This book deals with the institutional framework in post-socialist, after-empire spaces. It consists of nine case studies and two contributions of a more theoretical nature. Each of these analytical narratives sheds some light on the micro-politics of organised violence. After 1990, Serbs and Croats were competing over access to the resources needed for institution building and state building. Fear in turn triggered ethnic mobilisation. An 'unprofessional' riot of Serbs in the Krajina region developed into a professional war between Serbs and Croats in Croatia, in which several thousand died and several hundred thousand people were forcefully expelled from their homes. The Herceg-Bosnian style of resistance can be surprisingly effective. It is known that most of the heroin transported along the Balkans route passes through the hands of Albanian mafia groups; that this traffic has taken off since summer 1999. The concept of Staatnation is based on the doctrine according to which each 'nation' must have its own territorial State and each State must consist of one 'nation' only. The slow decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet and the Yugoslav empires was partly triggered, partly accompanied by the quest for national sovereignty. Dagestan is notable for its ethnic diversity and, even by post-Soviet standards, its dramatic economic deprivation. The integrative potential of cooperative movements at the republican, the regional and the inter-state level for the Caucasus is analyzed. The book also offers insights into the economics of ending violence. Finally, it addresses the question of reconciliation after ethnic cleansing.
socialist empires forced the societies of the post-socialist spaces to redeﬁne the most basic institutions that govern social life. They had, in short, to embark upon a process of competitive and contested polity building. All the societies of the collapsed empires faced this challenge. Not all societies, however, managed to ﬁnd a non-violent solution. Those administrative units of the collapsing empires with a multi-ethnical population faced particular problems: the ambitions and fears of two or more ethnic groups had to be O 1 Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher
state, the risk of social fragmentation is lower than when elites invent new institutions, such as round tables, popular fronts, or national congresses. For example, the communist apparatchik Milosevic rose by taking over the organisational potential of the Serbian Communist Party and reusing it for his nationalist agenda. The key to his ‘success’ was combining two central resources of post-socialist spaces, namely the mobilising power of ethnicity and the organisational power of party structures. The price for Serbia’s 248 Institutions and the organisation of