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José Luís Fiori

Introduction This strategy is guided by principled realism. It is realist because it acknowledges the central role of power in international politics, affirms that sovereign states are the best hope for a peaceful world, and clearly defines our national interests… We are also realistic and understand that the American way of life cannot be imposed upon others, nor is it the inevitable culmination of progress . The White House, ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ ( The White House, 2017

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
Editor’s Introduction
Juliano Fiori

limited to operating in countries under Western tutelage, but even those inspired by anti-communism were cautious about structural integration into Western security strategies. At the beginning of the 1990s, NGOs shrugged off their scepticism for the morality of state power, working more closely with Western military forces. Private and government funding for humanitarian operations increased. With the help of news media, humanitarian agencies boosted their political capital, presenting themselves as providers of public moral conscience for the

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
Staff Security and Civilian Protection in the Humanitarian Sector
Miriam Bradley

the differences between the two fields of practice. This article also builds on academic literature on the negative impacts of existing staff-security strategies on humanitarian action and on the limits of humanitarian approaches to the protection of civilians (see, for example, Bradley, 2016 ; Duffield, 2012 ; Fast, 2014 ; Ferris, 2011 ). However, even this more critical literature almost invariably focuses either on aid workers or on the wider

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
The Law and Politics of Responding to Attacks against Aid Workers
Julia Brooks
and
Rob Grace

security strategy’, ‘using the local community to be our protection’, and ‘rely[ing] so heavily on explaining who we are, and what we stand for, and how we work, and how decisions are made, and that’s the embodiment of humanitarian principles’. Approaches rooted in ‘protection’ tend to be seen as a necessary evil of security management, to be employed in particularly volatile environments when other approaches appear infeasible or ineffective. Furthermore, creating physical barriers between humanitarian actors and their operational environment can even hinder

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
Obama, Trump and the Asia Pacific political economy
Michael Mastanduno

international order informed by US values and interests. 3 The Trump administration is the first in the post-war era to question explicitly the desirability of America’s hegemonic aspiration and the durability of its hegemonic role. Its “America First” rhetoric and objectives signal a preference to depart from order maintenance in favour of the more transactional politics of the balance of power. Its National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2017 explicitly casts China and Russia as competitors, rather than as potential partners in the US hegemonic project. Strategic

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Obama’s legacy in US China Policy
Peter Gries

basked in the spectacle, and rewarded Xi by avoiding sensitive issues like human rights, press freedom, and even the American jobs he had promised to defend during his election campaign. Many Chinese lauded Xi’s triumph. ‘The leader of the world’s number one power has just made a pilgrimage to him’, Shanghai pundit Chen Daoyin gloated, ‘this is naturally how all Chinese people will see it’. 47 Just a month later, however, Trump’s first National Security Strategy (NSS) described China as ‘challenging American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Open Access (free)
An endangered legacy
Matteo Dian

National Security Council, modelled on the American example; the approval of a state secrecy law which allowed enhanced intelligence-sharing with the United States and other friendly countries; the reform of arms export principles that allowed Japan to jointly develop weapon systems with the United States and allies; and the release of the first ever National Security Strategy for Japan. The most consequential step for the alliance, however, was the re-interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution which allows Japan to perform “collective self-defence”. This

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Washington’s painful search for a credible China policy
Börje Ljunggren

eroded ‘in every domain of warfare’, concluding that ‘Great power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of US national security.’ 26 The 2017 National Security Strategy echoed this view, describing China (and Russia) as a competitor, which is ‘trying to erode American security and prosperity’. In this world reduced to a state of ‘great-power competition’, countries pursue their national interests without any commitment to creating a better world. 27 Across its first two years, the strategic response to these challenges by the Trump administration has

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Oliver Turner

’s first US National Security Strategy (NSS), for example, pledged to ‘rebuild our military, defend our borders, protect our sovereignty, and advance our values’. 48 It argues not simply that China (alongside Russia) is a material competitor, but a ‘revisionist’ nation looking ‘to shape a world antithetical to US values and interests’. With China promoting authoritarianism and expanding its state-centric economic model, it explains, ‘a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region’. Just like the

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Robert Sutter

Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS). 11 However, they were implemented along with concurrent high-level negotiations with China to reach a compromise over trade and other economic differences. 12 There was considerable domestic support, notably in Congress, for the new President’s security plans which were generally in line with the priorities of Republican congressional leaders stressing the need to reinforce the American military presence in the region. The omnibus spending bill signed by the President in March 2018 included the first

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific