This book offers a critical survey of religious change and its causes in eighteenth-century Europe, and constitutes a challenge to the accepted views in traditional Enlightenment studies. Focusing on Enlightenment Italy, France and England, it illustrates how the canonical view of eighteenth-century religious change has in reality been constructed upon scant evidence and assumption, in particular the idea that the thought of the enlightened led to modernity. For, despite a lack of evidence, one of the fundamental assumptions of Enlightenment studies has been the assertion that there was a vibrant Deist movement which formed the “intellectual solvent” of the eighteenth century. The central claim of this book is that the immense ideological appeal of the traditional birth-of-modernity myth has meant that the actual lack of Deists has been glossed over, and a quite misleading historical view has become entrenched.
The book knits together two of the most significant themes in the social and cultural history of modern Ireland - mass emigration and religious change - and aims to provide fresh insight into both. It addresses the churches' responses to emigration, both in theory and in practice. The book also assesses how emigration impacted on the churches both in relation to their status in Ireland, and in terms of their ability to spread their influence abroad. It first deals with the theoretical positions of the clergy of each denomination in relation to emigration and how they changed over the course of the nineteenth century, as the character of emigration itself altered. It then explores the extent of practical clerical involvement in the temporal aspects of emigration. This includes attempts to prevent or limit it, a variety of facilitation services informally offered by parish clergymen, church-backed moves to safeguard emigrant welfare, clerical advice-giving and clerically planned schemes of migration. Irish monks between the fifth and eighth centuries had spread Christianity all over Europe, and should act as an inspiration to the modern cleric. Tied in with this reading of the past, of course, was a very particular view of the present: the perception that emigration represented the enactment of a providential mission to spread the faith.
their present to the past,
forging intellectual time-lines and traditions where none really
The following series of discussions represents an attempt to
review some of the causes and contexts of religiouschange in Enlightenment Italy, France and England. Although to a degree different from each other in content and objective, the aim of the case
studies is to illustrate how the notion that the Enlightenment
founded ‘modernity’ has led to significant distortions in our understanding of religious and intellectual change. I wish to assert the
Enlightenments. What, then, was the relationship between the
development of Enlightenment thinking on religion and the
political realities of the peninsula?
Two facts stand out above all others: the centrality of Rome to
religiouschange and the evident decline in the international and
peninsular influence of Rome. Rome was now perceived by Italian
sovereigns as less capable of rallying extra-peninsular support to its
defence, and so it is unthinkable that – regardless of whether the
Enlightenment ever arrived or not – sovereigns would not seize the
pretence of Religion, were only grasping at Power’. As a consequence, he explained,
some gentlemen refused to countenance both parties.28 Such letters
are of limited value as evidence of religious reality – and certainly
not for the existence of a deist movement or real religiouschange.
After all, we know that clerics were prone to overstating the case for
their own ends. Yet this letter has been cited as important evidence
of the ‘transformation of the Puritan into a whig’, that in the transition to Whiggism the religious polity of presbyterianism was abandoned for a
By expanding the geographical scope of the history of violence and war, this
volume challenges both Western and state-centric narratives of the decline of
violence and its relationship to modernity. It highlights instead similarities
across early modernity in terms of representations, legitimations, applications
of, and motivations for violence. It seeks to integrate methodologies of the
study of violence into the history of war, thereby extending the historical
significance of both fields of research. Thirteen case studies outline the
myriad ways in which large-scale violence was understood and used by states and
non-state actors throughout the early modern period across Africa, Asia, the
Americas, the Atlantic, and Europe, demonstrating that it was far more complex
than would be suggested by simple narratives of conquest and resistance.
Moreover, key features of imperial violence apply equally to large-scale
violence within societies. As the authors argue, violence was a continuum,
ranging from small-scale, local actions to full-blown war. The latter was
privileged legally and increasingly associated with states during early
modernity, but its legitimacy was frequently contested and many of its violent
forms, such as raiding and destruction of buildings and crops, could be found in
activities not officially classed as war.
In May 1958, and four years into the Algerian War of Independence, a revolt again appropriated the revolutionary and republican symbolism of the French Revolution by seizing power through a Committee of Public Safety. This book explores why a repressive colonial system that had for over a century maintained the material and intellectual backwardness of Algerian women now turned to an extensive programme of 'emancipation'. After a brief background sketch of the situation of Algerian women during the post-war decade, it discusses the various factors contributed to the emergence of the first significant women's organisations in the main urban centres. It was only after the outbreak of the rebellion in 1954 and the arrival of many hundreds of wives of army officers that the model of female interventionism became dramatically activated. The French military intervention in Algeria during 1954-1962 derived its force from the Orientalist current in European colonialism and also seemed to foreshadow the revival of global Islamophobia after 1979 and the eventual moves to 'liberate' Muslim societies by US-led neo-imperialism in Afghanistan and Iraq. For the women of Bordj Okhriss, as throughout Algeria, the French army represented a dangerous and powerful force associated with mass destruction, brutality and rape. The central contradiction facing the mobile socio-medical teams teams was how to gain the trust of Algerian women and to bring them social progress and emancipation when they themselves were part of an army that had destroyed their villages and driven them into refugee camps.
that we realize that protagonists of the Enlightenment often
thought in this manner. It does not, however, oblige historians to
use the reasoning of the philosophes as a predicate to their own
research on the question of public opinion in religiouschange. The
distinction of the philosophes between the rude masses and the enlightened again implicitly raises the question of whether historians
can locate any fruitful dividing line between the enlightened and
non-enlightened. As we have seen, finding such a dividing line is
very problematic indeed, simply because we now
religiouschange has been relatively neglected because it
manifested itself in a traditional early modern politico-religious
form, rather than in the ‘modernizing’ language of the philosophes.
That the philosophes have been granted the credit for achievements
that were not theirs is not really suprising. They themselves were
prone to claim credit for victories of others against the establishment, even if – as in the suppression of the Jesuits in France – these
were in fact victories for one wing of Catholicism against another.
This circumstance cannot, however, form any
are viewed in
relation to each other. The type of diocesan histories undertaken by scholars as
diverse as Robert Sauzet, Keith Luria and Bernard Peyrous provide a more
realistic picture of religiouschange within France during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries; resistance to episcopal discipline has been shown to be
almost as common as acquiescence and, as both Sauzet and Luria demonstrate,
the contrasting personalities and approaches of prelates often had a significant
impact on the path of reform.10 Pierre Scarron of Grenoble adopted a very