Food agencies as an institutional response to
policyfailure by the UK and the EU
The UK public’s confidence in the quality of the modern food supply, and in
the governance of that supply, took a buffeting through a series of food safety
crises in the 1980s and 1990s. The much-quoted list ranged from pesticide
residues to salmonella in eggs, to BSE (which was estimated as a cost of over
£4 billion to the public purse) and E.coli 0157. The internal market of the EU
shared in some of those incidents
This book explores the new applications of established theories or adapts theoretical approaches in order to illuminate behaviour in the field of food. It focuses on social processes at the downstream end of the food chain, processes of distribution and consumption. The book reviews the existing disciplinary approaches to understanding judgements about food taste. It suggests that the quality 'halal' is the result of a social and economic consensus between the different generations and cultures of migrant Muslims as distinct from the non-Muslim majority. Food quality is to be viewed in terms of emergent cognitive paradigms sustained within food product networks that encompass a wide range of social actors with a wide variety of intermediaries, professional and governmental. The creation of the Food Standards Agency (FSA) and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) occurred at a juncture when perceptions of policy failure were acknowledged at United Kingdom and European Union governmental levels. The book presents a case study of retailer-led food governance in the UK to examine how different 'quality logics' actually collide in the competitive world of food consumption and production. It argues that concerns around food safety were provoked by the emergence of a new food aesthetic based on 'relationalism' and 'embeddedness'. The book also argues that the study of the arguments and discourses deployed to criticise or otherwise qualify consumption is important to the political morality of consumption.
Given the significant similarities and differences between the welfare states of Northern Europe and their reactions to the perceived 'refugee crisis' of 2015, the book focuses primarily on the three main cases of Denmark, Sweden and Germany. Placed in a wider Northern European context – and illustrated by those chapters that also discuss refugee experiences in Norway and the UK – the Danish, Swedish and German cases are the largest case studies of this edited volume. Thus, the book contributes to debates on the governance of non-citizens and the meaning of displacement, mobility and seeking asylum by providing interdisciplinary analyses of a largely overlooked region of the world, with two specific aims. First, we scrutinize the construction of the 2015 crisis as a response to the large influx of refugees, paying particular attention to the disciplinary discourses and bureaucratic structures that are associated with it. Second, we investigate refugees’ encounters with these bureaucratic structures and consider how these encounters shape hopes for building a new life after displacement. This allows us to show that the mobility of specific segments of the world’s population continues to be seen as a threat and a risk that has to be governed and controlled. Focusing on the Northern European context, our volume interrogates emerging policies and discourses as well as the lived experiences of bureaucratization from the perspective of individuals who find themselves the very objects of bureaucracies.
almost twenty years after it came down. The policyfailures of four generations ago continue to animate attitudes to policy today, and
underpin the stance of the Bundesbank and through it the stance of the European
Clearly, history matters, and it matters in important and interesting ways
for policy today. But it is not just actual events in the past. It is how they are
Bayly 04_Tonra 01 21/06/2011 10:20 Page 120
History, historians and development policy
recorded, interpreted and the interpretation transmitted, that matters. This is
happened in HercegBosna. Four conditions seem to contribute to such a diﬀusion of power owing to
A relatively restrained foreign intervention.
A tendency on the side of the interveners to address pre-existing political
structures (instead of appointing new ones) or to accept new political structures legitimised by ‘democratic’ elections.
A willingness on the side of the interveners to hold the representatives of the
local political structures responsible for certain policyfailures and human
A strong identity and a common
eyes and pretend that the system covers it.
Jan suggested that the cause of the problem was the result of a policyfailure
and a gap in social service provision. Yet the exclusion of people with precarious or no legal status from essential welfare services is, in this case, the
direct result of a law that purposely produces their destitution. As such,
this is nothing new; as argued by Könönen (2018, p. 53), immigration law
invalidates ‘the universalism of rights and a residence-based welfare system’.
Yet the minimum rights policies discussed in this chapter
proposals, i.e. to give a preliminary judgement as
to whether a proposal deserved to be developed by the Commission at all,
or whether it should be handed over to the national government.14
CoCoHAN was created after the trauma of Maastricht in 1992. It was felt
that the involvement of the very top-level civil servants would prevent
future policyfailures. Whereas CoCo consists of the heads of ministerial
EU units, the EU Director from the Foreign Affairs Ministry and a representative of the Dutch Permanent Representation, CoCoHAN involves the
secretary-generals of all the
one-and-a-half model also
visible here (Sainsbury, 1999).
Is the ambiguous record of social democracy due to relatively simple
policyfailures that await rectification? Or might those policies be perfectly
consistent with the productivist logic that underpins them?2 Productivist
logic demands either lots of waged breadwinning or lots of unwaged caregiving (or preferably both): the former facilitates economic growth, since
improvements in output are easier to achieve through formal activity; the
latter is consistent with economic growth so long as employment levels
Potentials of disorder in the Caucasus and Yugoslavia
Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher
-Bosna is such a case. External ‘soft’ intervention contributes to a diﬀusion of power, when four conditions are met: the external intervention is relatively restrained; the interveners target pre-existing political
structures instead of appointing new ones; there is a willingness on the side of the
interveners to hold the representatives of the local political structures responsible
for certain policyfailures and human rights abuses; and there is a strong common
sentiment among the recipients of the foreign intervention that the aims of the
intervention are not just
close to being a policyfailure, it has, nevertheless, also been a
remarkable sign of international ‘actorness’ on the part of the
EU, with the Union functioning for three years as the primary external
crisis manager (Owen 1995 ;
Jørgensen 1996 ). This
involvement also tells us something about the aspirations of policy-makers
concerning the international role of the European Union.
Sixth, Europe has