecoms access based on the UK case study. The book considers whether zero rating poses a serious challenge to Open Internet use. It explores some of the wider international problems of regulating the newest manifestation of discrimination: zero rating. The book also considers the various means by which government can regulate net neutrality.
discriminate against certain providers (either blocking their content or favouring commercial rivals such as IAP affiliates). It does not regulate those content providers directly. There are two types of net neutrality regulation: ‘lite’ and heavy. The former prevents IAPs from banning or throttling other content, application and service providers; the latter dictates non-discrimination on fast lane broadband
analysis of competition law suitability to regulate net neutrality by Maniadaki. Having analysed regulatory tools with little chance of success, I then examine what communications regulators actually do: regulating telecoms access based on the UK case study. This provides insights into how difficult net neutrality regulation will prove in practice, a subject to which we return in Chapter 6 and the concluding Chapter 8 . I then
effective net neutrality regulation. Any attempt to offer a time-limited zero-rated offer as an introduction to mobile data use could be flagged as such and limited by regulation to perhaps 3–6 months. This would be subject to FRAND conditions and regulatory enforcement. FRAND conditions could be applied to: mobile IAP contracts with Free Basics and other affiliated content
/15 legal manoeuvres in both the United States and European Union. Chapter 3 considers Specialised Services in both areas, and then Chapter 4 examines European law in minute detail. Note that as this book is written with Europe as the focus, US regulation is described more briefly. The development of net neutrality regulation US regulation of
throttling the BBC’s iPlayer service regularly from 2006. 15 The BBC is also a key player in UK net neutrality discussions, being both regulated by Ofcom for its commercial services and itself a major streaming media distributor via its iPlayer service. Network discrimination had arrived, if not net neutrality regulation. Despite this and other evidence, Ofcom confined itself to measuring IAP broadband performance, making it easier
Internet Protocol (VoIP, e.g. Skype, WhatsApp) or video (e.g. YouTube, BBC iPlayer or NetFlix) except under narrowly defined conditions. Net neutrality regulation is critical to the future of Internet access for businesses and micro-enterprises, as well as students, citizens and all domestic users – and therefore to the future mass adoption of the Internet of Things (IoT), cloud computing and Big Data. In this book I claim, as
the user from innovation. Thus it reduces the consumer’s welfare, statically and dynamically.’ 54 It concludes that: ‘For a vertically integrated IAP, a positive differentiation in favour of its own content is very similar to a specialised service.’ 55 This is an important conclusion, that SpS can in reality form a means of evading net neutrality regulations, while diverting traffic away from the
Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/HIS/?uri=celex: 52013PC0627 . c COM(2007) 698. d COM(2013) 627. e Madiega ( 2015 ). Trilogue agreement on net neutrality regulation 2015 Schaake and almost 200 other pro