shores of the wealthy by keeping those who suffer ‘over
there’. Whatever the reasons, the fact that international and local NGOs are heroically
working to deal with the consequences of disaster and conflict allows the deeper reasons for
inequities of power and money to go unchallenged. It performs the role of alibi, in other words,
for the political actors whose foreign-policychoices lie behind many of our major international
For example, for powerful states who had to navigate the end of the Cold War and the renewed
In the late 1990s Third Way governments were in power across Europe - and beyond, in the USA and Brazil, for instance. The Third Way experiment was one that attracted attention worldwide. The changes made by Left parties in Scandinavia, Holland, France or Italy since the late 1980s are as much part of Third Way politics as those developed in Anglo-Saxon countries. Since the early 1990s welfare reform has been at the heart of the Centre-Left's search for a new political middle way between post-war social democracy and Thatcherite Conservatism. For Tony Blair, welfare reform was key to establishing his New Labour credentials - just as it was for Bill Clinton and the New Democrats in the USA. Equality has been 'the polestar of the Left', and the redefinition of this concept by Giddens and New Labour marks a significant departure from post-war social democratic goals. The most useful way of approaching the problem of the Blair Government's 'Third Way' is to apply the term to its 'operational code': the precepts, assumptions and ideas that actually inform policy choice. The choice would be the strategy of public-private partnership (PPP) or the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), as applied to health policy. New Labour is deeply influenced by the thoughts and sentiments of Amitai Etzioni and the new communitarian movement. Repoliticisation is what stands out from all the contributions of reconstructing the Third Way along more progressive lines.
recent decline in US authority over global affairs has gradually led twenty-first-century American presidents to once again move from courting China to confronting and containing it. This increasingly demands the direct application of US hard power. In the 1950s and 1960s, US presidents depended largely on the army to implement their Pacific policies. From 2009 Obama made the US Navy the linchpin in his Asia Pacific strategy, a policychoice to which President Donald Trump from 2017 added more marine machismo.
This chapter argues that, as more than a foreign policy
the big Internet and data primes. Australia, as a US ally and middle power with a vital interest in the vanguard of high-tech advancement, is a willing partner but unsupported by indigenous capacity. Yet the more significant implications for Australia at a time of dynamic change in the international system arise from the tapering of Australian choices in and beyond the strategic setting, as it progressively integrates with US technologies and systems. Australia’s discomfort, which has also risen with the unpredictability of the Trump policychoices, is now more
Mobilising the concept of strategic culture, this study develops a framework for understanding developments in German security policy between 1990 and 2003. Germany's contemporary security policies are characterised by a peculiar mix of continuity and change. From abstention in the first Gulf war, to early peacekeeping missions in Bosnia in the early 1990s and a full combat role in Kosovo in 1999, the pace of change in German security policy since the end of the Cold War has been breathtaking. The extent of this change has recently, however, been questioned, as seen most vividly in Berlin's response to ‘9/11’ and its subsequent stalwart opposition to the US-led war on terrorism in Iraq in 2003. Beginning with a consideration of the notion of strategic culture, the study refines and adapts the concept to the case of Germany through a consideration of aspects of the rearmament of West Germany. It then critically evaluates the transformation of the role of the Bundeswehr up to and including the war on terrorism, together with Germany's troubled efforts to enact defence reforms, as well as the complex politics surrounding the policy of conscription. By focusing on both the ‘domestics’ of security policy decision making as well as the changing and often contradictory expectations of Germany's allies, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of the role played by Germany's particular strategic culture in shaping policy choices. It concludes by pointing to the vibrancy of Germany's strategic culture.
and the ways in which collective historical experiences, channelled through pervading values and norms, play a role in
deﬁning interests and thus shaping policychoices.
Reﬂecting on the critical junctures and ruptures that characterise
German history over the course of the past 100 years, the aptness of
Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd
Germany and the use of force
strategic culture to a consideration of contemporary security policy is
clear. The deleterious relationship that obtained between the military
and politics in
Germany, the use of force and the power of strategic culture
questions concerns identiﬁcation: what is German strategic culture? The second is about change: to what extent and in what form did
change in the external security environment after 1989–90 impact on
German strategic culture? The third relates to behaviour: in what ways
has strategic culture aﬀected behaviour and shaped policychoices?
Identifying Germany’s strategic culture
In identifying West Germany’s strategic culture I began by characterising its formative period, during which all previous values, beliefs and
practices regarding the use of force were rendered
(that is to say, without the
policy of specific interest) the policy is introduced and the consequences are
worked out given the model of the economy specified earlier. Those in the new
political economy school might also try to endogenize the policychoice itself,
by in turn modelling the policy and political process, the incentives of the
different players (interest groups). In this setting, the consequences of introducing a policy might be very different, since over and above how individuals,
households, etc., react to the policy is how the policy gets implemented
subsequently change its attitude to one of favouring the
‘legitimate’ government. The United States initially
favoured its (neo)colonialist allies, but over time adopted a position
closer to that favoured by the Third World. All other actors, to varying
degrees, had to redefine their stance. These contradictory preferences
were not, however, merely the policy ‘choices’ of
maximise their own interest. Policy-makers try
to ensure the policy outcome that is the most efficient translation of a
given set of interests or preferences. The assumption is that policy-makers
do this by assessing the costs and benefits of various possible policychoices and their possible outcomes in light of their preferences and
interests (March and Olsen 1998 ).
This approach has, explicitly or implicitly, dominated studies